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This thesis examines the theoretical and empirical relationship between modes 
of governance and public service efficiency. We argue that different modes of 
governance yield different levels of efficiency depending on the nature and scale of 
the transactions upon which they are deployed. The experience of OECD countries is 
used to examine the effects of different modes of governance on the efficiency of 
education, health, and social protection systems. 
In the education sector, the share of public providers is found to exert a 
negative effect on efficiency whereas the degree of decentralisation of the decision-
making procedures of public providers is found to exert a positive effect on 
efficiency. 
In the health sector, the introduction of market-type mechanisms to public 
integrated health systems is shown to have positive effects on efficiency, whereas 
further movement towards a market model of health care insurance and provision is 
shown to depress efficiency.    
In the social protection sector, we conclude that as public social security 
systems exceed their remit to assist individuals smooth their income across the life 
cycle and/or states of nature and to provide basic social safety nets to the destitute, the 
efficiency of social transfers in reducing poverty is damaged. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1  
 This thesis examines the theoretical and empirical relationship between modes 
of governance and public service efficiency.  There has been much debate in the 
political science and public management literature on the governance of public 
services, but relatively little conceptual or empirical work on the relationship between 
governance and efficiency.  The economics literature, in contrast, has developed 
complex theoretical frameworks for understanding the nature of this relationship, and 
sophisticated methodologies for measuring efficiency. However, it still lacks a unified 
theoretical framework, and progress is yet to be made in investigating the empirical 
link between public service governance and efficiency. This thesis makes a 
contribution by bridging this gap.  First, it brings together new institutional economic 
(NIE) theories of organisation and resource-based/evolutionary perspectives of the 
firm to clarify the nature of the relationship between governance and efficiency. 
Second, it draws on the experience of OECD countries operating similar services 
under different organisational configurations as a laboratory of inquiry to establish the 
impact of different modes of governance on public service efficiency. 
The importance of public service efficiency cannot be overstated. Public 
service efficiency affects economic performance through two different channels: (i) 
via productivity changes in the public sector itself, and (ii) via effects on the private 
sector. Public services are responsible for a large proportion of the overall output of 
an economy. Public service productivity (and efficiency1) is therefore an important 
driver of average productivity nationwide. Furthermore, the organisation and 
functioning of public services also affects productivity in the private sector. On the 
one hand, taxes required to fund public services distort relative prices in the economy 
influencing economic incentives, namely the willingness to work and invest. On the 
other hand, goods and services such as education, health, and social protection are 
known to have a positive influence on the development of economic activity2. The 
extent to which public expenditure has positive growth effects through this second 
channel depends not only on the size of public expenditure but also on the efficiency 
of public expenditure. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, there has been a growing concern amongst 
most developed nations with the potentially negative consequences of a rising trend of 
government expenditure and taxation. This concern has prompted widespread 
                                                 
1 One of the components of productivity. 
2 See Afonso, Ebert, Schuknecht and Thone (2005) for a good review of this literature. 
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 adoption of various initiatives aimed at curbing the enlargement of the public sector, 
or at least bringing its growth to a halt (Joumard, 2002). The need to scale down the 
size of government and increase the efficiency of government activity has also raised 
an important question: How can policy influence efficiency? what is the relationship 
between governance and efficiency? This question is the key driver of the work 
presented in this thesis. 
Our main theoretical assertion, rooted in a combination of new institutional 
economic theories of organisation and resource-based/evolutionary perspectives of the 
firm, is that different modes of governance yield different levels of efficiency 
depending on the nature and scale of the transactions upon which they are deployed. 
Thus the impact of different governance/organisational arrangements (including 
different degrees of public sector interference) on efficiency depends on the specific 
characteristics of the service/activity under consideration.  
Our subsidiary research hypothesis is that improving the efficiency of 
government activity implies that (i) governments retreat from interfering with 
transactions that do not exhibit the kind of attributes that call for public central 
coordination; (ii) when public central coordination is required (e.g. education, health, 
and social security), it should be confined to the specific attributes of transactions that 
markets fail to address (public good attributes, merit good attributes, externalities, 
and/or information asymmetries), and in a way that explicitly acknowledges the risks 
of government failure. This implies (amongst other things) that once a given optimal 
structure of provision is defined, the units (public or private) that deliver the 
service/activity should be managerially decentralised/autonomous.  
The first part of the thesis (chapters 2, 3, and 4) examines the relationship 
between governance and efficiency. The political science and economic literature on 
governance and efficiency is reviewed, the framework that underpins our main 
theoretical assertion is presented, and the research hypothesis is formulated.    
The second part of the thesis (chapters 5, 6, and 7) draws on the international 
public sector reform experience to test empirically the research hypothesis in the 
context of three key areas of the welfare state - education, health, and social 
protection.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews the most significant contributions of political science and 
economics to understanding governance and its relationship with efficiency. 
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 Governance is an eclectic term deployed in various contexts with diverse and often 
contradictory meanings. In the political science literature the terms governance and 
modes of governance have been broadly used to refer to the steering and coordination 
of interdependent actors based on institutionalised rule systems (Benz, 2004). In the 
economics literature, modes of governance are seen as forms through which order is 
achieved and sustained in economic and social life. The most traditional and well 
established economic theories of organisation are rooted in NIE (including transaction 
costs economics and property rights theory). Other competing explanations of 
organisation are resource-based/evolutionary perspectives of the firm. Serious 
divergences divide these alternative explanations, and an integrated economic theory 
of organisation is still missing. 
In the most conventional approach to economic organisation, governance is 
conceptualized as “the means by which to infuse order, thereby to mitigate contractual 
hazards and realize mutual gains from trade…[i.e.] the deployment of alternative 
modes of governance among differing transactions with the purpose of economizing 
on transaction costs” (Williamson, 2004, p.0). Modes of governance in turn are 
understood as institutional arrangements within which a transaction or set of related 
transactions are decided upon and implemented (Ménard, 2005)3. In this context, 
firms are seen as an instance of market failure - legal, contractual entities, owners of 
physical assets providing investment incentives and facilitating the resolution of hold-
up problems. 
The capabilities perspective, resource or competence based view of the firm is 
an alternative conception of economic organisation that sees the problem of economic 
coordination as an attempt to find integration mechanisms that sustain the division of 
labour amongst agents with incomplete, dispersed and disparate knowledge and help 
create and test new knowledge (Piore, 1992; Loasby, 1998a, 1998b; Kogut, 2000). 
Firms are conceived of as a bundle of essentially tacit “capabilities”, shared by the 
human assets that comprise it. The boundaries of the firm are “partly determined by 
the differential between the capabilities they hold in relation to potential supplies and 
the relative costs of developing capabilities internally against accessing them via non-
hierarchical means” (Araujo et al., 2003, p.1263). Opportunism and threats of hold-up 
                                                 
3 Recently Williamson defined a governance structure as “the institutional matrix in which the integrity 
of the transaction is decided” (Williamson, 1996, p.378). 
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 are part of the calculus of deciding which is the most cost-effective way to access 
capabilities (Barney, 1999). 
NIE deviates from the standard neoclassical assumptions regarding perfect 
information, unbounded rationality, and costless/instantaneous transactions. 
Incomplete information and limited mental capacity makes individuals face 
uncertainty about future events and incur transaction costs. To reduce risk and 
transaction costs individuals create institutions and develop modes of organisation 
embedded in those institutions (Ménard and Shirley, 2005). Markets, firms and 
hybrids are the archetypes of organisation, and the second half of the chapter is 
devoted to reviewing individually the NIE literature on these three modes of 
governance.  
The study of the internal characteristics of hierarchies and their costs by new 
institutional economists remains an underdeveloped area. Whether or not the 
transaction costs apparatus is helpful for understanding the fundamental 
characteristics of the different modes of governance that determine their comparative 
efficiency in coordinating different kinds of transactions is the subject of controversy. 
Some authors argue that transaction costs concern exclusively market exchanges, and 
that the analysis of administrative/bureaucratic costs requires employing other 
research tools (Demsetz, 1988a; 2002). Other authors lay emphasis on the need to 
better identify the costs involved in the trade-off among the different organisational 
arrangements (Masten et al., 1991; Joskow, 2005). 
Following Hayek’s seminal distinction between spontaneous self generating 
order and organized (“made”) order we argue that economic organisation is 
essentially about bringing order into systems of human interaction. Order can be 
accomplished through a multitude of modes of governance, ranging from conscious 
deliberate design to spontaneous self-reinforcing rules. Each of these modes of 
governance entails costs of coordination that vary with the attributes of the 
transactions upon which they are deployed. Minimising these costs is the main 
problem of economic organisation. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework and research hypotheses on the 
relationship between governance and efficiency that are empirically tested in the 
second part of the thesis. 
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 Economic organisation is about bringing order into systems of human 
interaction. Order can be accomplished through a multitude of modes of governance, 
a continuum ranging from markets to hierarchies, i.e. from conscious deliberate 
design to spontaneous self-reinforcing rules aggregating elementary actions guided 
only by individual criteria of interest. 
Achieving efficiency in the coordination and motivation of the decisions and 
actions of producers and consumers depends on how the information required for 
optimal allocation of resources and subsequent adaptations is managed. In theory two 
general solutions are feasible. Either transmit the dispersed information to a central 
planner who is then left with the task of computing the data and providing a solution 
to the resource-allocation problem, or else put in place a more decentralised system 
that involves less information transmission, delegating at least part of the decisional 
power to those who actually hold local information. 
Different modes of governance yield different levels of efficiency depending 
on the nature and scale of the transactions upon which they are deployed. In other 
words, different modes of governance entail different costs in coordinating 
transactions, and these costs should be the decisive criterion to determine which 
transactions ought to be coordinated through markets and which should instead be 
centrally coordinated. 
On the one hand, no system can solve the problem of coordinating economic 
activity at the societal level more efficiently than a system of markets (Arrow and 
Debreu, 1954). The price mechanism requires the transmission of less information 
than any other system capable of producing an equally effective outcome. Individuals 
and organisations acting on a self-interested basis, combining their local knowledge 
with the information synthesised by prices, and attempting to maximise their utilities 
and profits are motivated to carry out a plan that will lead them to an efficient 
outcome. 
On the other hand, decentralised coordination of transactions with design 
and/or innovation attributes (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) is sub-optimal due to the 
brittleness of the system in dealing with imperfect information and excessive demands 
in terms of communication. The quest for efficiency leads these types of transactions 
to be coordinated through formal organisations structured along hierarchical lines. 
Decentralised coordination of transactions with public good attributes, externalities, 
merit good attributes, and/or information asymmetries is also sub-optimal and leads 
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 perfectly competitive markets to produce inefficient outcomes. Under these 
circumstances, public central coordination is required to deal with these particular 
features of transactions and to generate an efficient allocation of resources. 
The case for public central coordination needs to be balanced with the 
idiosyncratic limitations of public bureaucracies and the political process. An 
imperfect market must be compared with an imperfect government. The relevant 
choice is not so much between an ideal norm (pure and perfect competition) and an 
existing imperfect institutional arrangement (the “real” market), but rather between 
alternative real and imperfect institutional arrangements (the market with or without 
external corrections). Numerous characteristics specific to political bureaucracies 
hinder the efficiency of governmental coordination. These need to be taken into 
account when calls for public central coordination are being made (Stiglitz, 2000). 
Furthermore, in seeking to improve efficiency, individuals have kept forging 
innovative hybrid governance arrangements resting on intermediate levels of 
(de)centralisation of information, in between the two extremes defined by fully 
decentralised organisational systems entirely driven by market forces on the one hand, 
and fully centralised hierarchical/bureaucratic authority-driven organisations on the 
other. Alliance/network modes of governance are one specific example of such hybrid 
arrangements. 
The structure and efficiency of public expenditure mediate the relationship 
between government size and economic performance. Apart from being limited to a 
set of core activities, and confined to certain levels, public expenditure needs to be 
efficiently administered if it is to have a positive effect on economic growth. Based on 
the theoretical framework exposed in chapter 3, we hypothesise that maximizing 
efficiency implies that (i) governments retreat from interfering with transactions that 
do not exhibit the kind of attributes that call for public central coordination; and (ii) 
when public central coordination is required (e.g. education, health, and social 
security), it should be confined to the specific attributes of transactions that markets 
fail to address (public good attributes, merit good attributes, externalities, and/or 
information asymmetries), and in a way that explicitly acknowledges the risks of 
government failure. Based on these two premises, managerial 
decentralisation/autonomy of delivery units is hypothesised to have a positive impact 
on efficiency.  
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 Chapter 4 presents the methodological issues involved in the measurement of 
public service efficiency. These arise in three sequential stages. First, when inputs and 
outputs are defined and measured. Second, when the set of feasible input-output 
combinations is estimated (i.e. the production/efficiency function/frontier). Finally, in 
comparing actual input-output combinations with feasible input-output combinations. 
With regards to the estimation of the production frontier, research has diverged into 
two streams, with economists typically following the route of statistical analysis and 
management scientists typically opting for a non-parametric route grounded in linear 
programming. Four sub-sections are devoted to presenting the most important 
methodologies associated with each of these streams (Data Envelopment Analysis; 
Free Disposable Hull; and Stochastic Frontier Analysis) and discuss their relative 
flaws and merits. 
The second half of the chapter concentrates on the specific methodological 
issues of measuring public service efficiency. Public services are normally provided 
free of charge (or at subsidised prices) at the point of delivery, which brings 
significant obstacles to the determination of their societal value and consequently to 
the aggregation of their output. Public service inputs normally pose fewer problems, 
insofar as they are purchased in competitive markets, and prices are available for 
determining their relative value (just as in the case of the private sector). In addition to 
problems in defining and measuring public service outputs and inputs, public service 
efficiency measurements are sensitive to the specific set of methodological choices 
adopted in the estimation of the productive frontier. Smith and Street (2005) lay 
emphasis on the consequences of four of these choices: the choice between a 
parametric or non-parametric approach to the estimation of the production frontier 
imposes distinct assumptions on output weights; decisions on the specification of the 
production process are likely to have an important impact on the efficiency estimates; 
the set of environmental variables to be included in the model, as well as the way in 
which these variables are controlled for is contentious irrespective of the particular 
approach adopted for the estimation of the frontier; finally, although allowing for 
dynamic effects in modelling the production process drastically increases complexity, 
this should be done whenever possible and the consequences of its disregard should 
be made explicitly from the outset. 
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 In the second part of the thesis (chapters 5, 6, and 7) we draw on the 
experience of OECD countries in the providing education, health and social protection 
services for testing our research hypothesis. Education, health, and social protection 
are not only the core functions of the welfare state, but also the areas where reforms 
advanced the most and where the most audacious initiatives at reformulating the role 
of the public sector took place. The three services alone account for an average of 
roughly 60% of public expenditure in OECD countries (28% of GDP). Efficiency in 
the provision of these services is thus crucial to the overall efficiency of the public 
sector and to economic performance. 
 
Chapter 5 tests our research hypothesis in the context of primary and 
secondary education. 
Government involvement in the education sector is justified on the basis of 
externalities, market failures in general, and redistributive motives (Hanushek, 2002). 
There is a consensual sense that education involves substantial externalities (Cohn 
and Geske, 1990) through a variety of paths - citizen involvement in the community 
and government, crime reduction, family decision making and child upbringing, and 
economic growth. Governments may allow for these external effects and help 
individuals bring their decisions in line with the appropriate social calculus. Capital 
market and information imperfections are other types of market failures that may 
require government intervention. If individuals cannot barrow against their human 
capital, they may be forced to underinvest in education (Becker, 1993). Also, if 
informational problems prevent individuals from accurately assessing the influence of 
schools on their performance4, they may be unable to make optimal human capital 
investment decisions. In both instances government interference can remove/mitigate 
the hindrances to efficient individual decision-making. The remaining argument for 
government involvement in education is usually entrenched in the desire to change the 
prevailing distribution of income (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993). 
While these attributes may be legitimately invoked to justify government 
involvement in education, none of them provides for extensive public funding of 
education or direct public provision of education services. Externalities and capital 
market imperfections lead to sub-optimal investment on education. Public funding is 
                                                 
4 Apart from school inputs, student performance is generally affected by a mixture of student innate 
ability and a range of environmental factors (namely the family socio-economic background). 
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 therefore required to motivate individuals to investment more on education, but this is 
likely to be residual. Using the education system as a redistributive mechanism also 
implies that a certain (residual) share of the system by publicly funded. Information 
imperfections, on the other hand, bring the need for government action to facilitate 
information, but have no implications for the funding or the provision of the service. 
Therefore, confining government interference to the attributes of education 
that call for public central coordination (externalities, market failures in general, and 
redistributive motives) provides for (some) government involvement in funding, but 
not necessarily in the provision of education services. It further suggests that when 
government directly provides the service through publicly owned and managed 
schools, these be allowed to operate on an essentially decentralised manner, in line 
with the incentives that guide privately managed schools. 
We measure primary and secondary education efficiency through a stochastic 
frontier for an unbalanced data panel of 18 OECD countries in 2000 and 2003. The 
organisational structure of education systems is explored through two analytical 
components: the share of public/private providers in the system and the degree of 
decentralisation of decision-making procedures of public providers. The share of 
public providers is found to exert a negative effect on efficiency whereas the degree 
of decentralisation of the decision-making procedures of public providers is found to 
exert a positive effect on efficiency. Both results corroborate our research hypothesis. 
 
Chapter 6 examines our research hypothesis in the context of health care 
services. Governments can be involved in the health sector in various ways, the most 
significant of which is in guaranteeing that the entire population is protected against 
the financial risks of sickness and medical treatment. The second most significant role 
is in the provision of medical services, by owning and operating medical care 
providers. 
The way health services are financed plays a critical role in the design of their 
optimal mode of governance. An adequately financed health system should ensure 
universal financial protection. It should avoid exposing individuals to large 
unexpected expenses, relying as fully as possible on predictable prepayment 
(insurance) and minimising the share of out-of-pocket funding. It should also 
effectively pool the financial risks of healthy and sick individuals. Problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection prevent free competitive insurance markets from 
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 achieving these goals efficiently, which prompts extensive government intervention in 
the funding of health care. This result motivates our first sub-hypothesis regarding the 
effect of health organisational structure on efficiency: modes of governance based on 
direct, short-term market interactions between patients and providers, or relying 
mainly on unregulated private insurance are expected to be relatively inefficient.  
At the service provision level, the combination of profit-maximisation with 
imperfect information propagates perverse incentives that lead competitive markets to 
failure. Public hierarchical modes of governance have the advantage of lacking a 
profit-maximising motif, and enabling greater political control over health service 
delivery, ensuring that transactions respect given priorities among interventions and 
patients. However, if the public sector holds the monopoly of health care provision it 
will lack competitive incentives for efficiency and innovation, which will tend to be 
aggravated by the characteristic rigidities of public hierarchical organisations 
reflected in the vested interests of bureaucrats and limited adaptability capacity to 
changing priorities and strategic orientations. This in turn leads to our second sub-
hypothesis: modes of governance that combine public and private provision and that 
integrate market-type mechanisms into the operation of the public sector are expected 
to counteract the perverse incentives of pure profit maximisation, the monopolistic 
and bureaucratic failures of exclusive public provision, and to maximise efficiency.   
Therefore, contrary to the education sector, confining government interference 
to the attributes of health transactions that call for public central coordination (mainly 
information imperfections) provides for extensive government involvement in health 
funding/insurance, and simultaneously significant involvement in the provision of 
services. On the other hand, and as in the case of education, it also suggests that 
public health care providers should be given sufficient autonomy to explore the 
benefits of decentralised coordination, and should be made to operate in an 
environment open to competitive forces. 
OECD countries have recently introduced substantial reforms to the 
organisational structure of their health services, in an attempt to stimulate innovation 
and flexibility in the way health systems respond to political priorities. These reforms 
have included experimenting with market-inspired mechanisms in the internal 
operation of public health care providers and in their interaction with private 
providers. We draw on the reform experience of 23 OECD countries to test the effect 
of health modes of governance on efficiency. The results corroborate our two sub-
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 hypothesis by showing that the introduction of market-type mechanisms to public 
integrated health systems has a positive effect on efficiency, whereas further 
movement towards a market model of health care insurance and provision (public 
contract, and private insurance/provider models) reduces efficiency.    
    
Chapter 7 examines the effect of modes of governance on the efficiency of 
social protection systems in reducing poverty. 
Free social insurance markets are prone to failures: imperfect knowledge in 
capital and insurance markets give rise to moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems; general economic instability, and inflation in particular, create uncertainty 
about the size of future claims making it difficult/impossible to set a realistic price for 
the insurance; most social risks are correlated in time, which implies that the 
aggregate risk cannot be solved by pooling the individual risks; finally, individuals 
tend to be sub-optimally provident, by short-sightedness or by deliberate strategic 
behaviour.  
Public social security systems can overcome some of these obstacles and assist 
individuals with the process of smoothing income across the life cycle (such as in the 
case of old age pensions) or across states of nature (such as in the case of 
unemployment benefits). Government intervention is also required at a residual level, 
as a means of last resort, providing a social safety net to those whose total income 
over the entire life-cycle is insufficient to sustain an adequate living standard5. 
The efficiency of public social protection systems is an essentially neglected 
issue in the academic literature. The purpose of this chapter is to estimate formally the 
efficiency of social protection systems and to investigate its causes. To do so we 
estimate a stochastic efficiency frontier for public non-pension social transfers in 19 
OECD countries using panel data from the mid-1990s and the year 2000. The 
targeting of transfers towards the bottom deciles of the working age population is the 
key explanatory variable of efficiency and its effect is estimated together with 
efficiency itself in a single-stage procedure. 
                                                 
5 In this case, income is redistributed in a way that is not actuarially linked to the contributions made to 
the system by the recipient.  
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 In addition to measuring and explaining efficiency, we use our results to test a 
common claim of two different strands of literature6 which suggests that there is a 
trade-off between the size of transfers and their targeting. 
The first posits that when social transfers become very large they “tend” to be 
poorly targeted due to the activity of pressure groups and the progressive 
universalization of the entitlement to social benefits irrespective of means-testing 
(Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1997a, 2000). Our results do not corroborate this argument. 
Both the correlation between the size of social transfers and their degree of targeting 
towards the poor as well as the correlation between the size of social transfers and the 
our efficiency estimates are non significant. Hence, according to these results size is 
not linked to targeting or to efficiency - there is no trade-off. 
The second argument asserts that the size-targeting trade-off stems from the 
political process. In the long run, focusing on the improvement of the targeting of 
transfers is said to be likely to reduce the total amount of resources available for 
redistribution and to have an overall negative impact on poverty alleviation (Korpi, 
1983; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Mahler and Jesuit, 2004; Nelson, 2004). The size of 
highly targeted programs is said to be limited by the lack of political power of their 
main supporters (the poor), whereas social programs with extensive coverage are 
expected to capture support from a much more powerful political base (Korpi, 1983). 
Our results do not corroborate this argument either. Firstly, our evidence does not 
support the notion of a size-targeting trade-off. Secondly, we find no evidence of a 
link between the targeting of transfers and poverty alleviation. 
After measuring efficiency and tracing it back to the targeting of transfers, we 
investigate the governance arrangements that lead different social protection systems 
to achieve different targeting patterns. Drawing on Kraus’ (2004) organisational 
typology of modern social security systems, the binomial combinations Beveridge-
con-social-assistance and Bismarck-without-social-assistance are found to be, 
respectively, the most and least efficient systems. The two policy strategies epitomise 
two radically different approaches to the governance of social security. The first 
prescribes a bureaucratic, centrally-driven remedy for dealing with a market failure. 
The second foresees the need for some level of central coordination in assuring a 
                                                 
6 Korpi, 1983; Korpi and Palme, 1998; and Mahler and Jesuit, 2004, on the one hand, and Tanzi and 
Schuknecht, 1997a, 2000, on the other. 
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 minimum level of insurance provision, but leaves the rest of the system to be 
coordinated by decentralised decision making procedures.    
 
Chapter 8 draws together the thesis’ main results and discusses possible future 
lines of research. In theory, there is an optimal level (and structure) of taxation to 
finance an optimal level of core public services provided in an efficient way. This 
thesis makes significant progress in comprehending the organisational drivers of 
public service efficiency. The next fundamental research step is to combine this 
knowledge with the current understanding of the optimal levels and structures of 
taxation and public expenditure, so that a better understanding of the optimal size and 
role of government may ensue. 
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This chapter reviews the most significant contributions of political science and 
economics to understanding governance and its relationship with efficiency. 
The word governance pervades the modern anglophone social science lexicon. 
It is an eclectic term deployed in various contexts with diverse and often contradictory 
meanings. It has become a ubiquitous “buzzword” which can mean anything or 
nothing (Jessop, 1998). Governance can be traced back to the classical Latin and 
ancient Greek words for the “steering” of boats. Its original usage overlapped with 
government, the action or manner of governing, guiding, or steering conduct. For a 
long time usage was confined to constitutional and legal issues connected with “state 
affairs” and/or the direction of specific institutions or professions. In the last two 
decades its meaning has somewhat shifted as the word resurged in various contexts 
representing an autonomous concept, distinct from government. While governance 
would refer to the modes and manner of governing (hence the widespread use of the 
synonymous expression modes of governance), government would primarily concern 
the institutions and agents responsible for the governmental process, including the 
policy decision-making process and the subsequent implementation acts. Some 
authors (including Jessop) argue that the transformation of governance from a 
relatively dormant concept with limited scope and usage into a fashionable analytical 
device is linked to a global paradigmatic crisis in the social sciences in the 1970s and 
1980s – an increasing dissatisfaction with the capacity of prevailing theoretical 
frameworks to describe and explain the empirical world. At a more pragmatic level, 
other authors indicate the crisis of the welfare state and the failure of reform policies 
during the 1970s as a key background factor for the emergence of the academic notion 
of governance and its early emphasis on new models of political steering (Mayntz, 
2003).  
 
2.2 Modes of Governance and Political Science 
 
Governance started its scientific terminological career in the fields of 
economics and organisational theory, from where it found its way into public 
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 management and political science (Mayntz, 2003; 2004). In recent years there has 
been a growing trend in public management and political science literatures towards 
analysis in terms of multiple modes of governance (Tenbensel, 2005). This trend is in 
part a reaction to the increasingly sterile ideological debate between old public 
administration and new public management. The debate is in itself a circumscribed 
version of a broader argument on the relative merits of markets and hierarchies as 
modes of social and economic coordination, imported in the 1980s and 1990s from its 
usual macro setting and brought to the discussion of modes of organising and 
governing the public sector. 
Political scientists have been actively involved in the conceptualisation of 
governance (for a recent overview, see Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004; Kooiman, 
2003; Mayntz, 2004; Pierre, 2000a). Although the terms governance and modes of 
governance have been broadly used to refer to the steering and coordination of 
interdependent actors based on institutionalised rule systems (Benz, 2004), the 
diversity of specific analytical meanings that pervades the literature is paramount. A 
wide variety of different phenomena are associated with these terms, ranging from a 
multitude of institutional structures and actor constellations in political decision-
making, to various types of policy instruments. Rosenau (2000, p.171) describes 
governance as “systems of rules, as the purposive activities of any collectivity, that 
sustain mechanisms designed to ensure its safety, prosperity, coherence, stability and 
continuance”. For Teib et al. (2004, p.1-2), “a workable definition of governance is 
best attained if we concentrate on the policy dimension”, and so governance is defined 
as “political steering, and modes of governance denote different styles or instruments 
of political steering”. Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (2004, p.99-100) define 
governance as “the continuous political process of setting explicit goals for society 
and intervening in it in order to achieve these goals”. These three definitions highlight 
three different perspectives on governance: as a system, a process, or a set of activities 
(Diedrichs, 2004). However, these are merely representative examples of the ample 
variety of alternative perspectives that characterises the political science literature on 
governance. 
In addition to this plurality of meanings and connotations, the scope of the 
term is also subject to different interpretations. In a broad understanding, governance 
is related to different forms and ways of taking decisions for and within society as a 
whole, i.e. a “pervasive form of political steering” (Mayntz, 2003). From a narrow 
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 point of view, governance is conceived as a counter-model to the ideal-type “nation 
state government” based on hierarchical steering of society through authoritative 
instruments and hinging on a relatively homogeneous source of legitimacy 
represented by the national electorate (Mayntz, 2004). The rising role played by 
international organisations, sub-national institutions and other non-state actors in 
defining the overall path of society has generated increasing scepticism on the idea of 
the nation state as the main political actor and its ability to steer society along 
traditional hierarchical lines (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). Growing attention has 
been devoted to the conceptualisation of different types of governance arrangements 
where coordination rather than hierarchical steering prevails. These arrangements are 
the exclusive attributes of governance when it is narrowly defined (Diedrichs, 2004). 
 
In a recent note towards the conceptual clarification of modes of governance 
Treib et al. (2005) argue that despite a common concern for the relationship between 
state intervention and societal autonomy, different strands of literature focus on 
different facets of this continuum: the politics, polity and policy dimensions of 
governance. 
In the politics dimension, governance is related to the process of policy-
making. It is about the ways in which the divergent preferences of citizens are 
translated into effective policy choices, the ways the plurality of societal interests are 
transformed into unitary action and the compliance of social actors is achieved 
(Kohler-Koch, 1999). In this context, the critical distinctive feature of different modes 
of governance is the relationship between public and private actors in the policy-
making process. At one extreme, a hierarchical state leaves the policy process to 
public actors. At the opposite extreme, self-regulations by firms without state 
intervention or self-organisation of communities only involves private actors. 
Between these extremes there are various intermediate modes of governance 
involving public and private actors. Typical examples include several forms of policy 
networks (Marin and Mayntz, 1991), and bureaucracies restructured along New Public 
Management lines, transferring formerly public tasks to the private sector 
(Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004; Mol, Liefferink, and Lauber, 2000). At the empirical 
level, only hybrid modes of governance including both public and private actors are 
said to exist. The state is dominated by public actors, whereas markets are dominated 
by private actors (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985). But even processes of private self-
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 regulation may be influenced by the state, as their own existence hinges on the threat 
of state coercion (Héritier, 2002; Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995). 
In the polity dimension, governance is seen as an institutionalised system of 
rules that shapes the actions of social actors (Rosenau, 1992; Mayntz, 2004). Different 
modes of governance are placed on a continuum defined by “markets” and 
“hierarchies” as the two ideal poles. Irrespective of the type of actors (public or 
private) involved in the decision-making process, the institutional structure governing 
their interactions can either be hierarchical, allowing some actors to achieve 
collectively binding decisions without the consent of others, or it can be inspired on a 
market structure, allowing each actor to voluntarily decide on their course of action. 
In between these opposing extremes, various other institutional structures coexist (e.g. 
communities, associations, and networks, Schneider and Kenis, 1996), the network 
structure being perhaps the most notorious - a non-hierarchical constellation of 
interdependent actors linked by different types of power resources. Again, this 
categorisation of institutional arrangements is seen as a theoretical abstraction. 
Empirically only hybrid forms involving elements of several ideal-type modes of 
governance can be found. Effective steering and coordination can only be 
accomplished though the practical combination of these elements (e.g. markets rely 
on hierarchical authority to enforce contracts, Streeck and Schmitter, 1985). An 
institutional feature that often stands out in the polity dimension of governance is the 
degree of centralisation/dispersion of the locus of authority, both in a horizontal 
(among central state actors) and vertical (among territorial units or boundaries of the 
state) perspective (Walker, 2005; Grosse, 2005). 
In the policy dimension, governance is defined as a mode of political steering 
(Héritier, 2002). Different modes of governance refer to the employment of different 
steering instruments for the achievement of particular policy goals. The state can 
intervene through various types of more or less heavy-handed instruments to achieve 
given societal outcomes: command and control; incentive and supply, information, 
deliberation and persuasion, as well as forms of social influence and control (Baldwin 
and Cave, 1999; Windhoff-Héritier, 1987). 
Although the politics, polity and policy dimensions of the governance debate 
carry with them specific analytical focuses and highlight particular facets of the 
governance phenomena, they share in common the discussion of the role of the state 
in society (Pierre, 2000b) by looking at aspects of the relationship between state 
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 intervention and societal autonomy as a continuum from public authority to societal 
self-regulation (Treib et al., 2005). Additionally, they share in common the separation 
between “ideal” conceptual modes of governance and “real” empirical modes of 
governance, emphasising the hybridity of these later.  
 
2.3 Modes of Governance and Economics 
 
The conceptualisation of modes of governance as forms through which order 
is achieved and sustained in economic and social life has been the subject of intense 
debate for many years and lies in the centre of economic analysis. The establishment 
of a market-hierarchy dichotomy as the two building blocks of economic organisation 
is as old as economic science itself. The discussion of the relative merits of a market 
driven economic system as opposed to a central planned economy can be traced back 
to Smith (1976) in his foundational work, and is in itself a discussion about the 
properties and capabilities of markets and hierarchies to produce co-ordination at the 
macro level. 
However, at the micro-analytical level it took a long time for economists to 
recognise the existence of alternative methods of economic coordination. 
Notwithstanding the early efforts of some prominent members of the profession in 
drawing attention to the peculiarities of business organisations in coordinating 
production (e.g. various writings from Marshall; Clark, Knight, and Robertson7), 
standard microeconomics relied for decades on the concept of firms as production 
functions, i.e. a set of technologically determined input-output combinations. During 
that time, the study of organisation developed in other disciplines to the point of 
generating a field of its own (Organisation Theory).  
The development of a theoretical framework for identifying and characterising 
alternative modes of organising transactions and investigating potential trade-offs 
between them was accomplished at the margin of neoclassic orthodoxy by New 
Institutional Economics8. 
                                                 
7 The author is responsible for a famous metaphor of business organisations in referring to them as 
“islands of conscious power in [an] ocean of unconscious co-operation” (quoted by Coase, 1937, p. 
333). 
8 The term “New Institutional Economics” (NIE) was first coined by Oliver Williamson in 1975 and 
refers to a strand of economic literature that has gained increasing influence over scholarly research in 
the last three decades, not only in economics, but also in legal studies, political science, sociology, 
anthropology, management sciences, and other fields. In a recent review of the topic, Ménard and 
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 The seeds of the NIE governance approach were set out by a series of 
promising ideas advanced, mainly independently, in the 1930s. Following the 
contributions of Karl Llewellyn (1931) and John R. Commons (1932), Ronald 
Coase’s groundbreaking article on “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) established a 
turning point in the economic inquiry of organisation9. Almost simultaneously, 
Chester Barnard (1938) reflected on the “marvel of hierarchy” publishing “The 
Functions of the Executive” and emphasising the role of “authority” in demarcating 
firms from markets. Some of the pioneering works of subsequent decades included 
Friederich Hayek’s (1945) reflections on “the marvel of the market” and in particular 
the coordinating efficiency of the price mechanism; Simon (1951) on the employment 
relationship; and Arrow (1964) on the role of control in hierarchies. 
The prevailing NIE model of economic organisation originates from the 1970s 
through several publications that built on these preliminaries. In a draft version of his 
future theory, Williamson (1971) focused on transaction costs in examining “vertical 
integration” and stressed the importance of contracts as a key organisational device. 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) followed with a controversial re-examination of the 
Coasian approach and interpreting the firm as a nexus of contracts. Arrow (1974) also 
made is contribution to further extending the importance of organisational issues on 
the economics agenda. In 1975, with the publication of Markets and Hierarchies 
Williamson established a new turning point in the NIE movement, assembling 
“dispersed elements (including his own contributions) into a coherent framework that 
linked transaction costs, contractual arrangements, and modes of organisation, thus 
                                                                                                                                            
Shirley (2005, p. 1-2) characterise NIE as the study of “institutions and how institutions interact with 
organisational arrangements. Institutions are the written and unwritten rules, norms and constraints that 
humans devise to reduce uncertainty and control their environment. These include (i) written rules and 
agreements that govern contractual relations and corporate governance, (ii) constitutions, laws and 
rules that govern politics, government, finance, and society more broadly, and (iii) unwritten codes of 
conduct, norms of behaviour, and beliefs. Organisational arrangements are the different modes of 
governance that agents implement to support production and exchange. These include (i) markets, 
firms, and the various combinations of forms that economic actors develop to facilitate transactions and 
(ii) contractual agreements that provide a framework for organizing activities, as well as (iii) the 
behavioural traits that underlie the arrangements chosen”.      
9 Coase’s article, although left aside for more than thirty years after it was originally published, went on 
to become a major driving force to the evolution of economic thought on organisational issues. Terry 
Moe (1984, p. 743) identifies three notions that have proved particularly influential: “(1) Economic 
organisations are best understood by comparing their efficiency to that of the market. (2) In the real 
world, which is clearly not characterized by perfect competition, perfect information, or frictionless 
exchange, economic activities and organisational arrangements are best understood in terms of the 
transaction costs inherent in any system of exchange relationships among rational individuals. (3) 
These relationships are contractual in nature, and the firm is best understood as founded upon a distinct 
kind of contractual arrangement, the authority relation”. 
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 providing a model that remains at the core of the micro-analytical branch of NIE” 
(Ménard, 2005, p. 283). At the end of the decade, Klein et al. (1978) examined the 
role of specific investments and risks of hold-up as the explanation to the choice of a 
mode of organisation.      
Transaction cost economics (TCE) and property rights theory, both rooted in 
the new institutional approach, are the most traditional and well established economic 
theories of organisation. However, they are not the only existing economic 
explanations of organisation as they now compete with a set of resource-
based/evolutionary perspectives of the firm. Serious divergences divide all these 
alternative explanations, and an integrated economic theory of organisation is still 
missing. In the following paragraphs we address the key features of some of the main 
approaches. 
 
2.3.1 Transaction Cost Economics and Property Rights Theory 
  
The most conventional approach to economic organisation sees governance as 
“the means by which to infuse order, thereby to mitigate contractual hazards and 
realize mutual gains from trade…[i.e.] the deployment of alternative modes of 
governance among differing transactions with the purpose of economizing on 
transaction costs” (Williamson, 2004, p.0). Modes of governance in turn are 
understood as institutional arrangements within which a transaction or set of related 
transactions are decided upon and implemented (Ménard, 2005)10. 
TCE focus on the microanalytics of transactions on the one hand, and of 
alternative modes of governance on the other. It analyzes and compares the 
competence of different modes of processing and monitoring transactions11 to take 
advantage of the division of labour while simultaneously economising on bounded 
rationality and safeguarding parties against contractual hazards. 
All modes of governing transactions involve costs. The sources of these costs 
are to be found in (i) the propensity of economic agents to behave opportunistically 
which generates the risk of contractual hazards and the associated need to define and 
                                                 
10 Recently Williamson defined a governance structure as “the institutional matrix in which the 
integrity of the transaction is decided” (Williamson, 1996, p.378). 
11 Coase uses the expression “institutional structure of production” to define these arrangements, 
whereas Williamson speaks of “mechanisms of governance”.  
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 implement costly safeguards; and (ii) in certain types of noncontractible uncertainties 
that plague the environment where transactions take place.  
In comparing the relative advantages of alternative ways of organising 
transactions, TCE first focuses on the attributes of transactions thought to determine 
variations in their costs. The most important of these attributes are the specificity of 
assets involved, the uncertainties surrounding the transaction at stake; and the 
frequency with which the transaction occurs (Williamson, 1985). 
Asset specificity12 creates mutual dependence and opens the possibility of 
“hold-up” problems by exposing the owners of specialized assets to the opportunism 
of trading partners owning other specialized and complementary assets who may seek 
to capture inappropriate quasi-rents stemming from the combined use of such assets 
(Araujo et al., 2003). 
Significant levels of uncertainty and complexity entailed by the transaction 
and high degree of difficulty in measuring performance pose important obstacles to 
the construction of mutually satisfactory agreements, forcing the parties to rely on 
contracts that merely specify rights, obligations and procedures rather than actual 
performance standards. In extreme cases this solution may itself be insufficient and 
internalising those transactions previously obtained through the market may become a 
better or indeed the only viable alternative. 
Finally, the frequency with which similar transactions occur and the duration 
or period of time over which they recurrently take place is another basic attribute. As 
a general principle, high frequency transactions taking place over long periods of time 
tend to be internalised within formal organisations or to be managed under specially 
created low-cost routines that reduce the need for formal mechanisms to enforce 
agreements between the parties. 
Williamson´s (1985) discriminating alignment hypothesis establishes the link 
between transaction costs and modes of organisation: calculative agents operating in a 
competitive environment will adopt the mode of organisation that fits comparatively 
better with the attributes of the transaction at stake. This hypothesis effectively 
enables TCE to circumvent the study of the inner-workings of alternative modes of 
governance responsible for their comparative ability to organise transactions 
efficiently. 
                                                 
12 The value of investments that would be lost in any alternative use. 
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 Property rights theory (PRT) pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and 
Hart and Moore (1990) shares with TCE the importance ascribed to the role of 
incentives in aligning the interests of cooperating parties in a context of transaction 
costs and incomplete contracts. In both approaches, the design of incentive schemes 
and ownership patterns that support those incentives are the key levers of the efficient 
organisation of transactions. 
Similarities apart, the two approaches differ at least in three important ways 
(Whinston, 2003). First, from a methodological point of view, PRT is substantially 
more formal than TCE. Second, PRT explicitly concentrates on distortions in ex-ante 
investments, whereas TCE’s main analytical focus is on ex-post haggling and 
maladaptation costs. Third, while TCE assumes that opportunism can be mitigated if 
the transaction is coordinated through hierarchical command (at the expense of 
bureaucratic costs), PRT assumes that this risk is present in all forms of organisation 
as investment and trading decisions are thought to be decentralised regardless of the 
structure of asset ownership.           
An important advantage of PRT is that it investigates the costs and benefits of 
integration in a manner that does not rely on the presence of an impersonal market as 
TCE does. A firm is seen as a set of non-human assets under common ownership. 
Control over assets gives the owner bargaining power when unforeseen or uncovered 
contingencies force parties to negotiate how their relationship should be continued. 
The owner of an asset can decide how it should be used and by whom, subject only to 
the constraints of the law and the obligations implied by specific contracts. Assets 
become bargaining levers that influence the terms of new agreements and hence the 
future payoffs from investing in the relationship. In contrast to TCE, PRT models 
assume that all bargaining, including any that occurs after investments are made, is 
efficient. Thus, everything turns on how ownership affects initial investments 
(Holmström and Roberts, 1998). 
 
2.3.2 Resource-based/Evolutionary Theories 
 
The conventional conception of economic organisation (including TCE and 
formal property rights theory) regards the emergence of firms as an instance of market 
failure. Firms are seen as legal, contractual entities, owners of physical assets 
providing investment incentives and facilitating the resolution of hold-up problems. 
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 The capabilities perspective, resource or competence based view of the firm is 
an alternative conception of economic organisation that sees the problem of economic 
coordination as an attempt to find integration mechanisms that sustain the division of 
labour amongst agents with incomplete, dispersed and disparate knowledge and help 
create and test new knowledge (Piore, 1992; Loasby, 1998a, 1998b; Kogut, 2000). 
Firms are conceived of as a bundle of essentially tacit “capabilities”, shared by the 
human assets that comprise it. The boundaries of the firm are “partly determined by 
the differential between the capabilities they hold in relation to potential supplies and 
the relative costs of developing capabilities internally against accessing them via non-
hierarchical means” (Araujo et al., 2003, p.1263). Opportunism and threats of hold-up 
are part of the calculus of deciding which is the most cost-effective way to access 
capabilities (Barney, 1999). 
The writings of Penrose (1959), Richardson (1972) and Loasby (1998a, 
1998b) are amongst the main contributions to the development of the capabilities 
approach to economic organisation. 
Penrose's (1959) underpinned the division of labour and the growth of the firm 
on a distinction between resources and the services they render. Resources are capable 
of providing a variety of productive services which, in turn, are capable of modifying 
the attributes of resources and thus enable the provision of new services. The disposal 
of productive resources between different uses and over time is determined by 
administrative decision. The boundaries of the firm are thus defined by the nature of 
its managerial and administrative responsibilities (Penrose, 1995, p.xvi).  
Richardson (1972) uses the notion of capabilities and activities instead while 
addressing issues of division of labour and coordination of capabilities in industrial 
settings. For Richardson the boundaries of the firm are delineated by the type of 
activities it performs, the integration of these activities with others and the capabilities 
underpinning these activities: “...organisations will tend to specialise in activities for 
which their capabilities offer some comparative advantage; these activities will, in 
other words, generally be similar...although they may nevertheless lead the firm into a 
variety of markets and a variety of product lines” (Richardson, 1972, p.891). The 
grouping of activities under hierarchical coordination is explained by 
interrelationships between activities and associations between the capabilities that 
support them. 
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 Complementary activities have to be matched in level and/or specification and 
require sequential coordination. Close complementary activities are to a certain extent 
specialized to each other and require more complex forms of coordination in the way 
they are combined (Richardson, 1972, p. 891). As for the resources that support them, 
activities can be classified as similar or dissimilar depending on the similarity of the 
capabilities they use.  
Different combinations of similarity and complementarity favour different 
modes of economic coordination. Complementary but dissimilar activities may be 
efficiently coordinated through market exchange without any form of ex-ante 
planning. Close complementary activities require concurrent coordination via intra or 
interfirm cooperation, where the sequential adjustment of activities is consciously 
planned or put together through the articulation of a limited number of decision 
making units. Close complementary and similarity activities favour intrafirm 
cooperation. Close complementarity and dissimilar activities favour interfirm 
cooperation as the coordination of dissimilar capabilities may prove impossible under 
a single administrative framework. Firms are here seen as institutional devices 
enabling the organisation of a set of closely complementary and similar activities that 
have to be put in place simultaneously and thus require conscious, planned direction 
(Richardson, 1998). The distinct nature of firms is “not simply the professional 
knowledge and skill its members bring with them but the complex pattern of 
relationships and 'local knowledge' derived from teamwork and continued interaction” 
(Araujo, et al., 2003, p.1262). 
Loasby (1998a, 1998b) developed Penrose and Richardson’s arguments by 
relating the definition of capabilities to the “knowledge-how” required for productive 
activities. “Know-how” is the domain of skilled performance, learned through situated 
practice and emulation of experienced performers (Araujo et al. 2003), and it can 
either be direct or indirect depending on whether the firm directly controls the 
capabilities itself or may have access to them in an organised way. 
  
Although resource-based/evolutionary theories of the firm are becoming ever 
more influential, the most well established approaches to economic organisation are 
still rooted in NIE (most notably transaction costs economics). NIE deviates from the 
standard neoclassical assumptions regarding perfect information, unbounded 
rationality, and costless/instantaneous transactions. Incomplete information and 
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 limited mental capacity makes individuals face uncertainty about future events and 
incur transaction costs. To reduce risk and transaction costs individuals create 
institutions and develop modes of organisation embedded in those institutions 
(Ménard and Shirley, 2005). Markets, firms and hybrids are the archetypes of these 
modes of organisation. Our analysis now turns to the characterisation that NIE-




Market can either designate a mode of organising economic transactions, 
alternative to firms and hybrid organisations, or the general set of arrangements that 
characterise a market economy, i.e. the set of institutions that embed all modes of 
organisation13.  
As a mode of organisation/governance market is a sub-class of the various 
existing institutional arrangements for transferring rights. Its defining trait consists in 
the exchange of property rights through mechanisms that require mutual consent of 
the parties involved and that coordinate decentralised decisions made by these parties 
using information provided by the price system (Coase, 2005). 
While NIE and neoclassic economics have in common the importance 
accorded to the role played by the price mechanism in coordinating transactions, their 
views diverge with regards to several other significant issues: NIE does not 
conceptualise markets as pure structures, but rather as entities shaped by institutional 
factors; for new institutional economists prices do not coordinate, but rather send 
signals to those coordinating; furthermore, agents do not adapt passively to prices, but 
instead carry out all sort of strategic actions that actively affect them. 
The acceptation of these premises has two important implications. First, 
markets require specific institutional supports to emerge and develop. These supports 
combine legal, political, and social factors, with enforcement of contracts as a 
fundamental element (White, 1981; North, 1981; 1990) alongside the definition and 
implementation of property rights (Alston, Libecap and Mueller, 1997). 
                                                 
13 Ménard (2005, p. 302) refers to this particular interpretation of market as “the central economic 
institution in last resort in that at some point all modes of organisation intersect with and/or are 
embedded in markets, e.g. firms and hybrids obtain resources through voluntary exchanges, compete in 
capital and labour markets, etc.”  
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 Second, since markets are institutionally embedded and shaped by formal and 
informal rules, they differ according to the arrangements that support them. Although 
they may share some common properties, namely those captured by microeconomics 
through the analytics of supply and demand, the heterogeneity of their institutional 
underpinnings influences the comparative costs and benefits of using them. The 
practical reflection of this influence is the potential variety of mechanisms involved in 
the formation of prices14, entailing different processes, arrangements and rules and 




In the neoclassical realm the firm is “a unitary profit-maximising entity 
defined by a technologically determined production function (Yarbrough and 
Yarbrough, 1988, p.2). The embedding models assume that monitoring is costless, or 
can be inexpensively endogenised through an adequate contract; shirking can be 
detected and punished on the basis of perfect revelation of information and no 
enforcement problems; and employees are subject to a fully contingent contract.    
NIE addresses integrated “formal organisations” (Barnard, 1938) primarily as 
governance structures. It recognises the importance of technology in defining the set 
of feasible activities, but it subsumes this production function dimension of firms 
under the notion of governance structure. This in turn is depicted as a combination of 
legal, economic and social dimensions. As legal entities, firms operate and are liable 
as individual agents capable of transferring rights. As economic devices, they rely on 
a multitude of contractual arrangements structured along hierarchical lines to 
coordinate transactions. As social units, firms have motivational properties shaping 
their members’ behaviour that go beyond monetary incentives. Although these 
different dimensions are equally important, NIE focuses mainly on the economic 
component, studying the specific properties that differentiate firms from other 
organisational arrangements and that confer them an edge in organising some 
transactions. 
The main assertion is that the comparative advantage of firms derives from 
their capacity to organise some transactions through centralised command in a cost 
effective way when compared to decentralised coordination via the price system 
                                                 
14 Posted prices, prices determined by auction, prices formed through negotiation, etc. 
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 (Coase, 1937). The distinctive feature of these hierarchical “system[s] of consciously 
coordinated personal activities or forces” (Barnard, 1938, p.72) is thus command – a 
relationship in which those who are assigned the implementation of a particular task 
have to report to the persons in charge who, in turn, can be accountable for the 
performance of that task (Ménard, 2005). 
A variety of arguments have been advanced to justify the comparative 
advantage that can be expected from these hierarchical relationships. It is thought that 
the ability of supervisors to reallocate human resources without negotiation reduces 
transaction costs and mitigates or eliminates some sources of uncertainty (Simon, 
1951; Beckmann, 1988). The internalisation of transactions is said to provide the 
means for the extension of the domain of rationality, improving the quality of 
decisions through division of “cognitive labour” (Aoki, 2001). Furthermore, it is 
frequently argued that the communication system supervised by the entrepreneur can 
be comparatively efficient when the information provided by the market is costly, 
incomplete and difficult to process (Alchian and Woodward, 1987). 
These potential advantages of hierarchical modes of governance need to be 
weighted together with the administrative/bureaucratic costs they create before a 
complete judgement of their relative merits in coordinating transactions can be made.  
Elements of both the comparative advantages and costs of hierarchies over 
alternative modes of coordination can be found in the three essential components of 
command: control, cooperation, and communication. 
Control makes command credible by providing the means for implementing 
orders, evaluating the adequacy of actions chosen, and checking on the propensity of 
members to renege their commitments (Williamson, 1985; Beckmann, 1988; 
Demsetz, 1995). Control provides flexibility, allowing supervisors to monitor the 
conformity of action to orders and, if need be, reallocate tasks without renegotiating 
contracts and using the price system. Under certain circumstances, this endows 
hierarchies with the capacity to re-adapt the organisation of transactions faster then 
decentralised coordination (Bolton and Farrell, 1990). Control provides powerful 
tools to constrain opportunism through interactions among levels of management 
(Tirole, 1986). Some authors have recently suggested that central control may 
facilitate the conduction of “controlled experiments” and help determine how assets 
can be organised more effectively (Foss et al., 2002). Finally, control allows settling 
disputes faster and less costly than arbitration by third parties (Williamson, 1975; 
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 Dow, 1987), and is often superior to external control in collecting/processing the 
relevant information and making the necessary adaptations (Williamson, 1975). 
New institutional economists have been keen on showing the positive side of 
control, but they have also gone the other end of the field calling attention to the 
rigidities and costs that draw a limit on the efficiency of centralised coordination. 
Demsetz (1988b, 1995, 2002) pinpointed the costs of excluding non-owners from 
using resources as a major limitation to control in large organisations. Hansmann 
(1988) demonstrated that owners of physical assets are as much concerned with 
controlling the use of their assets as with controlling residual profits, which imposes 
significant costs to hierarchies when compared to market coordination. Williamson 
(1985) identified the non-replicativity within firms of market incentives as the main 
obstacle to lessening administrative costs. Milgrom and Roberts (1990; 1992) 
disclosed the costs arising from influence activities among managers and from the 
loss of information along the numerous tiers that characterise control in hierarchical 
structures. 
Apart from control, cooperation is another vital component for the exercise of 
command (Simon, 1991). Although subject of controversy, cooperation can generally 
be defined as “the willingness of agents to pool resources even when they cannot 
assess ex-ante the benefits expected, or if there are any benefits at all to be expected 
in doing so” (Ménard, 2005, p.292). The presence and significance of cooperation for 
the support of hierarchies has long been recognised in the literature. Alchian et al. 
(1987, p.1031) characterised the firm as “a contractually related collection of 
resources of various cooperative owners” and “the organisation of cooperative joint 
production”. Following Common´s (1934) valuation of mutuality and Arrow’s (1974) 
emphasis on the economic value of social interactions, Williamson (1975) explored 
how cooperation, in the form of “attitudinal interactions”, can mitigate the costs of 
control in formal organisations by alleviating the risk of conflicts and enhancing their 
capacity to settle disputes15. 
As with control, cooperation is also open to limits and costs. Williamson 
(1975) identified some of the sources: free riding strategies through ex-ante selection 
of members and malingering behaviour once selected (ex-post); collective decision-
                                                 
15 Williamson (1975) identifies four main advantages deriving from a cooperative “atmosphere”: (i) 
scale economies in the acquisition of information; (ii) dispersion of risk through the different members 
of the group in the event of unanticipated contingencies; (iii) mitigation of moral hazard and adverse 
selection; (iv) increased productivity due to a better developed “sense of responsibility”. 
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 making detrimental to the advantages of command; incentives to collude and develop 
side-payments; and high costs of processing information and communicating in a 
team oriented organisation. 
Together with control and cooperation, information and communication 
completes the triptych of command. A key organisational feature of hierarchies when 
compared to other modes of governance is their ability to gain advantage in 
processing and communicating information under particular circumstances. Formal 
organisations can build and develop routines that make codification possible and 
reduce internal costs. The construction of a common language within the firm 
(corporate culture) facilitates the sharing of knowledge. The combination of human 
resources extends the capacity of individuals to absorb knowledge while the 
organisation of transactions by command promotes an efficient processing of 
information, its fast transformation into action and consequently rapid adaptation 
(Williamson, 1975; Aoki, 1986; Demsetz, 1988a, 1988b, 1995). 
As with the other two elements of the triptych, the informational structure 
underpinning internal coordination is not exempt from costs either. Hierarchies have a 
tendency to generate informational noises and uncertainties of their own which pose 
serious limitations to the comparative efficiency of command. Some contributions in 
the literature have addressed these limitations. Williamson (1967) examined how a 
small noise in the transmission of signals in multi-layered hierarchies imposes limits 
on the size of formal organisations. Demsetz (1988b, 1995) explored the “decreasing 
returns” to the capabilities of business managers to monitor information. Aoki (1986; 
1990) showed the trade-off in processing information between centralised 
organisation (accumulating noises along the various hierarchical layers) and 
decentralised coordination of dispersed information. 
 
2.3.5 Hybrid Arrangements 
 
NIE initially concentrated on the study of hierarchy as an alternative to 
markets in coordinating transactions. Other modes of governance falling in between 
these two extremes were deemed unstable and transitory. Until the mid-eighties a 
limited number of articles were published on inter-firm contracts (Klein et al., 1978; 
Ouchi, 1980; Eccles, 1981; Cheung, 1983), franchising (Rubin, 1978), and “non-
standard contracting” (Williamson, 1975). A turning point arose with the 
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 transformation of transaction costs economic into an empirical research program (e.g. 
Williamson, 1985; Palay, 1984; Masten, 1984; Joskow, 1985). In the years that 
followed, “hybrid” forms of organisation (Williamson, 1991) became the core topic of 
a burgeoning literature initially based on non-economic journals. 
The terminology contained in these studies is unstable. “Hybrids”, “clusters”, 
“networks”, “symbiotic arrangements”, and “chain systems” are often used 
interchangeably. The underlying organisational forms are equally heterogeneous: 
subcontracting, networks, alliances, franchising, collective trademarks, partnerships 
and cooperatives16. Nonetheless, there is a common thread uniting these concepts. All 
refer to forms of inter-organisational collaboration whereby distinct property right 
owners operating distinct legal entities, coordinate sub-set of transactions (share or 
exchange technologies, capital, products, and services) through specific, mutually 
agreed forms of governance (Ménard, 2005). 
The literature on these forms of inter-organisational collaboration reveals 
several key regularities that define their distinctive character. First, hybrids are 
created with the purpose of sharing some resources, coordinating some decisions and 
generating rents. Joint organisation of activities based on inter-firm coordination 
enables the pooling of resources and capabilities that would not have been adequately 
bundled through markets (Teece and Pisano, 1994), while hierarchical coordination 
would reduce flexibility, create irreversibility and deteriorate incentives. However, 
pooling resources can also be a source of conflicts and costs. The process of rent 
distribution is often controversial and can destabilize the organisational arrangement. 
Also, pooling resources requires continuity in the relationship and cooperation, which 
in turn impose limitations on the autonomy members benefited under a market 
arrangement, without the compensation of control that hierarchies concede.                    
A second regularity of hybrids is the peculiarity of the structure and purpose 
of their underpinning contracts. Hybrids rest on relational contracts, i.e. frameworks 
for “transactional reciprocity” (Park, 1996) linking activities and resources among 
members who simultaneously operate unrelated transactions. The relational 
dimension is ingrained in the advantages and risks of sharing resources between 
                                                 
16 Some of the most significant references include (Ménard, 2005, p.295): (i) on subcontracting: Eccles, 
1981; Aoki, 1988; and Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; (ii) on networks; Thorelli, 1986; Powell, 1990; 
Podolny and Page, 1998; (iii) on alliances: Oxley, 1999; Baker et al., 2003; (iv) on franchising: Rubin, 
1978; Williamson, 1985; Lafontaine and Slade, 1997; (v) on collective trademarks: Dwyer and Oh, 
1988; Ménard, 1996; Sauvée, 2002; (vi) on partnership: Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988; Powell, 1996; 
and (vii) on cooperatives: Cook, 1995; Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000. 
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 legally independent actors (Goldberg, 1980; Williamson, 1985; Baker et al., 2002). 
Advantages include increased market shares, transfer of competencies and access to 
financial resources. Risks emerge from partners coordinating only part of their 
decisions, subject to unforeseeable revisions depending on the level of uncertainty 
associated with the processes, products or demand targeted by the joint investment. 
The relational dimension of hybrids helps fill the gap left by incomplete 
contracts, monitor partners, and solve conflicts minimising repeated renegotiations. It 
also helps to economise on the costs of extensive contracting among autonomous 
partners, and thus maintain some advantages over the administration costs of single 
integrated hierarchies. This could not be achieved though without the intervention of 
other complementary internal governance mechanisms. That intervention is usually 
credited on formal governing bodies, which are made responsible for subclasses of 
decisions transferred from partners with a view to economising on transaction costs 
and stabilising relations (Ménard, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2004). Empirical studies suggest 
high volatility in the degree of formalism and power conferred to these governing 
entities, which is thought to reflect differences in the significance of contractual 




At one end of the spectrum, close to market arrangements, hybrids rely primarily on trust: 
decisions are decentralised and coordination relies on mutual “influence” and reciprocity. At the other 
end, hybrids come close to integration, with tight coordination through quasi-autonomous government 
bodies or “bureaus” sharing some attributes of a hierarchy. Between these polar extremes, mild forms 
of “authority” develop, based on relational networks and on leadership. Relational networks have 
attracted a lot of attention in organisation studies (Powell, 1990; Hakansson and Johanson, 1993; 
Grandori and Soda, 1995). They rely on tighter coordination than trust, with formal rules and 
conventions based on log-term partnerships, on complementary competences, and or on social 
“connivance” (Powell, 1996). By contrast, hybrids coordinated by a leader leave little room for 
autonomy although some formal symmetry can be maintained. Subcontracting, particularly with long-
term contractual relationships, or alliances related to R&D projects are often of that mode (Eccles, 
1981; Pisano, 1990; Powell, 1996). 
*** 
           
A third regularity of hybrids is the presence of competition. Hybrids involve 
complex combinations of interdependence and autonomy in which competition arises 
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 at two different levels. One the one hand, within these organisational arrangements 
partners cooperate on some issues, but they also compete against each other. Bilateral 
agreements with long-term contracts are often subject to internal competition since 
individual strategies remain autonomous (Coase, 2000). Collaborative agreements can 
be purposively designed so as to encourage recurrent competition as in subcontracting 
(Eccles, 1981; Dyer, 1997). Activities may overlap as partners compete to attract 
costumers from the same sub-set (Raynaud, 1997). Partners may cooperate on some 
activities and compete on others (Baker et al., 2003). On the other hand, outside the 
sphere of the collaborative organisational arrangement, competition also exists 
amongst hybrids and other arrangements through the market. 
Features of these regularities can also be found in markets and hierarchies. 
Therefore, the distinctive character of hybrids is not so much to do with the presence 
of any of these individual regularities, but rather with the specific mix of competition 
and cooperation that subordinates the role of prices in markets, and command in 
hierarchies (Jorde and Teece, 1989; Grandori and Soda, 1995; Ménard, 1997). This 
mix is the creator of a distinctive mode of governance. 
The particular incentives that have boosted the creation of these arrangements 
have been explored by Williamson (1991) based on the model originally applied to 
the market-hierarchy dichotomy. The fundamental idea is that when investments are 
specific enough to generate substantial contractual hazards, without justifying 
integration and its costs, and when uncertainties are consequential enough to require 
tighter coordination than that provided by markets, there will be strong incentives for 
the constitutions of hybrid modes of organisation. Uncertainty is secondary to specific 
investments in that without asset specificity the parties would transact through the 
market and there would be no hybrid. However, investment-specific relationships tend 
to be infused with uncertainties about the level of resources pooled and their 
monitoring. In practice, it is the combination of investment specificity and uncertainty 
that provides the proper incentives for the creation of hybrids, whereas the presence of 
only one of these attributes leans towards contract-based arrangements. In the 
presence of consequential uncertainty, hybrids need to combine flexible adaptation 
capacity, control, and safeguards against opportunistic behaviour. The intensity 
required for these items determines the degree of centralisation in the governance of 
hybrids. The more consequential uncertainties are the more centralised coordination 
will tend to be (Ménard, 1996; 1997; Nootebom, 1999).            
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2.4 Friederich Von Hayek on Markets and Hierarchies 
 
Transaction costs economics, arguably the most influential economic approach 
to organisation, treats market trade as a default that is assumed superior to within-
organisation trade unless levels of uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity are 
high enough to pull the transaction out of the market. Because the market is the 
default, its benefits are not spelled out as clearly as its costs. The market is treated as a 
black box, much in the same way as neoclassical microeconomic theory treats the 
firm. On the other hand, a variety of conditions have been adduced by Williamson and 
others to limit firm size - costs of bureaucracy, the weakening of individual 
incentives, the hazards of internal politicking, and so on - but none of these costs are 
fully understood either. 
In order to overcome the analytical limitations of TCE and NIE theories of 
organisation at large, we argue in the next chapter that economic organisation is 
essentially about bringing order into systems of human interaction through a 
multitude of modes of governance, ranging from conscious deliberate design to 
spontaneous self-reinforcing rules. The effects of each mode of governance on 
efficiency depend on the nature and scale of the transactions upon which they are 
deployed. Both assertions follow closely Friederich Hayek’s reflections on the inner 
workings of markets and hierarchies as modes of coordination and his seminal 
distinction between spontaneous self generating order and organized (“made”) order. 
The following paragraphs highlight the importance of these concepts as the 
fundamental pillars of economic coordination with potential to reunite and expand 
NIE and resource-based/evolutionary theories of organisation.     
 
The importance of Hayek’s theoretical framework to the economics of 
organisation, and in particular its potential for establishing a bridge between various 
theoretical strands has recently been captured by Ioannades (2003, p.533, 534, 535): 
 
*** 
According to the standard periodization of Hayek’s work, we have to distinguish between 
early Hayek, the analytical economist, and the mature Hayek, who focused on wider spheres of the 
social sciences like social philosophy, political theory, and cognitive psychology. Taken literally, this 
periodization seems to imply that it is his early period that may be of relevance for today’s analytical 
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 economics. Contrary to this view, we will argue that contemporary economics has a lot to learn even 
from that part of Hayek’s work that is not purely economic. 
We focus here on Hayek’s distinction between two types of social order: spontaneous orders 
and organisations…this distinction offers an important starting point for a theory of economic 
organisation…[it] allows us to construct an evolutionary approach to the firm…it introduces an 
understanding of the business firm as a process, in contrast to the static outlook of contractarian 
theories, while still allowing us to describe the firm as the outcome of a contracting process among 
asset owners. The importance of this line of analysis cannot be overestimated, because it indicates the 
possibility of constructing a unified theoretical framework for the analysis of firms, in which the 
concepts of contracts, growth processes, capabilities, and historical contingency can be applied 
simultaneously to the study of business organisation. 
*** 
 
In the Hayekian conceptualisation of the world (in Moldofsky, 1989, p.101) 
different mechanisms/models of social and economic coordination are essentially 
different forms of bringing about order, that is “a state of affairs in which a 
multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may 
learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form 
correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a good 
chance of proving correct”17. 
In the social and economic realm, order manifests itself by a certain 
correspondence of the expectations concerning the actions of others on which our 
plans are based with what they will really do. Such state of affairs is the result of two 
fundamentally distinct sources of order acting in combination: grown or spontaneous, 
self-generating order based on abstract relations of a certain kind; and concrete order 
made deliberately by exogenous forces resting on hierarchical structures of commands 
and obedience. 
Spontaneous orders (of which the market is perhaps the most prominent 
example) are eminently abstract in the sense that they do not obtrude themselves on 
our senses (we cannot intuitively perceive them). In order to be aware of their 
existence we must mentally reconstruct them by tracing the relations established 
between their parts. Not having been made by an outside agency they cannot be said 
to serve any specific purpose, even though an awareness of their existence may be 
                                                 
17 Hayek stresses the fact that this definition draws explicitly on both L. S. Stebbing’s (1933, p. 228) 
assertion that “when we know how a set of elements is ordered, we have a basis for inference” as well 
as on Immanuel Kant’s definition “Ordnung ist die Zusammenfügung nach Regeln” (Order is an 
integration of regularities,Werk (Akademie Ausgabe), Nachlass, Vol. 6, p. 669).  
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 critical for their elements to be successful in the pursuit of their own interests. The 
construction and preservation of such orders is strictly dependent upon the 
maintenance of a particular structure of relationships between their constitutive 
elements. This implies they have the potential to reach a level of complexity that far 
exceeds what could have been achieved through intentional human design. The 
existence of regularity in the way elements respond to their environment confers a 
general character to the resulting order, while the detail of its particular manifestation 
depends additionally on the initial position of those elements as well as on the 
particular circumstances of the immediate environment to which each element reacts 
in the process of formation of that order. Therefore, spontaneous orders are 
adaptations to and incorporate information on a myriad of particular facts dispersed 
amongst their various parts which will never be known in their totality to anyone. By 
changing some of the rules of conduct to which the elements obey we may be in a 
position to influence the general character of the resulting order but never its detail. 
In modern societies, the market epitomises a special kind of spontaneous order 
produced through people acting within the rules of the law of property, tort and 
contract (Hayek in Moldofsk, 1989). In this game the outcome of each player is 
determined by a mixture of skill and chance. Individual actions are guided in a way 
that leads to mutual adjustment of expectations, thorough utilization of the knowledge 
and skills of all members of society. An efficient state of affairs is thus achieved, in 
that no need is served at the cost of withdrawing a greater amount of means from the 
use for other needs than is strictly necessary to satisfy it. Furthermore, and most 
importantly this game is exclusively means-connected since it makes the 
reconciliation of divergent purposes possible without requiring any form of agreement 
on the importance of the needs and associated claims of its participants. 
Concrete orders on the other hand are human-constructed entities that can be 
intuitively perceived by inspection and that are especially designed to deal with 
directed social order of the kind that bounds organisations. These orders are created 
by exogenous forces channelled through hierarchical structures of command and 
obedience. Despite being intrinsically confined to levels of complexity manageable by 
their creators (whose specific purposes they are intended to serve), man made orders 
are for a vast number of limited tasks the most powerful method of achieving 
effective coordination since they enable a degree of control over the particular 
contents of the resulting order that could not ever be attained through an alternative 
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 ordering mechanism of a spontaneous kind. That is so because the formation of 
spontaneous orders stems from their elements following rules18 that are independent 
of any common purpose in their responses to the immediate environment, while in the 
case of organisations the emerging order is created through a combination of 
commands and rules subsidiary to those commands. In typical organisational contexts 
the general aspects of the upcoming order such as the function to be performed by 
each element, the purposes to be achieved and the methods to be employed are 
usually set by commands. However, the details of the procedures are usually governed 
by subsidiary rules that leave margin for each individual to use his particular 
knowledge and skills for the performance of assigned tasks (the only way of making 
use of knowledge spread amongst the different members of the organisation and 
which nobody possesses as a whole). As Richardson (1998, p.51, 56) puts it: 
 
*** 
Direction, of the kind that concern us, does indeed mean telling people what to do, but in the 
sense of allotting them roles and providing associated job descriptions. Management’s function is to 
establish an appropriately related set of roles and rules – an appropriate organisation – and not to seek 
to prescribe what people should, in every foreseeable set of circumstances, seek to do. Management 
will change the organisation from time to time as circumstances change and to take account of 
personalities within a business, but will not routinely intervene to instruct a particular job holder to take 
this or that particular action at a particular time. 
Co-ordination through direction is not, therefore, what might at first seem. It does not mean 
that those who undertake the activities to be co-ordinated are being continuously told how to carry 
them out. It implies, rather, the setting up, for a chosen purpose, of an organisation in which people 
with appropriate skills, aided by appropriate fixed equipment, are given appropriate roles. The roles 
established, and the relationships between them, are designed to be such that if all the members of the 
organisation further the particular aims set for them the aim of the organisation will itself be realised. 
*** 
Within a firm, it is often remarked, hierarchy prevails. It does, but one should not imagine 
that, for this reason, the firm works by means of commands which originate from the top and are filled 
in with appropriate detail at each operational level. It is doubtful that even armies and navies function 
                                                 
18 Some of these rules also have a spontaneous character as in the case of those that result from 
cognitive similitude in the interpretation of the environmental context and behavioural regularities 
derived from shared cultural patterns, while others are deliberately designed (namely the laws enforced 
by the State): “some such rules all individuals of society will obey because of the similar manner in 
which their environment represents itself to their minds. Other they will follow spontaneously because 
they will be part of their common cultural tradition. But there will be still others which they may have 
to be made to obey, since, although it would be in the interest of each to disregard them, the overall 
order on which the success of their actions depends will arise only if these rules are generally 
followed” (Hayek in Moldofsky 1989, p. 109). 
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 in this manner, far less so-called “command economies”. Management does not consist just in giving 
orders from the bridge though this is part of it, but, rather, in creating, monitoring and, when need be, 
modifying a system of working relationships designed to ensure that each person employed by the 
organisation, by doing the specified job allotted to him, will further an overarching purpose. A chief 
executive can scarcely do more harm than by spending all his time telling people what to do. 
*** 
 
At the societal level, efficient economic coordination will always rest upon a 
combination of both spontaneous order and deliberate organisation. At the micro 
level, coordinating the efforts of limited groups of men with a view to achieving some 
particular ends will be more adequately fulfilled in the context of organisational 
entities structured according to hierarchical-authoritarian guidelines. At the macro 
level, synchronising the activities of these several organisations and separate 
individuals will be accomplished more effectively through forces conducive to the 
formation of spontaneous order. Our ability to influence such an order will be 
confined to some general aspects that define its overall nature and not the particular 
circumstances through which it will reveal itself in practice. However, that is the way 
efficient coordination can be brought into a system comprising elements of such 
number, diversity and variety of conditions that no human mind could ever supervise. 
In between the macro and micro level we can think of a third intermediate 
layer (meso level) aggregating forms of inter-organisational coordination premised on 
a hybrid ordering logic. Hayek does not explicitly acknowledge these structures in his 
discussion of spontaneous and concrete order. However some of his writtings seem to 
herald the possibility of such a conceptualisation: 
 
*** 
“The spontaneous order which we call society also need not have such sharp boundaries as an 
organisation will usually possess. There will often be a nucleus, or several nuclei, of more closely 
related individuals occupying a central position in a more loosely connected but more extensive order. 
Such particular societies within the Great Society may arise as the result of spatial proximity, or some 
other spatial circumstances which produce closer relations among their members. And different partial 
societies of this sort will often overlap and every individual may, in addition to being member of the 
Great Society, be a member of numerous other spontaneous sub-orders or partial societies of this sort 
as well as of various organisations existing within the comprehensive Great Society” (in Moldofsky, 






NIE conceptualises governance as an exercise of organisation aimed at 
minimising transaction costs defined in a narrow sense – costs deriving from 
combinations of incomplete information, bounded rationality, and opportunistic 
behaviour. By shedding light over specific aspects of transactions that can generate 
significant costs of this kind (e.g. asset specificity), NIE provides a useful set of tools 
with which to understand defining elements of the optimal boundaries of the firm 
(including public service providers). The approach, however, it is not exempt from 
limitations. 
The study of the internal characteristics of hierarchies and their costs by new 
institutional economists remains an underdeveloped area. Whether or not the 
transaction costs apparatus is helpful for shedding light over the fundamental 
characteristics of the different modes of governance that determine their comparative 
efficiency in coordinating different kinds of transactions is the subject of controversy. 
Some authors argue that transaction costs concern exclusively market exchanges, and 
that the analysis of administrative/bureaucratic costs requires employing other 
research tools (Demsetz, 1988a; 2002). Other authors lay emphasis on the need to 
better identify the costs involved in the trade-off among different organisational 
arrangements (Masten et al., 1991; Joskow, 2005). 
The importance ascribed to the vertical integration decision is responsible for 
the construction of rather narrow and simplistic theory. It avoids a variety of 
complications that emerge in transactions between firms and consumers, including 
disparities of information; differential access to technical and legal expertise; 
differential capacity to bear risk, etc (Williamson, 2004). By doing so, it ignores 
attributes of transactions other then asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency that 
are likely to be critical for describing transactions and that should be factored in. 
The next chapter brings together elements of NIE and resource-based theories 
of the firm under a broader conception of economic organisation. The purpose of such 
an exercise is to overcome the limitations of both NIE and resource-based theories to 
explain economic organisation, and to build a more comprehensive understanding of 
the relationship between governance and efficiency.  
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 Chapter 3: Modes of Governance and Efficiency 
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 3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework that underpins the research 
hypotheses on the relationship between governance and efficiency empirically tested 
in the second part of the thesis.      
The expansion of production in modern economies has been accomplished in 
large measure through specialisation, according to which any one individual performs 
only a tiny fraction of the kinds of tasks required to make what he or she consumes. 
The benefits of this process, however, can only be extracted if some degree of 
coordination between the actions of each individual is achieved. Coordinating the 
actions of the various individual actors so that they form a coherent plan and 




“…created entities within and through which people interact to reach individual and collective 
economic goals. The economic system consists of a network of people and organisations, with lower-
level organisations linked together through higher-level organisations. 
The highest-level organisation is the economy as a whole. While it is somewhat unusual to 
think of an entire economy as an organisation, this perspective is useful because it emphasizes that the 
economic system is a human creation and because many of the problems that smaller, more formal 
organisations face exist at the economy-wide level as well”. 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p.19) 
*** 
 
Economic organisation is essentially about bringing order into systems of 
human interaction. Order can be accomplished through a multitude of modes of 
governance, a continuum ranging from hierarchies to markets, i.e. from conscious 
deliberate design to spontaneous self-reinforcing order stemming from the 
aggregation of self-interested individual actions. 
This notion of economic organisation is analytically distinct from that of 
formal organisations (corporations, government agencies, labour unions, universities, 
churches, etc). The first and foremost defining characteristic of formal organisations 
is their independent legal identity, enabling them to enter binding contracts and to 
seek their court enforcement in their own name. This characteristic has been 
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 extensively explored by contractarian theories of organisation19, which see firms as 
nexus of contracts, treaties and understandings amongst their members, i.e. legal 
fictions that allow members to achieve their aims without requiring the operation of 
complex, multilateral agreements between them. The second defining characteristic of 
formal organisations is their functional autonomy (they are largely free from 
intervention by outside parties in their internal operation). This second feature helps 
to draw the effective boundaries of formal organisations by intrinsically incorporating 
other aspects of organisational architecture apart from the legal element20. 
Formal organisations tend to be associated with a specific form of economic 
organisation - the hierarchical mode of governance. This association is far from being 
univocal and deterministic however. The transactions taking place within formal 
organisations do not necessarily have to be coordinated by command and authority. 
The extent to which the underlying governing structure approximates the hierarchical 
ideal will vary in accordance with the nature of the transactions themselves. 
The fundamental unit of analysis in economic organisation theory is the 
transaction, defined as the transfer of goods and services from one individual to 
another. Central to economic transactions are individual human beings in the role of 
indivisible decision makers and actors who create and manage organisations, the 
performance of which can only be judged with reference to their needs, wants and 
personal objectives. The key problem of economic organisation - the coordination of 
individual decisions and actions so that the potential gains of productive specialisation 
and cooperation may be appropriated - can thus be aptly defined as a problem of 
optimising the way transactions are conducted (i.e. a problem of organisational 
efficiency). 
Achieving efficiency in the coordination and motivation of the decisions and 
actions of producers and consumers depends on how the information required for 
optimal allocation of resources and subsequent adaptations is managed (information 
about individual tastes, technological opportunities and resource availabilities). The 
                                                 
19 Originally advanced by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). 
20 Examples of these elements are the patterns of resource and information flows; the authority and 
control relationships and the distribution of effective power; the allocation of responsibilities and 
decision rights; organisational routines and decision-making processes; the methods for attracting and 
retaining members and resources; the means by which  new ideas and knowledge are generated and 
diffused throughout the organisation; the adaptation of the organisation’s routines to reflect and 
implement organisational learning; the organisation’s expressed objectives and the strategies and 
tactics employed; and the means used to unify the goals and behaviour of the individual members of 
the organisation and the objectives of the organisation as a whole (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 20).    
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 high degree of dispersion of this information throughout the economy, i.e. the fact that 
it is not known to any single person or institution in society as it is mainly localised 
and diffused amongst economic agents, largely contributes to obscuring the process of 
setting up an optimal mechanism for coordination. In theory two general solutions are 
feasible. Either transmit the dispersed information to a central planner who is then left 
with the task of computing the data and providing a solution to the resource-allocation 
problem, or else put in place a more decentralised system that involves less 
information transmission, delegating at least part of the decisional power to those who 
actually hold local information. The main challenge to the first option resides in 
shaping the system in a way that enables timely decisions to be made while still 
moderating the costs associated with information communication and planning. The 
alternative of decentralisation, in turn, needs to tackle the problem of ensuring that 
autonomous individual decisions drawing extensively on local knowledge yield a 
coherent and synchronized result. 
These two extreme solutions to the problem of economic organisation are 
epitomised by the traditional, long-debated dichotomy that opposes a system of 
markets and prices to a system of central planning of economic activity. Taking the 
market mechanism of coordination to its limit, all transactions could take place 
between separate individuals on an arm’s length basis without there ever being the 
need for the creation and maintenance of other kinds of organisation except for the 
market system itself21. Conversely, accepting the prescriptions of a system of central 
planning in its full expression would involve the complete elimination of the price 
system and the subsequent absorption of all relevant decisions within a single 
hierarchical organisation. The same line of reasoning can be adopted, without 
revision, as we move down the scale from coordinating complex systems of economic 
activity at the national level to simpler and more localised transactional systems like 
those of small business enterprises. Hence, as two extreme modes of governance, 
markets and hierarchies are in theory applicable to any problem of economic 
coordination irrespective of the operational scale.  
                                                 
21 In such a world each stage of production would be organised as a separate entity/firm and the 
transactions between stages would be intermediated by the market. If we picture a production line, it is 
as if each person/firm is buying input from the person/firm on one side and selling output to the next 
person/firm in the production line. Examples drawn from the private sector, namely comparisons 
between American and Japanese car manufacturers, seem to demonstrate that this kind of alternative is 
far from being surreal. 
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 In practice, however, efficient coordination of economic affairs requires the 
coexistence of both mechanisms. History shows that even in the most centralised 
economic systems a vast amount of decisions were left to the individual sphere and 
were partially guided by prices. On the other hand, modern capitalist societies are 
made of formal organisations interacting with each other through the market, and 
within these organisations transactions are coordinated through hierarchical structures 
of authority and command. 
The reason why the optimal solution for coordinating economic activities 
involves a mixture of market and hierarchy is to do with the fact that while these 
mechanisms can in principle be used in the coordination of any kind of transactions, 
the efficiency attained by each mechanism will vary with the nature, magnitude and 
complexity of the coordination process required. 
In the presence of problems with design attributes (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992), in which there is a great deal of a priori information about the form of the 
optimal solution, i.e. about how the variables should be related, and where failing to 
achieve the right relationship among the variables is generally extremely costly, 
centralised coordination tends to reduce the cost of errors and the amount of 
communication and search necessary to identify the optimal solution. Problems with 
innovation attributes, in which the optimal allocation of resources depends on 
information not accessible to any of the participating individuals, also require 
centralised coordination for gathering, developing, and communicating that 
information to the relevant stakeholders. Finally, problems with public good 
attributes, externalities, merit good attributes, and/or information asymmetries also 
lead decentralised coordinating mechanisms to produce inefficient outcomes. In this 
case, public central coordination is required to generate an efficient allocation of 
resources. 
At the other end of the spectrum, it has been formally demonstrated that, under 
specific conditions, no system can solve the problem of coordinating economic 
activity at the societal level more efficiently than a system of markets (Arrow and 
Debreu, 1954). The price mechanism requires the transmission of less information 
than any other system capable of producing an equally effective outcome. In a 
perfectly competitive market the transmission of detailed information (about 
preferences, technological possibilities, resource availabilities, etc) is reduced to a 
minimum. The knowledge synthesised by the price system ensures that individual 
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 decisions are harmonized while conveying less information than that required by 
central coordination to achieve a similar outcome. Alongside this information-saving 
feature, equally valuable is the market’s motivational power, that is its ability to 
channel individually self-interested behaviour towards the generation of an efficient, 
coordinated collective pattern of choices. 
 
Different modes of governance yield different levels of efficiency depending 
on the nature and scale of the transactions upon which they are deployed. In other 
words, different modes of governance entail different costs in coordinating 
transactions, and these costs should be the decisive criterion to determine which 
transactions ought to be coordinated through markets and which should instead be 
centrally coordinated. 
Transactions costs comprehend all the costs of running a governance 
mechanism, including costs of coordinating and motivating individual/organisational 
decisions. 
In a market system, transaction costs of coordination are reflected in the 
determination of prices and other details of the transactions; in the dissemination and 
acquisition of information on the existence and location of potential buyers and 
sellers; and in the process whereby buyers and sellers convene to transact22. In a 
hierarchical system, transaction costs of coordination emerge in the transmission of 
the dispersed information required to elaborate a central plan; in processing that 
information so as to devise the plan itself; and in communicating the ensuing 
guidelines to those responsible for implementing it. During the course of this process 
there are costs borne out directly from the compilation and transmission of 
information but also time costs of delay between the moment decisions need to be 
made and the instant the planned instructions are actually communicated and 
implemented. Finally, there are also costs of maladaptation resulting from 
unavoidable imperfections (incompleteness and inaccuracy) in the collection and 
transmission of information as well as from the limited ability of central planners to 
process the data received. 
                                                 
22 In practical terms, on the sellers’ side transaction costs of coordination in a market system 
encapsulate expenditures on such things as market research, advertising and other marketing 
categories, managerial decisions determining the prices to charge, etc. From the buyers’ perspective 
they condense the costs associated with the time spent searching for suppliers and for the best 
contractual terms. Furthermore, they include lost benefits not realised due to imperfect matching of 
buyers and sellers.    
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 Transaction costs associated with the motivational dimension of the 
organisational problem comprise both costs of informational incompleteness and 
asymmetries and costs of imperfect commitment. In the first case mutually 
advantageous transactions fail to occur or costly arrangements need to be put in place 
on account of lack of relevant information to determine whether the terms of the 
agreements are mutually acceptable and/or are actually being met. In the second case 
the incapacity of contractual parties to commit to their own promises and threats 
creates missed opportunities and/or expenditures intended to facilitate commitment or 
protect against opportunism. In spite of manifesting themselves in different ways, 
both types of costs are present in market and non-market governance mechanisms. 
The diverse nature and intensity they assume under each organisational form implies 
that for the coordination of specific type of transactions, one form may be better 
suited than another. 
 
3.2 The Meaningfulness of a Discrete Structural Typology 
  
In the past, some authors have challenged the analytical meaningfulness of the 
discrete structural typology “market-hybrids-hierarchy”. It has been suggested that the 
study of social and economic coordination requires the employment of different 
models in combination or in a comparative framework (Goldberg, 1980; 
Stinchcombe, 1985; Eccles and Crane, 1987; and Bradach and Eccles, 1989). The idea 
is effectively captured by Thompson’s (1991, p.2) analogy of models-torch: 
 
*** 
 “…by shining our model-torch on the complexity of social existence we only expect it to 
highlight some of that complexity. In our case we clearly have three torches to work with – one labelled 
hierarchy, one labelled markets and the third labelled networks. If we were to shine each of them on to 
that aspect of running the country under examination, we would expect each torch to highlight just a 
part of the landscape. Perhaps one or other of the torches would highlight more than the others do. As a 
result we can say which of the models was most appropriate in analysing that particular aspect of social 
existence under scrutiny. So our models act as a kind of sifting device”. 
*** 
 
Taken to an extreme, this argument has been used to raise doubts over the 
analytical value of the distinction between markets, hierarchies and hybrids. Some 
authors have claimed that organisational reality is exclusively composed of hybrid 
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 forms of coordinating exchanges, i.e. interdependent combinations of price, authority 
and trust in ways that are not compatible with a mutually exclusive vision of the 
relationship between their respective models of coordination: 
 
*** 
 “…it is becoming clear that market, hierarchy and relational contracting are not mutually 
exclusive control mechanisms. For instance, relational contracts are frequently laced with elements of 
hierarchy…markets exhibit traits of hierarchies, and hierarchies display properties of markets…These 
studies suggest that the control mechanisms, price, authority, and trust – which map roughly on to 
market, hierarchy, and relational contracting – are useful concepts provided we recognize that they are 
independent and can be combined with each other in a variety of ways”. 
(Bradach and Eccles, 1989, p.99) 
*** 
 
This argument is founded in a reductionist, linear association of each model to 
a specific and distinctive coordinating/control mechanism (price, authority and trust, 
respectively). Thompson (1991, p.15) contends that “if it is price competition the 
central coordinating mechanism of the market and administrative orders that of 
hierarchy, then it is trust and cooperation that centrally articulates networks”. In the 
same vein, for Bradach and Eccles (1989, p.99) “the control mechanisms, price, 
authority, and trust map roughly on to market, hierarchy, and relational contracting”. 
Often this linear association between structures and mechanisms is stretched to the 
point of developing into an identity. Hence markets become mere synonyms with 
prices; hierarchy is subsumed under the label “authority”; and hybrids are equated to 
trust. 
The approach to economic organisation adopted in this thesis deviates from 
this argument on the grounds that it ignores that each of the three elements (prices, 
authority and trust) per se are not exclusive to, or defining features of each model. 
Markets require a certain level of trust in order to work properly23 as well as 
coercive authority in the form of law. In order for markets to operate efficiently 
transactions need to be framed by credible commitments. These commitments are 
                                                 
23 As both Arrow (1974) and Luhmann (1979) have noted, trust is a remarkably efficient lubricant to 
economic exchange since in trusting another party one treats as certain those aspects of life which 
modernity rendered uncertain, reducing complex realities far more quickly and economically that 
prediction, authority or bargain. 
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 supported by formal mechanisms such as specific contractual clauses, but also 
informal mechanisms where trust and reputation play an important role. 
Hierarchies are not exclusively dependent on authority. As we mentioned in 
the previous chapter, in order to provide credible alternative to markets as a 
governance mechanism when tight coordination is required, hierarchies entail a 
complex combination of control, cooperation, and communication. In particular, they 
require subsidiary rules that delegate power for individuals to make decisions on the 
basis of their judgments about the details of each situation (which inevitably involves 
some degree of trust). In fact, as the level of organisational complexity increases the 
critical drivers for control shift from enforcement of specific commands to reliance on 
these rules. 
Finally, hybrid forms of organisation do not rely exclusively on trust as a 
coordinating mechanism either. Hybrids are manifestly unsustainable if deprived of 
structures of authority for articulating their behaviour and solving possible disputes 
between their members. They are equally unsustainable if deprived of decentralised 
coordinating mechanisms for the conduction of operations where local knowledge is 
of paramount importance.   
 
Central to the theory explored in this chapter is the idea that markets and 
hierarchies are the two basic, distinct forms of bringing about order in socio-economic 
systems (Hayek, 1973). 
By means of spontaneous ordering forces the market mechanism exploits 
knowledge dispersed amongst numerous individuals without it ever being 
concentrated in and limited to the planning of a single mind. This facilitates 
coordination at a level of complexity24 that could not have been mastered by 
deliberate human design. Such capacity however comes at the cost of external 
inability to control the concrete content of the resulting order. 
For the performance of limited tasks (such as those which bring together 
groups of individuals into organisations), concrete order deliberately created through 
exogenous forces resting on hierarchical structures of command proves to be the most 
efficient coordinating mechanism insofar as it enables a superior degree of control 
                                                 
24 Both in terms of the number of the elements involved and the intricacy of the relationships between 
them. 
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 over the ensuing order, forcing individual action to align with the specific purposes of 
the ruling authority. 
These two key mechanisms of coordinating economic transactions have rules 
of their own that cannot be adulterated in the way we find most convenient: 
 
*** 
“Though spontaneous order and organisation will always coexist, it is still not possible to mix 
these two principles of order in any manner we like. If this is not more generally understood it is due to 
the fact that for the determination of both kinds of order we have to rely on rules, and that the important 
differences between the kinds of rules which the two different kinds of order require are generally not 
recognized”. 
(Hayek in Moldofsky, 1989, p.112) 
*** 
 
Amid the ideals of spot market transactions and pure hierarchical structures of 
command there are hybrid, specially crafted modes of governance (amongst which 
typical inter-organisational coordination is included) resting on intermediate levels of 
(de)centralisation of information. Hence, hybrids fall in between the two extremes of 
fully decentralised organisational systems entirely driven by market forces on the one 
hand, and fully centralised hierarchical/bureaucratic authority-driven organisations.  
The triptych “hierarchy-hybrid-market” contains different approaches to the 
generation of order. They may not be perfectly descriptive of social and economic 
systems. However, as ideal references as to how coordination can be brought about 
they allow us to make progress in understanding the extraordinary diversity of 
economic arrangements found in empirical reality. 
   
3.3 Decentralised Coordination - Spot Market Transactions 
 
The problem of economic organisation is one of providing individuals with the 
information required for them to make coherent decisions (i.e. parts of an efficient 
overall plan), and to motivate them to perform their parts of the plan. A critical claim 
of neoclassical economics and perhaps the most prominent result of the economic 
science at large is that, under certain circumstances, a system of prices is able to 
perform such tasks more efficiently than any other system. 
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 According to the first Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics (Pareto, 
1906; Barone, 1908; Lerner, 1934; Hotelling, 1938; Lange, 1942; Allais, 1943), if 
each productive unit knows the prices, its own individual production technology and 
maximises its own profits at the prevailing prices; if each consumer knows the prices 
and his/her own individual preferences and then maximises utility given the 
prevailing prices and his/her income; and if prices are such that supply equals demand 
for each good and service, then the ensuing allocation of resources is Pareto efficient - 
given all the restrictions in terms of available resources and technological 
possibilities, no other allocation is unanimously preferred. 
Individuals and organisations acting on a self-interested basis, combining their 
local knowledge with the information synthesised by prices, and attempting to 
maximise their utilities and profits are motivated to carry out a plan that will lead 
them to an efficient outcome. The process whereby the price mechanism leads to a 
Pareto efficiency hinges on the notion of rate of substitution. Leaving the 
mathematical formalisation of the concept aside, Friedrich Hayek provides an 
insightful synthesis of the role rates of substitution play in the coordination of 
transactions, and how prices relate to them: 
 
*** 
“The crucial point here – which, it must be admitted, even leading classical economists down 
to John Stuart Mill did not understand – is the universal significance of changing rates of substitution 
between different commodities. This simple insight, which helped us at last to understand the role of 
differences and variability of the prices of different commodities, began slowly to develop with the 
recognition – I will not say the discovery, since of course every simple peasant knew the facts if not 
their theoretical significance – of decreasing returns from successive applications of labour and capital 
to land. It was next found to govern, under the name of decreasing marginal utility, the rates of 
marginal substitution between different consumers’ goods. And it was finally discovered to be the 
universal relation prevailing between all useful resources, determining at once if they are economically 
the same or different, and if they are scarce or not. Only when it was understood that changing supplies 
of the different factors of production (or means of satisfaction) determines their variable marginal rate 
of substitution, was the indispensability of known rates of equivalence (or rates of marginal 
substitution) for any efficient calculation fully understood. Only when it was at last seen that through 
market prices this rate of equivalence in all their different uses, mostly known only to a few of the 
many persons who would like to use them, could be made equal to the rates at which any pair of 
commodities could be substituted in any of its countless uses, was the indispensable function of prices 
in a complex economy fully understood. 
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 Variable “marginal rates of substitution” for different commodities, to which I have 
previously referred, naturally mean their temporary rates of equivalence determined by the situation at 
the moment, and at which these things must be substitutable at the margin in all their possible uses – if 
we are to get their full capacity out of them. 
It was both the understanding of the function of changing rates of equivalence between 
physically defined objects as the basis of calculation, and the communication function of prices which 
combined into a single signal all the information on these circumstances dispersed among large 
numbers of people, which at last made it fully clear to every person who could follow the argument that 
rational calculation in a complex economy is possible only in terms of values or prices, and that these 
values will be adequate guides only if they are the joint efforts, such as the values formed on the 
market, of all the knowledge of potential suppliers or consumers about their possible uses and 
availability”. 
(in Moldovsky, 1989, p.132) 
*** 
 
A critical aspect of a competitive market system is that it involves the minimal 
information transmission compatible with the determination of an efficient allocation 
of resources25. A price-guided, decentralised system of coordination does not entail 
the transmission of detailed information about resource availability, consumer 
preferences and technological opportunities that a centrally planned system would do. 
Decisions on resource allocation are left to the individuals and organisations with 
whom context-specific knowledge on preferences, endowments and production 
possibilities reside26. The price system conveys to the individuals the minimum 
additional knowledge they need to fit their plans with those of others, and by so 
                                                 
25 The Hurwicz criterion is one of the most widely applied references for judging informational 
efficiency: “Suppose that there is no a priori information about the optimal resource allocation, so that 
given what any single producer or consumer knows, any allocation of society’s limited resources might 
still be efficient. Suppose too that each producer is uniquely well informed about its own productive 
capabilities and each consumer alone knows his or her own preferences and what amounts of various 
goods he or she initially owns, so that no single agent alone has the information needed to compute an 
efficient allocation of resources. Then any system capable of supporting an efficient resource allocation 
using augmented plans must communicate, in addition to the plan, at least one additional variable for 
each separate good or resource, minus one” (in Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p.102). 
In conditions of perfectly competitive equilibrium the price system communicates one additional 
variable (the price) for each good after the numeraire (the good with reference to which other goods’ 
prices are expressed, historically gold or silver) and achieves economic efficiency with an absolute 
minimum of information transmission. 
26 The importance of this feature has been vividly captured by Richardson (1998, p. 53): “against the 
disadvantages of the decentralised approach have to be set the difficulties, which complexity soon 
make insurmountable, inherent in the timely and continuous collection of, processing of, and acting 
upon information that centralised deployment would require. Decentralisation has advantages, of 
course, in terms of motivating and developing those taking the decisions, but recourse to it is essential, 
most fundamentally, because complex tasks requiring much detailed and “local” information have to be 
broken down into parts, each of which becomes the responsibility of particular persons or group”. 
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 doing, brings a coherent pattern into the economic system - an admirable mechanism 
given that “it is not the product of human design and that the people guided by it 
usually do not know why they are made to do what they do” (Hayek, 1945, p.527). 
Perhaps one of the most impressive expressions of the power of the market 
mechanism is the fact that formal hierarchical organisations are increasingly 
recreating the functioning of the market in conducting their own operations. Modern 
multidivisional organisations, for example, make extensive use of financial controls, 
performance measurement indicators and internal transfer pricing systems for 
coordinating intra-organisational transactions, which represents an obvious attempt to 
mimic some of the characteristic features of markets as governance devices. The 
multidivisional form seeks to put in place mechanisms that ensure decisions made at 
the local level by those with whom the relevant local knowledge resides are 
coordinated and guided by proper incentives. Senior management usually retains 
primary roles in critical areas where global coordination is required such as in raising 
outside capital, allocating resources among divisions, appointing and evaluating 
divisional managers, and mastering the firm’s overall strategic direction. With some 
degree of variation all other decisions and activities are delegated to divisional 
managers who normally control context-specific variables such as research and 
development, design, engineering, procurement, personnel, manufacturing, marketing 
and sales27. 
 
3.3.1 Decentralised Coordination and Public Service Provision 
 
Recent reforms in the public sector also provide interesting examples of how 
some of the virtues of the market are being recreated in areas traditionally coordinated 
through centrally-driven modes of governance. 
In the provision of primary and secondary education services in the OECD for 
example, although governments are still responsible for most of the funding, they are 
increasingly relying on the transfer of public funds to privately managed schools as a 
means of defining an institutional environment that induces efficient behaviour. 
Furthermore, successive reforms throughout the last decades have transformed the 
way in which the public sector operates as a service provider. The drive for efficiency 
                                                 
27 “As Voltaire said of God, if prices did not exist, we should have to invent them, and in the design of 
the internal arrangements of a firm, this is what we in fact do” (Richardson, 1998, p. 52). 
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 led many countries to opt for decentralising decision-making authority to schools and 
lower levels of governments. This has been accomplished in the expectation it will 
enable downsizing of central education administration; elimination of superfluous 
layers of bureaucracy; and improvement of chains of command in decision making, 
delivering a larger proportion of financial and human resources directly to local 
governments, schools, and students (Behrman, et al., 2002). In chapter 5 we find 
evidence of a negative effect of the share of public providers on efficiency and of a 
positive effect of decentralisation on efficiency. 
In the health sector, increasing disappointment with the rigidity, inertia and 
apparent inefficiency of bureaucratic national health systems has also triggered a 
series of market-inspired reforms. In the OECD the quest for efficiency has led many 
countries to separate purchasers from providers within public integrated systems, to 
strengthen purchasers’ agency role within the health-care system, and more generally 
to shift towards more independent producers with greater management independence 
and responsibility. Contracting-out selected activities has also increased, and a limited 
number of countries have experimented with greater competition among hospitals. 
Chapter 6 shows evidence of a positive link between some of these reform 
movements and health care efficiency – public integrated systems with active 
purchaser provider split are found to outperform public integrated systems without 
active purchaser provider split in terms of efficiency.  
In the social protection field, the financial sustainability of traditional 
Bismarckian systems rooted in the state’s monopolistic provision of social insurance 
has also been called into question in recent years. In attempting to protect individuals 
of certain corporatist groups from inappropriate voluntary self-protection, these 
systems often fail to protect those who are in most need. They also leave a very small 
margin for individual voluntary action in the insurance market, which results in a 
substantial share of social transfers being allocated on a categorical basis and 
redistributed horizontally. Beveridgian systems, on the other hand, lay emphasis on a 
basic role for the state in the provision of social insurance. They acknowledge the 
need for state intervention (generally in the form of flat-rate insurance benefits 
covering as large a proportion of the population as possible), but leave protection 
above a given minimum to be acquired in the market through voluntary social 
insurance. Chapter 7 shows evidence of this market-inspired policy approach clearly 
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 improving the targeting of transfers towards the poor, and therefore the efficiency of 
social expenditure. 
 
3.4 Centralised Coordination - Hierarchy 
 
One of the basic economic reasons for the existence of the public sector is the 
correction of situations where the market fails to organise efficiently transactions 
associated with particular goods, services or activities. When markets fail, however, 
governments are not the only ones that can step in to remove, avoid or mitigate 
whatever factors are preventing markets from achieving efficiency. Private 
individuals and firms also dispose of and in fact exercise the option to use nonmarket 
forms of organisation that enable them to meet more thoroughly their economic goals 
(Chandler, 1977). 
Formal organisations are one particular expression of such exercise. They 
represent conscious efforts to supplant the market mechanism when planned central 
coordination proves to be more efficient a mechanism for coordinating economic 
activities. 
Formal organisations do not always set their dealings with one another on the 
basis of simple market transactions. They often coexist in dense networks of co-
operation and affiliation with other organisations, which represent another example of 
deliberately created nonmarket forms of organisation. These networks may be geared 
towards creating stable trading relationships so that demand expectations are made 
more reliable and thereby production planning facilitated; they may have the purpose 
of inducing sub-contractors to assume the risks inherent to investments in specialised 
skills and equipments and permitting continuing cooperation between parties involved 
in the development of specifications, processes and designs; or they may be a vehicle 
for pooling or transferring technology, just to name a few examples. 
As we have been arguing, the particular governance mechanism that proves to 
be more efficient in generating economic coordination is a function of the nature and 
scale of the transactions onto which the mechanism is applied. 
Some transactions have to be put into a precise relationship in respect of their 
character, magnitude and timing as they exhibit properties of systematic close 
complementarity (Richardson, 1998). Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p.91) refer to these 
transactions as involving design attributes, situations in which “there is a great deal of 
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 a priori information about the form of the optimal solution, that is, about how the 
variables should be related, and failing to achieve the right relationship among the 
variables is generally more costly then are other kinds of errors, including slight 
misspecifications of the overall pattern, as long as the individual pieces fit”28. 
Examples of problems with design attributes include tasks of synchronization 
and assignment. Common to both tasks is a sense of urgency about the decision; the 
extreme dependence of the optimal course of action on particular circumstances; and 
the substantial knowledge hold by some central entity about the form of an optimal 
decision. Under these conditions, using a centralised governance mechanism that 
directly communicates the design variables themselves to ensure coordination is 
generally more efficient than a decentralised alternative solution such as the one 
projected by a system of prices. The inadequacy of the price mechanism in this 
particular instance lies in the excessive level of information it requires to provide a 
solution to the coordination problem and also in its difficulty to avoid costly failures 
of synchronization or fit29. 
When design problems arise repeatedly, calling essentially for similar 
solutions, centralised coordination is normally abandoned in favour of the 
implementation of routines that ensure decentralised solutions to the recurrent design 
problems. Routines provide the human assets of formal organisations with the 
opportunity to exercise judgement and act accordingly, within the general framework 
set by the subsidiary rules of the organisation. This freedom of action means that the 
interactions among members of the organisation will tend to establish ever-new rules 
for the coordination of their activities, although they will always be framed within the 
rules set by the commanding authority (Ioannides, 2003; Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Given their spontaneous nature, these routines can be seen as embodying tacit 
knowledge shared by the human assets of the organisation, enabling them to cope 
with ignorance and to bring order to their collective actions. In the words of Richard 
Langlois (1992, p.176), “the personnel of a firm follow, invent, learn and imitate 
routines that persist over time. As in Hayek’s theory of culture, the routines are often 
                                                 
28 Milgrom and Roberts (1992) also refer to these transactions as exhibiting design connectedness 
properties – transactions extremely sensitive to problems of maladaptation to the system they are part 
of, which usually leads to the strengthening of central coordination mechanisms.  
29 If some of the information is missing or inaccurate the performance of the price system deteriorates 
more sharply than in the case of central coordination (the brittleness/sensitivity of the price system is 
thus greater in comparison with more centralised alternatives). 
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 tacit and skill-like, followed unconsciously because they produced success in the 
past”. 
Transactions with innovation attributes are another typical domain for central 
coordination. When the optimal allocation of resources depends on information not 
accessible to anyone alone at the operating level of the organisation, it becomes 
necessary for someone to gather, develop, and communicate that information to 
decision makers in the organisation. Local knowledge may still have to be combined 
with new information so that effective coordination may be achieved. However, in 
such circumstances a decentralised system like the price mechanism, built on 
individual responses formulated on the basis of localised information will often be 
inappropriate for the achievement of an optimal coordinating plan. 
 Some of the most important problems of strategic decision-making in formal 
organisations display both design attributes and/or innovation attributes, which run 
counter to using prices or other decentralised models of coordination and favour 
centralised control. 
The scale, scope and core competencies of the organisation are all design 
variables that can be more efficiently administered through a centrally-driven 
approach. Operational scale is a design variable because it has predictable 
implications for the various parts of the organisation, and errors deriving from 
incorrect perceptions of scale by some parts of the organisation can be very costly. In 
a typical formal organisation the anticipated volume of activity influences any 
decision on production capacity, size of sales force, supplies, distribution equipment 
and facilities, etc. Everyone in the organisation needs a shared vision of the intended 
scale of operations if their actions are to be coherent. Economies of scale achieved in 
the manufacture of components used in several products30 also increase the need for 
central coordination since the optimal scale of each product is an increasing function 
of the predicted scale of the other products that use the same components. Equally 
important a kind of economy of scale, entailing similar needs of coordination, is the 
one that concerns the core competencies of the organisation, the acquisition of 
knowledge, experience and skills required to design and trade new products in a set of 
related markets or in using a set of related technologies31.  
                                                 
30 Also designated as economies of scope. 
31 In a certain sense, these competencies or capabilities (Richardson, 1972) are shared components 
whose costs are spread among a series of products that do not yet exist. 
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  The existence of complementarities between a set of activities is one of the 
most important sources of design attributes32. Organisational strategies themselves are 
made of complementary dimensions. In an industrial context this is reflected in the 
fact that a company’s business strategy encompasses decisions over essentially 
complementary issues, including product strategy, manufacturing policy, equipment 
choice, human resource management, supplier relations, accounting methods, etc. 
Again, central coordination is required so that the various parts of the organisational 
strategy may be connected and aligned properly in an optimal way. 
In addition to design attributes, organisational strategies also involve 
innovation attributes since the information necessary to identify the optimal strategy 
and the specific pattern that enables its pieces to fit together is often not available 
within the organisation, and thus needs to be acquired and compiled from the outside. 
Radical changes in the environment (for instance in demand conditions or production 
technologies), may call for equally radical shifts in strategy. Being confined to the use 
of local knowledge, the members of the organisation may only engage in processes 
whereby their decisions are marginally adjusted to the local movements in the 
environment. However, recognising that radical strategic shifts are necessary and 
estimating the benefits of such changes is most likely to require knowledge they do 




A firm is a system of organized co-operation. Where only a few complementary activities 
have to be fitted together, this can be achieved by co-operation between the relevant arties, each of 
them having a more or less equivalent say. It is possible for a handful of people to work out together a 
concerted plan of action and then to be jointly responsible for its execution. But even then it will prove 
at best laborious to agree whatever modifications in the plan will from time to time be required in order 
to meet changing circumstances. A leader is likely to emerge, or be chosen, and members of the group 
will tend usually to follow that leader, without having to be convinced at each and every stage that he 
or she is on the right road. Where the number of closely complementary activities or investments is 
large, where they have to be put into a precise relationship in respect of their character, magnitudes and 
timing, I have said, for want of a better term, that systematic close complementarity exists. In such 
circumstances, co-ordination requires direction. 
                                                 
32 In this context a group of activities is said to be mutually complementary if doing more of any one 
particular activity increases (or at least does not decreases) the marginal profitability of each other 
activity in the group. Complementarities introduce predictability into the relationships amongst the 
activities, which is precisely one of the defining features of design attributes.  
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 *** 
I cannot therefore agree with Coase that the existence of firms as to be attributed to the cost of 
using the price mechanism. As we shall see, a cost of this kind may be a consideration, even if not the 
principal one, in a firm’s decision to “make or buy” a necessary input, but to say that transactions costs 
explain the existence of firms is to reduce the role of conscious business planning to vanishing point. 
The term “price mechanism” may perhaps too readily lead us to think that resources are somehow 
allocated without human agency. The reality, as we know, is that things happen because people do 
things; in this context, firms and consumers do things on the basis of plans that they consciously make, 
but plans which by interacting in their execution are so modified as to become woven into an 
overarching economic order. 
Where ordering can be built up through incremental adjustment it can come about 
spontaneously, as a result, that is to say, of decisions taken by firms independently, without any 
consideration being given to their necessary integration. But where ordering relates to a set of closely 
complementary activities that must fit together in a specific way there must be conscious design and 
planned execution. And it is the function of management, at different levels within the organisation, to 
provide this. 
George Richardson (1998, p. 49,50) 
*** 
 
3.4.1 Public Central Coordination 
 
Decentralised coordination of transactions with design and/or innovation 
attributes is sub-optimal due to the brittleness of the system in dealing with imperfect 
information and excessive demands in terms of communication. The quest for 
efficiency then leads these types of transactions to be coordinated through formal 
organisations structured along hierarchical lines. 
Decentralised coordination of transactions with public good attributes, 
externalities, merit good attributes, and/or information asymmetries is also sub-
optimal and leads perfectly competitive markets to produce inefficient outcomes33. 
Under these circumstances, public central coordination is required to deal with these 
particular features of transactions and to generate an efficient allocation of resources. 
                                                 
33 The effect of increasing returns to scale in some industries is another classic example of a situation 
where the market, left to its own fate, is due to fail. In conditions of natural monopoly Pareto 
optimality requires a pricing policy that will result in significant losses for producers. From a private 
point of view the viability of production hinges on cooperation between producers with a view to 
acquiring market power. From a social point of view, however, such strategy would bring about 
allocative deadweight losses as a result of the ensuing reduction of output. In these circumstances 
public central coordination in the form of government regulation, subsidisation of producers or 
nationalised corporations may prove to be beneficial. 
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 Transactions with public good attributes are non-rival in their consumption, 
and non-excludable34 (Samulelson, 1954). Each of these two attributes (or a 
combination of both) is a potential cause for market failure (Stiglitz, 2000). On the 
one hand, problems of demand revelation associated with the dominance of non-
cooperative strategies enable individuals to “free-ride” by consuming the good 
without contributing to their provision. On the other hand, it may be inefficient for 
society as a whole to exclude those individuals from consumption (Head, 1974). The 
achievement of a cooperative solution in this case hinges on public central 
coordination and its ability to coerce tax contributions, especially when a high number 
of people are involved (Olson, 1993). 
Transactions subject to externalities reflect situations where the utility of some 
individuals is influenced by activities of others in a way that is not captured by the 
price mechanism (Buchanan and Stubblebine, 1962), thereby originating 
discrepancies between private and social costs and benefits. Public central 
coordination is required to take account of these external effects, and to achieve an 
efficient allocation of resources.    
The efficiency of decentralised coordination rests on the assumption that 
individuals are the best judges of their own welfare. Accepting that premise is 
equivalent to accepting that individuals think they ought to be sovereign consumers, 
also that they think they are able to be sovereign consumers and finally that they want 
to be sovereign consumers (Mooney, 1979). While these judgements may be valid in 
the vast majority of cases, there are situations where they may not hold due to limited 
information, limited consumer rationality (e.g. mental illness or other personal 
damage) and/or consumer delegation. In such cases of transactions with merit good 
attributes, “public policy [should] aim at an allocation of resources that deviates from 
that which is reflected by consumer sovereignty”35 (Musgrave, 1959, p. 9) – again for 
that purpose public central coordination is required.  
Deviation from the neoclassical assumption of perfect information is one of 
the strongest criticisms of a system of freely competitive markets (Arrow and Lind, 
1970). When one party to a transaction has more or better information than the other 
party decentralised coordination is bound to create inefficiency. The effects of 
                                                 
34 Once the good has been provided consumers cannot (at less than prohibitive cost) be excluded from 
consumption benefits, 
35 Musgrave classifies these situations as involving merit goods.  
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 asymmetrical information are particularly acute in private insurance markets where 
they give rise to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In those circumstances, 
public central coordination is often required so that a pooling equilibrium is reached 
by making the insurance compulsorily and regulating the ability of individuals and 
organisations to accept/reject contracts. 
 
3.4.2 Government Failure 
 
The case for public central coordination needs to be balanced with the 
idiosyncratic limitations of public bureaucracies and the political process. An 
imperfect market must be compared with an imperfect government. The relevant 
choice is not so much between an ideal norm (pure and perfect competition) and an 
existing imperfect institutional arrangement (the “real” market), but rather between 
alternative real and imperfect institutional arrangements (the market with or without 
external corrections)36. 
Numerous characteristics specific to political bureaucracies hinder the 
efficiency of governmental coordination. These need to be taken into account when 
calls for public central coordination are being made (Stiglitz, 2000). 
The organisational incentives of public bureaus are normally driven by 
political concerns and provide little incentive to maximise productivity. They are 
often monopolies operating in “non-contestable” markets, i.e. protected from potential 
competition due to possible entrance of other firms in the market. Because of public 
ownership, these monopolies face soft budget constraints (any losses are made up out 
of government revenues, and there is no threat of bankruptcy – Komai, 1986). 
The organisation of the public sector obeys civil service rules designed to 
ensure that public employees do not abuse their position and power, that governments 
hire and promote people on the basis of merit, and that their pay is appropriate. While 
these rules serve an important function, they introduce substantial rigidities to the 
management of personnel with significant effects in terms of incentives. In a similar 
vein, traditional public bureaucracies are subject to numerous procurement 
restrictions, destined to avoid abuses in government’s purchases, but with similar 
consequences on incentives and efficiency. The political restrictions on budget-
                                                 
36 An ideal norm can only be used as a reference or standard from which divergences may be assessed 
for all practical alternatives and the most efficient alternative selected (Demsetz, 1988c). 
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 setting processes are another source of inefficiency, particularly strong for long term 
capital investments. 
In the absence of profit-driven incentives and performance related rewards, 
individuals are often encouraged to pursue political goals, such as the power and 
social prestige of supervising large organisations. Rational, self-interested bureaucrats 
will tend to expand the production of public services beyond the socially optimal level 
(Niskanen, 1971). The development of such bureaucratic behaviour detrimental to 
efficiency is stimulated not only by improper individual incentives but also by the 
general lack of competition. 
One trait typical of public bureaucrats is their excessive levels of risk 
aversion. By following certain bureaucratic procedures that ensure that all actions are 
peer reviewed, public bureaucrats are able to absolve themselves of responsibility for 
errors. Since they do not bear the costs of excessive focus on bureaucratic procedures 
(the ensuing inefficiency is supported by the general body of tax payers), there is a 
tendency for these formal procedures to thrive37. 
Public choice theorists have also emphasised that public organisations are 
prone to failure because of three additional factors. First, there is no credible reason to 
believe that politicians will demand a pattern of goods and services that reflects the 
interest of society as a whole. Politicians act in accordance with their own interest, on 
many occasions producing benefits for interest groups38 as a result of vote trading, or 
pursuing policies involving short run highly visible outputs in detriment of the more 
beneficial, but less visible, medium and long run projects (Mueller, 2003). Moreover, 
the nature of the political process itself encourages imprecision in policy formulation. 
Clearly defined policies allow failure to be easily spotted. Yet, lack of precision in 
policy formulation is in itself a source of failure. Second, there is also no convincing 
reason to believe that the bureaucracy itself will carry out the instructions of 
politicians, since these instructions may well not be in line with the bureaucrats’ 
interests. Thirdly, public organisations are apt to be dynamically inefficient in 
developing technological and methodological innovations due to lack of competition 
and inability of individuals to collect the benefits of technical advance. 
                                                 
37 The need to follow a set of routines is not merely the result of bureaucrats’ self-interested behaviour 
but follows from the fiduciary relationship between government bureaucrats and funds they allocate, 
i.e. the “publicness” of the later. 
38 Interest groups in turn tend to concentrate on issues related with redistribution of income which yield 
greater and more immediate returns than pressuring for total production improvements (Olson, 1982). 
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 In general, the mechanisms that bring together supply and demand of public 
services in public bureaus are weak because it is “essentially a political process 
characterised by lags, bottlenecks, coalitions, log-rolling and other fuzzy attributes of 
political behaviour” (Wolf, 1988, p. 62). 
 
3.4.3 Public Central Coordination and Public Service Provision 
 
The virtues of central coordination have long had a strong echo in the 
provision of public services. In primary and secondary education, for example, 
governments are often forced to intervene in the funding of the services so as to 
correct/mitigate the effects of externalities and credit constraints that decentralised 
coordination fails to address. Externalities in education tend to occur because 
individuals interacting through a decentralised decision-making process are not likely 
to take into account the full effects of education on economic growth (Barro, 2001). 
Credit constraints arise when individuals are not able to borrow against their human 
capital. This limits the capacity of families to fund school education and to provide an 
appropriate educational environment during children formative years (Carneiro and 
Heckman, 2002)39. In both instances, governments may intervene by providing 
financial support and pushing the consumption of education closer to the societal 
optimal.  
The virtues of central decision-making in education appear to extend further to 
the service provision level. Since the early eighties, educational reforms in OECD 
countries have shifted decision-making authority in some areas (e.g. organisation of 
instruction40) to lower levels of the education system. However, increased school 
decision-making autonomy in some areas has been accompanied by greater influence 
of central authorities in other areas such as planning and structures41, through national 
assessment programmes and centrally established frameworks (OECD, 2004a).  
                                                 
39 Carneiro and Heckman (2002, p.3) refer to this credit constraint as “the inability of the child to buy 
the parental environment and genes that form the cognitive and noncognitive abilities required for 
success in school”. 
40 Student admissions; student careers; instruction time; choice of textbooks; grouping students; 
additional support for students; teaching methods; and regular day-to-day student assessment. 
41 Opening or closure of schools; creation or abolition of a grade level; design of programmes of study; 
selection of programmes of study taught in a particular school; choice of range of subjects taught in a 
particular school; definition of course content; setting of qualifying examinations for a certificate or 
diploma; and credentialing (examination content, marking and administration). 
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 In healthcare, decentralised market interaction between patients and healthcare 
providers exposes individuals to the financial risks of illness unless the financial 
resources are adequately pooled. The ability of private insurance markets to 
adequately pool financial risks and promote access to services is hampered by 
problems of adverse selection, and moral hazard resulting from information 
asymmetries (Docteur and Oxley, 2003). Higher propensity of those with greater 
health risks to buy insurance and to insure at higher levels than those in good health 
limits access to affordable insurance for high risk individuals, lowers coverage and 
leads to under-consumption of healthcare from a social point of view. On the other 
hand, the fact that insured households do not bear the full cost of treatment received, 
leads to consumption beyond the social optimum. Finally, healthcare providers are 
better informed than insurers about the need and scope for medical treatment, and 
about the quality of services supplied, which allows them to artificially induce 
demand for care. 
In medical care, a combination of information asymmetries between patients 
and physicians as to the complexities of medical care diagnosis and treatment, 
difficulties in ascertaining the quality of services even after they have been provided, 
and the profit-maximisation motif of private providers disseminate perverse 
incentives that lead competitive markets to failure. 
Public central coordination in the form of both public provision of insurance 
and public regulation of health service provision and private health-insurance markets 
is then critical for the efficiency of health systems. This explains why in most cases, 
the public sector has come to take a dominant role in the financing and, in some cases, 
the provision of healthcare services. 
A similar problematic permeates the field of social protection. In a world of 
perfect knowledge and perfect foresight, with well functioning capital and insurance 
markets, there would be no reason for the state to play an extensive role in social 
protection. Voluntary decisions, insurance contracts, and the saving instruments 
created by markets would suffice. Government intervention would only be required at 
a residual level for the provision of social safety nets to those whose total income over 
the entire life-cycle is insufficient to sustain an adequate living standard. However, 
real world social insurance markets also suffer from moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems which prevent them from delivering an efficient outcome. Public 
central coordination is then required to make insurance compulsorily, and to regulate 
64  
 individuals’ ability to accept/reject so that a pooling equilibrium may be reached. 
Additional factors that limit the efficiency of social insurance markets include 
uncertainty underlying the size of future claims (moulded by macroeconomic 
instability and inflation in particular), and the consequent difficulty/impossibility of 
setting a realistic price for the insurance; and time correlation of social risks, which 
determines that the aggregate risk cannot be solved by pooling the individual risks 
(public central coordination by itself does not solve this problem, but the state may 
have an edge in using its budget and public debt to shift resources across time). At a 
more general level, there is evidence that, left to their own decisional criteria, 
individuals tend to be sub-optimally provident, in that their saving pattern fails to 
fully acknowledge their future income needs. Public central coordination is then 
required to overcome individuals’ short-sightedness in making provisions for adverse 




In seeking to constantly improve organisational efficiency, individuals have 
kept forging innovative hybrid governing structures that combine features of both 
markets and hierarchies in an attempt to bring the best of the two worlds together. 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) present four examples in the private sector that give a 
good account of such an effort. 
- In the nineteenth century, the development of utopian experimental 
communities led to the creation of the co-op (or cooperative) form of organisation. 
These business organisations were owned by the individuals who transacted with 
them (workers, costumers, or occasionally suppliers) and structured around specific 
legal rules. Individual members´ voting power was usually exerted on a one-
member/one-vote basis, contrasting with the traditional rule in standard private sector 
organisations based on the capital share hold by each member. Profits were 
distributed in the form of reduced prices for the services or goods supplied. Despite 
their initial development being formulated on an explicitly social and ideological 
basis, the popularity of the cooperative form of organisation grew over time as a result 
of its efficiency in alleviating problems of monopoly pricing in situations where 
economies of scale restrict the number of suppliers that can profitably operate in the 
market. 
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 - In the first half of the twentieth century, another example of a hybrid mode 
of governance appeared in the form of franchise retailing42. This was a clear attempt 
to combine the advantages of ordinary market arrangements (owner-operators’ 
incentives to maximise profits) with the economies of scale arising from selective 
central coordination (in specific fields such as marketing, purchasing, etc), while 
simultaneously avoiding the problems posed by asset specificity in spot market 
transactions. As the parties are unable to accurately foresee the circumstances 
bounding their relationship in the future, they agree on processes through which 
decisions are to be made by contractually binding themselves to explicit rights and 
responsibilities. At the same time they develop routines in the conduct of their 
business so as to bring an extra degree of regularity to their relationship. The nature of 
the franchise agreement, as a mode of governance, is thus both different from the pure 
hierarchical structure of most formal organisations, and the cash-for-product contract 
of simple market transactions. 
- In the second half of the twentieth century, another success story of hybrid 
coordination of transactions was the supplier organisation introduced by Japanese 
automobile companies. Instead of relying on vertical integration or competitive 
bidding as many other systems did (especially in the United States), the Japanese 
management of supplier relations focused on achieving many of the advantages of 
market incentives by implementing a reward system whereby suppliers were 
evaluated in accordance to their performance in previous contracts. In comparison 
with the traditional method of competitive bidding among independent suppliers, this 
system enabled companies to assess supplier performance with much greater 
accuracy. It allowed them to select suppliers before the parts specifications were made 
final, opening up an opportunity to exploit considerable economies resulting from 
involving the suppliers’ know-how in design engineering; conceiving parts that fitted 
the capabilities of the suppliers’ existing equipment; and giving them more time to 
plan and prepare for production. Both the Japanese system and the system of vertical 
integration used in the United States allowed for the creation and protection of 
specific assets, the former hinging on reputation and repeated dealings and the later on 
ownership. However, an important advantage of the Japanese system was that it did 
                                                 
42 The franchisee owns and runs a retail business using the franchisor’s brand name, often buying 
inputs or goods for resale from the franchisor. The franchisor collects fees and royalties from the 
franchisee for the use of the brand name and commonly also provides training, advertising, and other 
services. Franchisors also generally maintain rights to set and enforce standards on the franchisee. 
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 not seem to be subjected to the kind of influence costs43 found in its American 
counterpart in case of failure. Breaking relations with a supplier who failed to perform 
to adequate standards often proved to be substantially easier than stopping obtaining 
supplies from badly performing internal divisions. Furthermore, the Japanese system 
generated a competitive framework that brought an efficient discipline to prices and 
quality, in a way that seemed difficult to mimic under common ownership through 
competing internal supply divisions, also for influence cost reasons.        
- Finally, the multidivisional form of organisation mentioned in section 3.3 is 
in itself a hybrid governance mechanism that does not fit either with the extreme 
model of spot market transactions or with the pure hierarchical approach to economic 
organisation44. It represents an attempt to tackle problems encountered in both highly 
functionally centralised organisations as well as in collections of entirely 
decentralised firms under common ownership (the so-called holding companies). In 
organisations relying mainly on central coordination the distance separating head-
office decision makers from critical local knowledge often poses very significant 
obstacles to efficient decision-making. Costly time and information lost in 
communication throughout the bureaucratic structure hampers an effective course of 
operations, as does the excessive level of complexity managers are forced to contend 
with. In holding companies, on the other hand, the head office typically performs a 
very limited or no management role at all, self-confining its actions to collecting the 
profits of the constituents firms. This system, however, fails when there are gains to 
be extracted from exploring economies of scale and coordinating decisions across 
units on production, investment and marketing. 
 
As we have seen in the last chapter, there is a growing body of literature on 
these assorted organisational forms, highlighting their role in facilitating the 
stabilisation of relations between independent exchange partners through informal 
                                                 
43 The result of attempts to reallocate and protect rents and quasi-rents within organisations. In general, 
the larger the organisation, the larger are the rents in total and the more people competing for them. 
Bigger prizes and greater number of contestants, tend to create greater competition for these rents, 
leading larger firms to suffer from more than proportionally higher influence costs (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). 
44 The way in which information is made use of within multidivisional organisations is set at an 
intermediate level of (de)centralisation, in between the two limits of individual decisions based on local 
knowledge complemented by the price system, and centrally-planned coordination resting on a 
bureaucratic structure of authority and command. In these organisational arrangements, centralised 
decisions define parameters that constrain the discretionary power of local decision makers. 
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 mechanisms based on trust. The conceptualisation of these patterns of reciprocity and 
collaboration as alternative governance mechanisms distinct from markets and 
hierarchies is said to enable firms to gain access to know-how unavailable in-house; 
spread the risks associated with uncertain ventures; benefit from economies of scale; 
enter new product and geographic markets more efficiently; manage 
interorganisational dependencies; and respond adequately to changing circumstances 
(Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Porter and Fuller, 1986; Miles and Snow, 1986; Powell, 
1987; Johnston and Lawrence, 1988; Ouchi and Bolton, 1988). 
The approach adopted in this thesis takes these hybrid arrangements as resting 
on intermediate levels of (de)centralisation of information, in between the two 
extremes defined by fully decentralised organisational systems entirely driven by 
market forces on the one hand, and fully centralised hierarchical/bureaucratic 
authority-driven organisations. Hybrids offer the possibility to coordinated 
transactions through long-term relationships between autonomous organisations. 
Mediating these relationships is an element of trust that plays an important role for the 
sustainability of the overall structure. Trust is here taken as the reflection of an 
enlightened mutual interest (Doz and Hamel, 1998) which leads organisations to 
renounce the exploitation of profitable opportunistic behaviours in the sort run, for the 
sake of medium and long term dynamic benefits that outweigh those that would arise 
from pursuing a static optimisation strategy. 
 
*** 
The essence of co-operative arrangements such as those we have reviewed would seem to be 
the fact that the parties to them accept some degree of obligation – and therefore give some degree of 
assurance – with respect to their future conduct…Where buyer and seller accept no obligation with 
respect to their future conduct, however loose and implicit the obligation might be, then co-operation 
does not take place and we can refer to a pure market transaction. Here there is no continuing 
association, no give and take, but an isolated act of purchase and sale such, for example, as takes place 
on an organised market of financial securities. The pure market transaction is therefore a limiting case, 
the ingredient of co-operation being very commonly present, in some degree, in the relationship 
between buyer and seller. Thus although I shall have occasion to refer to co-operation and market 
transactions as distinct and alternative modes of coordinating economic activity, we must not imagine 
that reality exhibits a sharp line of distinction; what confronts us is a continuum passing from 
transactions, such as those on organised commodity markets, where the co-operative element is 
minimal, through intermediate areas in which there are linkages of traditional connection and goodwill, 
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 and finally to those complex and inter-locking clusters, groups and alliances which represent co-
operation fully and formally developed”. (Richardson, 1972, p.886, 887) 
*** 
 
3.5.1 Hybrids and Public Service Provision 
 
Hybrid modes of governance are not strange to the provision of public 
services. Most public service governance arrangements observed in practice are 
hybrid in the sense that they that do not fit entirely in the centralised hierarchical ideal 
or in the pure spot market transactions model. Furthermore, some of the most 
interesting examples of alliance/network forms of organisation are being implemented 
in the public sector. 
In the provision of primary and secondary education, the public sector is 
redefining the way it operates as a service provider, from a traditional purely 
bureaucratic form of organisation to the constitution of effective service agencies, 
highly decentralised, and operating along privately-inspired management criteria. In 
this new environment, partnerships and other forms of collaborative work play a 
prominent role. Governments are increasingly relying on schools that are privately 
managed but predominantly financed through the public purse to achieve efficiency 
gains, simultaneously combining elements of central coordination with decentralised 
managerial capacity. That same combination is captured in a recent survey on the 
distribution of the decision-making process in lower secondary education (OECD, 
2004a). According to this survey, decisions on the organisation of instruction are 
predominantly taken by schools in all OECD countries, while decisions on planning 
and structures are mostly the domain of more centralised tiers of government45.  
In healthcare examples of inter-organisational cooperation also appear to 
abound. In theory, health services can be organised in three fundamentally different 
ways: via hierarchical bureaucracies; through long-term contractual arrangements 
under some degree of non-market control; and as direct, short-term market-based 
interactions between patients and providers (WHO, 2000). Given the disadvantages of 
both hierarchical and market-based modes of governing health services, recently 
many countries have opted for experimenting with long-term contracts to achieve the 
                                                 
45 The distribution of decision-making authority is less clear for items such as personnel management 
and allocation and use of resources. 
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 combined advantages of greater flexibility and scope for innovation while maintaining 
overall control over strategic objectives and financial protection. This has involved 
transformations to the incentive environment of organisations, modifications to the 
distribution of decision-making control, revenue rights, and financial risk of the 
different stakeholders. Chapter 6 shows evidence of these changes having a positive 
effect on efficiency, and of further movement towards a market-inspired mode of 
governance having a negative effect on efficiency46. 
 
3.6 Government and Economic Performance 
  
The effects of public policies on economic productivity come about through 
two different channels - via productivity changes in the public sector itself, and via 
the effects of taxation, public spending and regulations on the private sector 
(European Commission, 2004). 
The public sector is responsible for a large proportion of the overall output of 
an economy. Public employment ranges from 10% (Germany) to 30% (Sweden) of 
the labour market in the European Union. Public sector labour productivity is 
therefore an important driver of average labour productivity nationwide. 
Furthermore, the organisation and functioning of the public sector affects 
productivity in the private sector. Taxes distort relative prices in the economy 
influencing economic incentives, namely the willingness to work and invest. 
Government expenditure on selective areas such as education, health, research and 
development or infrastructure is an important determinant of long term economic 
growth. Government regulations also have an important impact on economic 
performance by limiting the choices of individuals and enterprises. 
There is a growing body of empirical literature investigating the link between 
government activity and the performance of economic systems via this second 
channel47. The literature stresses the importance of some core, essential, productive 
expenditure for economic growth. This type of expenditure is said to be as important 
to growth as private capital and labour. It can act directly upon the human and 
                                                 
46 According to the categorisation of health systems employed in chapter 6, public contract systems and 
private insurance/private provider systems are shown to be systematically outperformed by public 
integrated systems. 
47 Hemming et. al (2002); Romero de Avila and Strauch (2003); Tanzi and Shuknecht (2000, 2003); 
Tanzi and Zee (2000); and Zagler and Durnecker (2003). 
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 physical capital stock and technical progress of the economy, as well as indirectly 
through synergies with private activities48. 
The first and foremost government-spending category is on administrative 
services and justice. The creation of a well-defined institutional framework conducive 
to growth implies the formulation of clear property rights so as to minimise 
institutional uncertainty, enhance the predictability of returns of investments and thus 
increase market efficiency. It also implies the enforcement of general rules that 
promote competition, allow information to flow without restraint and foster efficient 
risk management. Such an institutional framework will work to minimise transaction 
costs of economic agents, and help them deal more effectively with externalities and 
spillovers49. 
Another area where government intervention is usually associated with 
positive growth effects is investment expenditure50 (acquisition or accumulation of 
physical capital goods). Physical infrastructure can be seen as a public good since 
users usually cannot be excluded from consumption, and one user’s consumption 
might not interfere with the consumption of others. On certain occasions, exclusion 
might be technically feasible and there may be some degree of rivalry in consumption, 
however the state may still decide to provide the good/service free of charge at the 
point of delivery because exclusion is economically inefficient51 or inequitable. 
Notwithstanding a tradition of dispute52, there is currently a consensus over the 
growth-enhancing properties of public investment. Public expenditure on physical 
capital is thought to be linked to higher growth rates if it is applied on infrastructures 
that serve as inputs for the private sector (e.g. transport, communication and public 
utilities)53. There is also evidence of this type of expenditure being exposed to 
diminishing marginal returns (De la Fuente, 1997; Kalyvitis and Kalaitzidakis, 2002). 
                                                 
48 Afonso, Ebert, Schuknecht and Thone (2005) provide a good review of this literature. 
49 Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2002); von Hagen, Hallerberg and Strauch (2004). 
50 Aschauer (1989); Cashin (1995) ; Nourzad and Vrieze (1995); Sanchez-Robles (1998); Shioji 
(2001); and Kamps (2004). 
51 In situations of zero marginal cost from additional users. 
52 Some authors present evidence of a non significant impact of public investment on growth  - Barth 
and Bradley (1988); Ford and Poret (1991); Holtz-Eakin (1994); Yi and Kocherlakota (1996); and 
Cassou and Lansing (1999). Vanhoudt, Mathä and Smid (2000) even find evidence of reverse causality 
(economic growth exerting a significant impact on public investment, and not the other way around).   
53 Easterly and Rebelo (1993); Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996); Thöne (2004). 
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 The production of human capital is the area of government activity for which 
there is the clearest evidence of positive growth effects54. Government intervention in 
education hinges on four main pillars (Hanushek, 2002): externalities, economies of 
scale, other market failures, and redistribution motives. The available evidence 
indicates that public spending can push education closer to the optimum in 
comparison with a pure market scenario. This result is only weakened by the 
limitation of most empirical studies to formal school education (vocational training is 
typically kept out of the analysis), and by regressing economic performance on school 
attendance rates, schooling years, or graduation rates instead of public education 
expenditure.  
Health expenditure is also typically seen as an area where public intervention 
leads to better economic performance. Government intervention is justified both by 
equity and efficiency considerations. Health insurance markets are prone to failures 
due to problems created by information asymmetries. These failures have a negative 
impact on the efficiency of the sector. Perverse incentives may be created, 
encouraging over/under consumption/provision of health services. Public sector 
provision and regulation of health services can mitigate some of these failures, help 
improve general health condition of the population thus creating a direct positive 
impact on human capital and hence on growth55.    
Research and development is commonly recognised as a key growth factor in 
modern economies. Difficulty in confining the commercial exploitation of an 
innovation to the creative firm is a source of externality failure, resulting in R&D 
activity being conducted below the social optimum. Government corrective 
intervention is therefore justified, both in the form of research conducted in public 
institutions (universities and laboratories), or funding/subsidising of private R&D 
activity. However, the growth effects of public R&D activities are empirically 
undetermined. If public and private R&D are seen as complements, then public R&D 
is expected to have a positive effect on growth56. If public and private R&D are seen 
as substitutes, then public R&D is expected to crowd out private R&D57. Currently 
                                                 
54 Englander and Gurney (1994); De Gregorio (1996); Keefer and Knack (1997); De la Fuente and 
Domenech (2000); Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001); Gemmell and Kneller (2001); Heitger (2001); and 
Buysse (2002). 
55 Bleaney, Kneller and Gemmel (2001); Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2001). 
56 Robson (1993); Park (1995); Busom (1999); Diamond (1999); Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2000). 
57 Toivanen and Niininen (1998); Wallsten (1999); Bassanini, Scarpetta and Hemmings (2001). 
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 there is an equal balance of views on these two opposing perspectives, so the question 
remains unsolved58. 
Social expenditure on basic social safety nets is in theory expected to reduce 
the need for precautionary savings, improve the ability for risk taking and 
consequently act as another growth-promoting institutional factor (Afonso, Ebert et 
al., 2005). However, pure redistributive spending beyond a certain scale can 
undermine growth by exerting a negative effect on incentives to work, and invest in 
human capital and in entrepreneurial enterprise.    
  
Most econometric studies on the effects of general government spending on 
economic growth find a negative relationship between the two variables59. The 
theoretical arguments for such relationships are rooted in various soils: superfluous 
policy-induced distortions and the associated tax burden; crowding-out of private 
investment; and inefficient resource use due to insufficient market forces (Dar and 
AmirKhalkhali, 2002). 
Some studies (Barro, 1990; Heitger, 2001), however, suggest the relationship 
between government size and economic performance is non-linear, and that a negative 
correlation between the two is likely to emerge only when government size exceeds a 
given optimal size (see Figure 3.1). 
 




                                                 
58 The relative merits of one view or the other seem to critically depend on the particular field of R&D 
activities considered as well as on the incentive mechanism provided (European Commission, 2004). 
59 See for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995); Bassanini, Scarpetta and Hemmings (2001); De 
Gregorio (1996); Fölster and Henrekson (1999); Heitger (2001); Lee (1995). 
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 Barro (1990) argues that an increase in public expenditure is likely to increase 
the marginal productivity of capital, while an increase in taxes is likely to reduce it60. 
The first positive effect is said to dominate when government is small, being offset by 
the tax effect when it grows beyond a certain point. Economic performance is then 
defined as an inverted U-shaped function of government size. Heitger (2001) agrees 
with Barro and attributes the downward part of the inverted-U function partly to the 
negative tax effects and partly to crowding-out effects. Gwartney, Lawson and 
Holcombe (1998) reach similar conclusions, arguing that government is likely to exert 
an overall positive effect on economic performance as long as it is confined to some 
core activities61. As government activity exceeds these core functions their net effect 
is expected to be adverse to economic growth because of disincentives caused by high 
taxation; diminishing returns as governments expand their activities into areas for 
which they are ill-suited; and interference with the market mechanism of allocation. 
Studies portraying economic performance as an inverted-U function of 
government size suggest that in many of the countries analysed governments have 
outgrown both the scope of activities and the level of spending in the core activities 
mentioned above. Increasing the size of government in those countries is therefore 
expected to have a negative impact on growth as the crowding-out of private 
investment and other distortions caused by high taxation are likely to become 
dominant. 
The legitimacy of these conclusions is mitigated by the fact that the size-effect 
analysis underlying these studies does not take into account the efficiency of public 
spending, which is an additional factor that mediates the relationship between 
government size and economic growth. Apart from being limited to a set of core 
activities, and within certain levels, public expenditure needs to be efficiently 
administered if it is to have a positive effect on economic growth.  
 
3.7 Public Service Reform: from Hierarchies to Markets 
  
                                                 
60 There is econometric evidence that a high level of taxation damages the general allocation of 
resources by distorting incentives to work, to invest and/or to save - Cashin (1995); de la Fuente 
(1997); Folster and Henrekson (1999); Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1998). Growth is also impaired 
by high and sustained government deficits and growing debt (Tanzi and Chalk, 2000). 
61 Including the protection of persons and property; national security; education, physical 
infrastructure; and environmental protection. 
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 In most developed nations the share of public spending and taxation in the 
economy rose steadily until the end of the 90s. Since then, a growing concern with the 
potentially negative consequences of such a trend has prompted a widespread 
adoption of various initiatives aimed at curbing the enlargement of the public sector, 
or at least bringing its growth to a halt (Joumard, 2002). 
As we have just seen, this general movement to scale down the size of 
government is based on two fundamental theoretical/ideological assumptions: first, 
that high levels of public expenditure and taxation have distorting consequences on 
private incentives and therefore on economic performance; and second, that economic 
growth and productivity are hampered by high levels of public spending and taxation 
since the resources consumed by the public sector would have been more efficiently 
administered by the private sector.  
In addition to these theoretical arguments, pressures to scale down government 
have also arisen from more pragmatic reasons. In the EU the monetary union and the 
Stability and Growth Pact have set restrictive norms on public debt and deficits. High 
unemployment rates have created pressures to reduce labour taxation. Population 
ageing has compelled governments to consolidate public finances in anticipation of 
rising financing burdens with health and pension expenditures. Finally, the global 
integration of markets and the inherent mobility of capital have eroded the capacity of 
individual nations to maintain high levels of taxation without compromising their 
international competitiveness. 
The need to scale down the size of government has become the main driver of 
most public sector reforms, putting pressure on governments to re-conceptualise the 
form of their intervention in the economy and increase the efficiency of their 
activities. In the previous chapter we concluded that different modes of governance 
yield different levels of efficiency depending on the attributes of transactions and the 
scale of coordination required – i.e. the impact of different organisational 
arrangements (including different degrees of public sector involvement in the funding 
and provision of services/activity) on efficiency depends on the type of 
service/activity under consideration. 
In the light of that result, we now hypothesise that improving the efficiency of 
government activity implies that (i) governments retreat from interfering with 
transactions that do not exhibit the kind of attributes that call for public central 
coordination; (ii) when public central coordination is required (e.g. education, health, 
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 and social security), it should be confined to the specific attributes of transactions that 
markets fail to address62 (public good attributes, merit good attributes, externalities, 
and/or information asymmetries), and in a way that explicitly acknowledges the risks 
of government failure63. An important result that follows from these two hypotheses 
is an expected positive effect of managerial decentralisation of service delivery units 
(public or private) on efficiency.   
In practice, our research hypothesis involves re-defining the areas where 
government intervention is thought to be required (areas where the market left to itself 
is expected to produce sub-optimal results); re-defining the scope of such intervention 
(the extent to which public central coordination is needed, and in particular finding 
the right balance between the public and private sectors); and re-defining the 
particular forms whereby that intervention occurs (ranging from small regulation of 
private sector activity to the monopolistic provision of goods/services through 
centrally coordinated public bureaucracies). 
Although the international experience of public sector reform is diversified 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004), there seem to be common elements that reflect these 
prescriptions to a certain extent. Some of these elements include the segregation of 
large public bureaucracies into smaller independent units with autonomy to operate 
relatively freely; the introduction of pricing and charging for public services; 
contracting-out services to the private sector on a competitive basis; control of public 
agencies exercised through performance-based regimes; development of property 
rights for managers as the basis of incentives; and the separation between the 
purchasers and providers of the services, i.e. the formal separation between the 
political and the operational dimension of collective action. 
The public policy literature is crowded with arguments on the predicted effect 
these reforms should have on the efficiency of public services (e.g. Lane, 2000; 
Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Lewin, 1991, Self, 1993; Udehn, 1996). However, none 
of these arguments is rooted in a comprehensive theory of economic organisation. 
Furthermore, research on the actual effect on efficiency is almost non-existent64 
                                                 
62 Outside this domain, the coordination of transactions should still be decentralised as much as 
possible – by involving the private sector and/or by allowing state owned agencies enough flexibility to 
respond to market incentives.    
63 See section 4.3 of chapter 3. 
64 Some of the few existing evaluative empirical studies concentrate on the financial effects of 
contracting-out municipal services (solid-waste collection; bus transport; water supply; maintenance of 
vehicles, parks and streets, etc) to the private sector (e.g. Savas, 2000). However, these studies suffer 
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 (Boyne, 1998; Pollitt et al., 1998; Boyne et al., 2003; Talbot, 2004). Most of the work 
on public service reform focuses on the causes of change (the economic, political and 
administrative antecedents of reform) rather than on its effects (Leemans, 1976; 
Caiden, 1988; Zifack, 1994; Pettigrew et al., 1992; Lane, 1997; Kickert, 1997; Olsen 
and Peters, 1998; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000).     
In the second part of the thesis we draw on the experience of OECD countries 
in the provision of education, health and social protection services to test our 
hypothesis of the effect of modes of governance on efficiency. Education, health, and 
social protection represent the core functions of the welfare state. These are services 
where reforms advanced the most and where the most audacious initiatives at 
reformulating the role of the public sector took place. The three services alone 
account for an average of roughly 60% of public expenditure in OECD countries 
(28% of GDP). The level of efficiency in the provision of these services is thus crucial 
to the overall efficiency of the public sector and to economic performance. 
There has been recent progress in measuring efficiency in some of these areas 
(e.g. Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2004, for health and education; Afonso, Tanzi and 
Schuknecht, 2005, for the public sector as a whole). However, as far as we know, no 
attempts have been made so far to investigate the effects of different modes of 
governance on the efficiency of these services. In the absence of a proper analytical 
framework for measuring efficiency and evaluating the impact that shifting modes of 
governing public services have had on efficiency, the discussion around the effects of 
public sector reforms on efficiency is informed not by scientific knowledge, but crude 




NIE compares the competence of different modes of organising transactions to 
take advantage of the division of labour while simultaneously economising on specific 
transaction costs caused by opportunistic behaviour and noncontractible uncertainties. 
                                                                                                                                            
from important limitations both in terms of the economic significance of the services scrutinised, the 
context-specific nature of the data used, and the simplistic financial (cost-oriented) perspective 
adopted. 
65 “Most supposedly empirical discussions of the complex issues involved are dominated either by new 
public management evangelists exaggerating the efficiency impacts of changes on the basis of very 
preliminary or selective data; or by detractors basing their scepticism on dramatic anecdotes or sketchy 
arguments from past experience” (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994, p.13).  
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 Based on a narrow conception of transaction costs, and a sole focus on production66, 
NIE fails to provide an in-depth account of the inner-workings of alternative modes of 
governance that explain differences in aptitude to organise transactions efficiently. 
Resource-based/evolutionary perspectives of the firm bring to light the 
limitations of NIE by drawing attention to the importance of interrelationships 
between activities (and associations between the capabilities that support them) in 
explaining the virtues of hierarchical coordination. However, these theories also fail 
to provide a comprehensive account of the link between organisation and efficiency.  
This chapter provided an analytical framework for the study of economic 
organisation that brought together NIE and resource-based theories of organisation 
under a broader conception of transaction costs - all the costs of running a governance 
mechanism, including costs of coordinating and motivating individual/organisational 
decisions (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
Following the work of Friederich Hayek, we have conceptualised economic 
organisation as a means of bringing order into systems of human interaction. Order 
can be accomplished through a multitude of modes of governance - a continuum 
ranging from hierarchies to markets, i.e. from conscious deliberate coordination to 
spontaneous self-reinforcing coordination of self-interested individual actions. 
Transaction costs of the kind defined by NIE and associations between activities and 
capabilities of the kind defined by resource-based theories of organisation are an 
important part of this continuum, but they do not define it per se. 
More broadly, we have demonstrated that decentralised coordination of 
transactions with design and/or innovation attributes (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) is 
sub-optimal due to the brittleness of the system in dealing with imperfect information 
and excessive demands in terms of communication. For such types of transactions, 
hierarchical coordination is optimal. 
In parallel, decentralised coordination of transactions with public good 
attributes, externalities, merit good attributes, and/or information asymmetries is also 
shown to be sub-optimal and to lead perfectly competitive markets to produce 
inefficient outcomes. Public central coordination is required to address these features 
and generate an efficient outcome. 
                                                 
66 Transactions between consumers and producers are kept out of the analysis. The focus is exclusively 
on productive issues, and in particular on the make-or-buy decision (producer-supplier relationship 
versus in-house production). 
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 The overlap of these two principles formed the basis of our understanding of 
the link between governance and public service efficiency reflected in our main 
research hypothesis: optimising government efficiency requires that (i) governments 
retreat from interfering with transactions that do not exhibit the kind of attributes that 
call for public central coordination; (ii) when public central coordination is required 
(e.g. education, health, and social security), it should be confined to the specific 
attributes of transactions that markets fail to address (public good attributes, merit 
good attributes, externalities, and/or information asymmetries), and in a way that 
explicitly acknowledges the risks of government failure. 
The second part of this research hypothesis implies that the coordination of 
attributes that do not require public central coordination should be decentralised as 
much as possible, either by allowing the private sector to operate freely in a 
competitive environment and/or allowing state owned agencies enough flexibility to 
respond to market incentives.  
In summary, we argued in this chapter that (in)efficiency in the provision of 
public services depends on the way key organisational design variables (in terms of 
funding and provision arrangements) interact between themselves and with the 
specific attributes of each service to create incentives for efficient behaviour. This 
principle is systematically deployed in chapters 5 through 7 to formulate testable 
research hypotheses on the effects of governance on efficiency in the context of 
primary and secondary education, healthcare, and social protection, respectively. 
Before that, the next chapter focuses on the metrics of public service efficiency. 
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 Chapter 4: Research Design 
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 4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter concentrates on the technicalities of efficiency measurement and 
the peculiarities and difficulties of measuring public service efficiency.   
The methodological issues involved in the measurement of efficiency are 
presented in three stages -  when inputs and outputs are defined and measured; when 
the set of feasible input-output combinations is estimated (i.e. the 
production/efficiency function/frontier); and when actual input-output combinations 
are compared with feasible input-output combinations.  
Four sub-sections are devoted to presenting the most important methodologies 
associated with the estimation of the set of feasible input-output combinations (Data 
Envelopment Analysis; Free Disposable Hull; and Stochastic Frontier Analysis) and 
discussing their relative merits. 
The final sections of the chapter concentrate on the specific methodological 
issues concerning the measurement of public service efficiency. 
 
4.2 Efficiency Measurement: methodological issues 
 
As proposed by Farrell (1957)67, economic efficiency comprises two different 
components: technical efficiency, which reflects the ability of a decision-making unit 
(DMU)68 to obtain maximal output from a given set of inputs; and allocative 
efficiency, which reflects the ability of the DMU to use inputs in optimal proportions 
and produce the right mix of outputs (given the prevailing prices and the production 
technology). Technical efficiency (TE), allocative efficiency (AE), and economic 
efficiency (EE) are put together in the overall efficiency relation69: AETEEE *= . 
 
Efficiency is open to input/output interpretations depending on the specific 
orientation adopted (optimal combination of inputs to achieve a given level of output 
– input orientation; or optimal combination of outputs that could be produced with a 
                                                 
67 Following the work of Debreu (1951) and Koopmans (1951). 
68 Any entity that directly or indirectly transforms inputs into outputs (for-profit firms, non-profit 
organisations, public organisations, etc).   
69 Measurement of technical efficiency is sometimes preferred to overall economic efficiency. 
Technical efficiency is a purely physical notion that can be measured without recourse to price 
information (often difficult to find and/or flawed), and without having to impose a behavioural 
objective on producers (cost minimisation; revenue, or profit maximisation). 
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 given set of inputs – output orientation. Input/output-oriented measures of efficiency 
are only equivalent when constant returns to scale exist (Fare and Lovell, 1978). 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates theses concepts in a simplified two input (x1, x2) - two 
output (y1, y2) production process. 
 
Figure 4.1: Input efficiency 
 
 
Suppose that the DMU produces a given level of output (y1*, y2*) using the 
input combination defined by point A. The same level of output could have been 
produced with a radial contraction of both inputs (point B), which lies on the isoquant 
defined by the minimum level of inputs required to produce (y1*, y2*). Therefore, the 
input-oriented level of technical efficiency (TEI(y,x)) of the DMU is given by the ratio 
0B/0A. 
 
The minimum-cost combination of inputs that produces (y1*, y2*) is given by 
point C (where the marginal rate of technical substitution between the two inputs is 
equal to the input price ratio w2/w1). To achieve that level of cost, both inputs would 
need to be further contracted to point D. Input allocative efficiency (AEI(y,w1,w2)) is 
therefore given by 0D/0B (Kumbhaker and Lovell, 2000). Overall economic 
efficiency EEI=(TEI(y,x)).AEI(y,w1,w2)= (0B/0A).(0D/0B)=OD/OA. 
 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the production possibility frontier for a given set of 
inputs and allows us to measure efficiency in an output-orientated way. 
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Figure 4.2: Output efficiency 
 
 
Once again, it is assumed the DMU currently operates at point A. Technically 
efficient production using the inputs currently employed by the DMU would radially 
expand output to point B. Hence, the output oriented measure of technical efficiency 
(TEO(y,x)) = 0A/0B. 
Although point B is technically efficient (it lies on the production possibility 
frontier), the DMU could generate higher revenue (price-weighted output aggregate) 
with the same level of inputs by producing at point C (where the marginal rate of 
transformation between y2 and y1 equals the price ratio p2/p1). To achieve the revenue 
associated with point C while maintaining the same output combination, the DMU 
would have to expand output to point D. Hence, output allocative efficiency 
(AEO(y,p1,p2))=0B/0D (Kumbhaker and Lovell, 2000). Finally, overall economic 
efficiency EEO=(TEO(y,x))* (AEO(y,p1,p2))= (0A/0B)* (0B/0D)=OA/OD. 
 
In practice measuring efficiency usually involves three sequential steps. First, 
inputs and outputs need to be properly defined and measured. Secondly, the set of 
feasible input-output combinations needs to be estimated (i.e. the 
production/efficiency function/frontier70). Finally, comparing actual input-output 
combinations with feasible input-outputs yields efficiency estimates.  
                                                 
70 The technical relationship between inputs and outputs is usually designated production/efficiency 
frontier in the efficiency measurement literature, and production function in orthodox microeconomic 
textbooks. 
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 Although the first two steps are relatively straightforward in a one-input/one-
output scenario, substantial analytical difficulties often arise when the technology 
involves multiple inputs/outputs, particularly in the context of public services. An 
example of such a difficulty, which we will discuss later in greater detail, arises in the 
valuation of outputs. While in the case of private organisations operating in 
competitive markets different outputs can be aggregated using observed prices as 
weights, these are all but absent in most public services, which often makes it very 
difficult to estimate the value of the output of these services. Another difficulty 
concerns the treatment of variables that are capable of affecting efficiency but that lie 
outside organisations’ managerial control. The way in which the effect of these so-
called environmental variables should be allowed for in measuring efficiency is often 
controversial (Coelli et al., 1998). 
There are two distinct approaches to estimating the efficiency frontier. The 
first involves the theoretical definition of the set of feasible input allocations, their 
costs and associated outcomes (under conditions of technical efficiency), as well as 
the identification of the set of outputs that maximise the objective function for the 
resources available. This approach is extremely complex and demanding in terms of 
the information required, rendering it unfeasible for international comparative studies. 
The second approach is to estimate the frontier from a sample of observed 
inputs and outputs from different DMUs. The procedure is to compare a DMU with 
an ideal comparator constructed from information on other DMUs operating in the 
same field (and ideally with similar size and environmental factors). This provides a 
relative benchmark or comparison among DMUs, on the basis of the real or observed 
performance of units, and not the theoretical maximum derived from an abstract 
theoretical production function as in the first approach. 
 
Within the second approach, Farrel (1957) suggested that the efficiency 
frontier be estimated either by (a) a non-parametric piece-wise-linear convex 
isoquant, or (b) a parametric function fitted to the data, both constructed such that no 
observed point lies to the left or below them. Since this seminal work, research on 
efficiency measurement has diverged into two streams, with economists typically 
following the route of statistical analysis and management scientists typically opting 
for a non-parametric route grounded in linear programming. 
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 The non-parametric route originally explored by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1978) resulted in the development of the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA 
uses linear programming methods to construct a non-parametric piece-wise surface 
(or frontier) over the data, assuming free disposability and convexity of the 
production set. A more general nonparametric approach is Free Disposable Hull 
(FDH), introduced by Deprins, Simar and Tulkens (1984), which assumes only free 
disposability of the production set. 
 
The parametric route initially introduced by Aigner and Chu (1968) is based 
on a deterministic71 model using a Cobb Douglas functional form. This model did not 
allow for the influence of measurement errors or statistical noise on the frontier. All 
deviations from the frontier were assumed to be the result of technical inefficiency. 
Another early application of parametric efficiency analysis in which the entire 
residual was interpreted as being due to inefficiency is the so-called corrected 
ordinary least squares (COLS) approach. A production function is first estimated 
using ordinary least squares (OLS). The OLS intercept parameter is then shifted up by 
the value of the largest positive residual to give the equation for the frontier. Again, 
no allowance is made for the possibility that the residual may incorporate factors 
other than inefficiency, such as measurement error or omitted model variables.  
As a means of tackling some of the limitations of these methodologies Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), proposed the 
stochastic frontier production function (SFA), in which the residual is separated into 
two components with zero covariance: inefficiency, ui, and all other sources of error, 
vi. 
The following sections describe the most relevant aspects of DEA, FDH and 
SFA in greater detail.  
 
4.2.1 Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis originates from Farrell’s (1957) seminal work and 
was popularised by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). It assumes the existence of a 
convex production frontier and uses linear programming methods to construct linear 
                                                 
71 Observed output is bounded above by a non-stochastic term. 
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 segments that interpolate between those observations with the highest ratios of output 
to input (e.g. Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.3: DEA frontier 
 
 
Assuming just one input X, the DEA formulation of the production process 
seeks for each organisation “0” to find a set of weights w0 and an efficiency score θ0 

























     j = 1,…,n 
Equation 4.1 
 
where w0 is the set of weights that maximizes the performance of organisation 0, 
subject to requiring that, using that set of weights, no organisation has an efficiency 
score greater than 1. In other words, it searches for a linear composite of other 
organisations that produces the same (or more) of each output (yr), but at the least cost 
a fraction 1/ θ0 of the costs X0 of organisation 0 (Smith and Street, 2005). 
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 A separate linear program is estimated for each organisation, and therefore a 
different set of weights wj will be computed for each organisation. The efficiency 
score thus obtained for each observation uses the set of weights that is most 
favourable for that observation. 
 
In a multiple input/output context, the fractional programme equivalent to 
(Equation 4.1) can be reformulated into a linear programme by constraining the 
numerator or denominator to be equal to unity. The optimal values of θ0 and w0 can 
then be determined using standard linear programming techniques. The input-
minimising programme is: 
 
,min , θλθ  

















where θ is a scalar (the efficiency score of DMU i) and λ is a vector of constants. For 
each DMU, the programme seeks to maximize a radial contraction of the vector of 
inputs (x) constrained to remain within the feasible input set. 
The linear programme (Equation 4.2) corresponds to the original Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978) formulation of the DEA model assuming constant returns 
to scale (CRS). A variable returns to scale (VRS) frontier can be obtained by adding 
to programme (Equation 4.2) the constraint 1'1 =λN , where N1 is a vector of ones 
(Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984). This second formulation forms a convex hull of 
projecting planes enveloping the data more tightly than the CRS conical. This ensures 
each DMU is effectively evaluated against DMUs of similar size. 
Recently, some of the most interesting extensions of this basic DEA model 
have included the use of panels of observations and bootstrapping efficiency estimates 
to assess statistical significance (Thanassoulis, 2001; Coelli et al., 1998; Simar, 1992; 




 4.2.2 Free Disposable Hull 
 
Free disposable Hull (FDH), first formulated by Deprins, Simar, and Tulkens 
(1984), has nearly identical modelling features and properties to DEA except that it 
omits any assumptions concerning convexity and/or returns to scale. The basic 
motivation is to ensure that efficiency evaluations are derived only from observed 
performances. The production possibility set is defined by all the points whose input 
coordinates are at least as large as their corresponds in the vector of observed values xj 
for any j=1,…,n, and whose output coordinates are no greater than their corresponds 
in the vector of observed values yj for any j=1,…,n (Cooper, et al., 2000). The 
resulting efficiency frontier is a step function of the type portrayed in Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4: FDH frontier 
 
  
The following mixed integer linear program defines the FDH production 
frontier: 
 
,min , θλθ  
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4.2.3 Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
 
The stochastic specification of the production function frontier was 
independently proposed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van 
den Broeck (1977). This specification explicitly acknowledges that some deviations 
from the maximum observed output may occur due to factors unrelated to inefficiency 
(e.g., inaccuracy in the measurement of output; exogenous shocks outside the control 
of the production system, etc; see Figure 4.5). 
 
Figure 4.5: SFA frontier 
 
 
A parametric production function is estimated assuming the error term has two 
components: one representing random errors vit, and the other representing technical 
inefficiency uit. Let Yit denote output of country i in time period t, the production 
function is of the following form: 
 




where Xit is a vector of inputs and vit is the error term with mean zero. The term 
is a random variable representing DMU-specific technical inefficiency, and is 
constrained to be always non-negative. Technical efficiency is then defined as the 
ratio of the expected value of observed output for country i to the expected value of 
the output when u
0≥iu








TE ==  
Equation 4.5 
 
The denominator represents the frontier since the technical inefficiency term 
takes the value of zero. When Equation 4.4 is applied to cross-sectional data the 
distributional form of the two residual components vi and ui must be specified 
explicitly and maximum likelihood techniques used to estimate the model parameters. 
The random error vi is usually modelled as the traditional two-sided error with a 
normal distribution. The inefficiency error component ui is modelled as a one-sided 
distribution as inefficiency is reflected in a negative deviation from the efficient 
frontier (Schmidt and Lin, 1984). Various distributional assumptions for ui have been 
used in empirical applications of Equation 4.4, including the half-normal, truncated 
normal, exponential and gamma distributions. There is no theoretical basis for 
favouring one distribution over another (Schmidt, 1985). 
When Equation 4.4 is applied to longitudinal data, an organisation-specific 
fixed or random effect can be estimated and interpreted as a measure of inefficiency. 
Recently, some alternative estimation procedures have considered the possibility that 
fixed or random effects may incorporate unobserved organisation-specific influences 
on performance other than inefficiency (Greene, 2005; Farsi et al., 2003). 
 
4.2.4 Methodological Comparative Discussion 
  
The relative merits of each of these approaches to the estimation of the 
efficiency frontier are well documented (see for e.g. Henderson, 2003). 
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 Within the non-parametric paradigm, apart from differences in DEA models 
following the various possible assumptions regarding returns to scale, there are 
substantial differences between the DEA and FDH techniques that should be taken 
into account when comparing results. 
The linear programming technique used in DEA measures efficiency as the 
distance from a convex envelope of the data. An undominated input/output set is 
deemed inefficient if it does not lie on the convex envelope. In contrast, FDH is 
essentially concerned with dominance rather than distance. Only input/output 
combinations dominated by other observed input/output combinations are deemed 
inefficient. Some authors (e.g. De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; and Vanden Eeckaut, 
Tulkens and Jamar, 1993) argue the convexity assumption fails to recognize local 
nonconvexities, leading to an overestimation of inefficiency. DEA models often 
compare inefficient observation to unobservable, fictitious linear combinations of 
efficient observations. FDH does not suffer from this problem as it relates each 
inefficient observation to a single dominating observation. However, in small samples 
it is likely to underestimate inefficiency due to the lack of comparable DMUs72. 
  
The relative merits of the parametric and non-parametric paradigms are also 
well established (Coelli et al., 1998): 
 
- Non-parametric approaches assume all deviations from the frontier occur 
exclusively on account of inefficiency, which renders them highly vulnerable to 
measurement error, exogenous shocks and omitted variables; furthermore, the non-
stochastic character of these approaches does not permit testing hypotheses regarding 
the inefficiency and the structure of the production technology.   
 
- Stochastic frontiers also have some significant limitations of their own. The 
selection of the distributional form for the inefficiency effects is often arbitrary, and it 
may have a significant impact on the efficiency estimates obtained; the production 
technology needs to be specified a priori through a particular functional form; 
                                                 
72 As Henderson (2003, p. 7) notes, “in the FDH framework, an observation with epsilon amount less 
of a particular input and a substantial amount less of output than an efficient firm may be deemed 
efficient, whereas that firm would be considered to be highly inefficient by DEA”. 
91  
 multiple-output technologies imply the aggregation of output into a single measure, or 
the assumption of cost-minimising behaviour.  
 
Gong and Sickles (1992) use Monte Carlo experiments to compare DEA with 
several econometric techniques. The performance of the estimators is assessed using 
the correlation and rank correlation coefficient between the true and estimated 
inefficiencies, which measure the degree to which deterministic and stochastic 
efficiency estimates are in accordance with the true data generating process. The 
authors show that the stochastic model outperforms the DEA model, when the 
functional form employed is close to the underlying technology. However, the choice 
of functional form proves to be important in deriving unbiased information about the 
firm-specific technical efficiency. Furthermore, the experiments suggest the tracking 
ability of both the deterministic and stochastic techniques deteriorates rapidly as the 
true technology becomes more complex. 
 In chapters 5 through to 7, the stochastic specification of the production 
function is our generally preferred method of estimating efficiency73. Four factors 
motivate our choice: (i) our analysis is generally confined to single-output 
technologies, which immediately rules out favouring non-parametric approaches on 
the basis of their alleged relative advantage in dealing with multiple outputs; (ii) the 
stochastic approach in its own nature to test hypotheses regarding inefficiency and the 
structure of technology, whereas the adjustments to non-parametric approaches that 
allow such hypotheses testing are seldom exempt of important limitations; (iii) the 
stochastic approach is less prone to be influenced by measurement errors, exogenous 
shocks, and omitted variables; (iv) the need to specify a priori the production 
technology (often presented as one of the main limitations of the stochastic approach) 
can be mitigated by the adoption of flexible functional forms (e.g. translogarithmic 
production function).     
 
4.3 Efficiency vs Productivity 
 
Most of the literature on the effects of public service reforms has concentrated 
on changes/differences in productivity (e.g. Pollitt et al., 1998; Boyne et al., 2003; 
                                                 
73 The exception is chapter 6 where data envelopment analysis is used in parallel with stochastic 
frontier analysis as a means of testing the robustness of results in the context of multiple-output 
technology. 
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 Talbot, 2004). However, there are problems in interpreting productivity 
growth/differences as welfare or efficiency measures.  
Differences in productivity between different DMUs or individual DMUs in 
different moments in time, depend on dissimilarities/changes in efficiency, technical 
change, exploitation of scale economies, or some combination of these three factors 
(Coelli et al., 1998). 
Let yt, ys, and xt, xs represent observed quantities of outputs and inputs 
produced by a DMU in periods t and s, respectively. Let the production technologies 
in these periods be represented by fs(x) and ft(x). The productivity change between 










If the DMU is technically inefficient in both periods t and s, and assuming 
output efficiency is reflected in the scalar λ then75, 
 
)( jjj xfy λ= ,     where 10 ≤≤ jλ , j = s,t 
Equation 4.7 
 
If we further assume that the level of input consumed is different between the 
two periods so that st xx κ= , and that the production function is homogeneous of 























                                                 




 The first part of Equation 4.8 represents change in technical efficiency77 
(changes in the distance from the production function); the middle component reflects 
the effect of a change in the scale of operations (which depends on the scale of 
operations (κ) and the returns to scale parameter ε(t)); and the last component 
measures technical change (shifts of the production function)78. 
 
Cross-sectional and longitudinal comparisons of aggregate measures of 
productivity do not generally allow disentangling these three components unless very 
restrictive (non-credible) assumptions are made. Without a link between variations in 
productivity and changes or differences in efficiency, scale and technology, the 
analytical value of productivity variations is very limited. Dawson et al. (2004) 
provide a good illustration of this point (Figure 4.6).        
 
Figure 4.6: Productivity and efficiency (adapted from Dawson et al., 2004, p. 7) 
 
 
Figure 4.6 depicts a simple single input, single output technology. Point A in 
year 1 has higher productivity than point B in year 2 (given by the slope of the 
segments that link each point to the origin). However, both welfare and technical 
efficiency are lower at point A (A is below the social welfare indifference curve and 
is further from its period production frontier). Technical progress shifted the frontier 
                                                 
77 In a more general formulation, the valuation of inputs and outputs would introduce “allocative 
efficiency” as an additional component to equation 4.8.  










λ −= . The measure of technical change given by the last component 
in this equation is only equivalent to that of equation 4.8 if there are constant returns to scale (in the 
single-input case) and input homotheticity in the case of multi-input/multi-output production. Also, if 
the TPF index was derived using an input oriented approach instead of the output oriented approach 
implicit in equation 4.8, the technical change and technical efficiency measures of the two approaches 
would only coincide in the presence of CRS/input homotheticity (Coelli et al., 1998).      
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 upwards from P1 to P2, but productivity change does not even have the same sign as 
technical progress. The increase in welfare between period 1 and 2 is partially 
explained by technical progress (B was not feasible under the old technology) and 
partially explained by improvements in efficiency. Although both technologies in this 
example have diminishing returns to scale (increases in inputs along the frontier 
reduce productivity), moving along the frontier can be welfare increasing. 
In other words, declining productivity alone may not indicate reduced 
efficiency or welfare but simply rapid increases in expenditure coupled with 
diminishing returns to scale79. These considerations suggest that there are problems in 
interpreting productivity growth as a welfare or efficiency measure. The growth in 
TFP is a combination of technical change, efficiency change (technical and 
allocative), and scale change. 
 
4.4 Public Service Efficiency: Methodological Issues 
 
As it has been mentioned in section 3, measuring efficiency involves three 
sequential steps: defining and measuring inputs and outputs; estimating the set of 
feasible input-output combinations; and comparing actual input-output combinations 
with feasible input-outputs combinations. 
These steps are relatively straightforward in the case of private organisations 
operating in competitive markets. Even when organisations trade multiple inputs and 
outputs, prices are usually available for aggregating these operations and so efficiency 
can be easily estimated provided the number of observations in the sample is 
sufficiently large. 
The provision of public services80 though, is impregnated with peculiarities 
that hinder the process of measuring efficiency. Public services are normally provided 
free of charge (or at subsidised prices) at the point of delivery, which brings 
significant obstacles to the determination of their societal value and consequently to 
                                                 
79 The expansion of public services may indeed be subject to diminishing returns. Historically, initial 
reductions in neo-natal mortality may have been relatively easy to achieve, but driving down rates 
today below their current level may involve much more expensive interventions. When schools have 
halved their truancy rate, they may find it increasingly difficult to achieve further reductions. When re-
offending has been reduced by 5 per cent, the next 5 per cent may mean working with more difficult 
cases. Diminishing returns do not, of course, mean that the expansion is unjustified. The value of the 
additional output may still exceed the cost of the inputs. 
80 Irrespective of whether these services are funded and provided by government, or whether the private 
sector plays a major role in their provision.  
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 the aggregation of their output. Public service inputs normally pose fewer problems, 
insofar as they are purchased in competitive markets, and prices are available for 
determining their relative value (just as in the case of the private sector). However, 
there are situations where government is not just another buyer in a competitive 
market. Instead, it may have considerable monopsony power; it may bargain with 
powerful trade unions; or prices may be determined by complex regulatory 
mechanisms. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 address the specificities of government outputs and 
inputs in the context of efficiency measurement. 
Apart from difficulties in measuring inputs and outputs, there are a number of 
methodological choices relating to the estimation of the production frontier that are 
likely to have a significant impact on public service efficiency measurements. Some 
of the most important choices concern the determination of output weights; modelling 
the production process; controlling for environmental constraints; and allowing for 
dynamic effects (Smith and Street, 2005). Section 5.3 concentrates on these choices 




Traditionally public sector output has been measured as of value equal to the 
total value of inputs used; by extension output volume has been measured by the 
volume of inputs. The wide spread usage of the “output=input” convention reflects 
difficulties of alternative estimates: the exact nature of the output generated by 
collective services (e.g. defence and public administration) is very difficult to define; 
and in the case of services supplied to individuals (e.g. education, health) the societal 
value of these services is also difficult to determine since there is no market 
transaction (Atkinson, 2005). 
 
A useful distinction can be made between activities, outputs (goods/services 
which may require a bundle of activities), and outcomes (the characteristics of output 
which affect utility). Consumers value goods because of the bundle of utility yielding 
characteristics they produce. The quality of the output can also be seen as some 
function of the vector of outcomes it produces (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; 
Lancaster, 1971; Dawson et al., 2004). 
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 In competitive markets, prices measure the consumers’ marginal valuations of 
the bundle of characteristics associated with the consumption of outputs. In the public 
sector, there are no final markets or prices to reveal consumers’ marginal valuations 
of outputs, and so their value needs to be estimated. There are two ways of doing that: 
either measure the outputs and attempt to estimate the marginal valuations attached to 
them or measure the outcomes produced by each unit of output and attempt to 
estimate the marginal valuations of the outcomes (Dawson et al., 2004) 
 
Let us assume the production technology is of the type 
, where y0),,,...,,( 1 =jjjMjjj vzqqyg j is the volume or quantity of output j (the 
number of units produced) and qjm is the amount of outcome or characteristic m 
produced by consumption of one unit of output j. The vector qj determines the quality 
of the product. At the equilibrium of a market economy the price paid for a unit of 
output j depends on the outcomes it produces pj(qj), and is also a measure of quality. 
The marginal effect of outcome m on the price of output j is jmjjm qp ∂∂≡ /π . In the 
competitive equilibrium these prices represent social values as well as costs of 
production. Then if  we can replace the problem of estimating pj with 
estimating the m marginal values πm of the outcomes
∑= m jmmj qp π
81.  
 
If the marginal social values of output (pj) or of outcomes (πm) vary over time 
or across DMUs, variations in the value of government output depend both on 
differences in production conditions (the rates of growth of outcomes per unit of 
output and the rates of growth of outputs) but also on differences in preferences (the 
rates of growth of the marginal social values of outcomes). Changes in the value of 
outcomes should affect decisions about the allocation of resources within the public 
sector and the relative size of the public sector, and therefore should be taken into 
consideration when efficiency is being measured.  
 
                                                 
81 Note that assumption that the marginal social value of a unit of output j is a linear function of its 
characteristics and that the π jm is independent of j characteristics is strong. Dawson et al. (2004) 
provide an example from the health sector where this assumptions requires that an improvement in the 
quality of hospital food has the same effect on the value of treatment for throat cancer as on the value 
of a hip replacement. 
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 In the past measures have been employed whereby the cost of public sector 
output is used to estimate its marginal value. The main problem with using costs to 
evaluate public output is the lack of a market mechanism ensuring that the marginal 
cost of public output equals the marginal value to consumers. It can be shown that 
cost weighted output indexes are equivalent to the value weighted index 
 only if (a) quality variation/change is zero for all characteristics of all 
outputs; and (b) costs are proportional to the marginal social value of output (Dawson 
et al., 2004, section 2.11)
∑= m jmmj qp π
82. 
An alternative approach to cost weights is to place judgements on the relative 
merits of different outputs by constructing a composite indicator. However, the use of 
“judgemental” weights is likely to be controversial at best and open to abuse at worst 
(O’Mahony and Stevens, 2004), and evidence suggests the composite is highly 
sensitive to these methodological choices (Jacobs, Smith and Goddard, 2003). 
Composite indicators often take the form of linear performance indexes, which 
implicitly assumes that the trade-off between different outputs should be resolved by 
maximizing a linear function of the various output measures. Figure 4.7 provides an 
example with a simplified two-output technology. The parallel lines indicate different 
values of a chosen composite indicator, with scores increasing towards the top right-
hand corner. Given the weights used in the composite indicator the choice P* on the 
possibility frontier is optimal, and the choice of any other point on the frontier would 
be allocatively inefficient (Smith and Street, 2005, p. 406, 408). 
 
Figure 4.7: Production possibility frontier 
 
                                                 
82 An additional limitation of using costs to evaluate public output is the difficulty in incorporating 





Measuring the inputs used by the public sector poses fewer conceptual 
problems as most inputs are sold on markets and prices are readily available. In 
competitive markets (where buyers and sellers are price takers and suppliers of inputs 
bear the full costs of their decisions) input prices reflect marginal social costs and thus 
can be used directly to value inputs. However, there are situations where government 
has considerable monopsony power; others where it bargains with powerful trade 
unions; and yet others where prices are determined by a complex regulatory 
mechanism (Dawson et al., 2004). 
In input markets where government purchases affect the market price, because 
the supply curve is upward sloping the marginal expenditure on the input will exceed 
the market price, and the amount bought will be less than if the government were 
price taker. Since suppliers will still be on their supply curve, and assuming the 
supply curve reflects all the costs of supply, the price in this monopsonised market 
will still equal the marginal social cost of the input. 
In the opposite scenario where sellers have monopoly power, the price paid 
will exceed the marginal social cost of supply. This is also likely to be true in markets 
where government bargains with powerful trade unions. The precise levels of wage 
and employment will depend on the specification of the bargaining model (e.g. 
whether it occurs over the wage and employment, or just over the wage, with 
government acting as price taker in choosing employment levels). In either case, 
however, the bargained wage will include a rent and so will exceed the marginal 
social cost of labour. 
When prices are determined by regulatory mechanisms (e.g. the 1999 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme in the health sector), the suppliers’ rate of 
return on inputs sold to the public sector is generally limited. The effect of regulation 
is thus to push prices closer (on average) to marginal production costs, although there 
will tend to remain a gap between the two. In the pharmaceutical market for example 
prices are sufficiently above marginal production costs to enable firms to earn a rent 




 4.4.3 Efficiency Measurement 
 
In addition to problems in defining and measuring public service outputs and 
inputs, public service efficiency measurements are sensitive to the specific set of 
methodological choices adopted in the estimation of the productive frontier. 
Smith and Street (2005) lay emphasis on the consequences of four of these 
choices: the choice between a parametric or non-parametric approach to the 
estimation of the production frontier imposes distinct assumptions on output weights; 
decisions on the specification of the production process are likely to have an 
important impact on the efficiency estimates; the set of environmental variables to be 
included in the model, as well as the way in which these variables are controlled for is 
contentious irrespective of the particular approach adopted for the estimation of the 
frontier; finally, although allowing for dynamic effects in modelling the production 
process drastically increases complexity, this should be done whenever possible and 




Measuring public service efficiency implies deciding on the set of objectives 
against which the performance of organisations will be evaluated and on the weights 
attached to these objectives. As we have seen in section 5.1, the set of weights w 
ought to reflect societal values. However, in practice determining vector w is often 
problematic. First, prices for valuing outputs or outcomes are generally non-
available83. Second, public sector organisations usually face multiple objectives and 
lack a consensus on the prioritisation of those objectives. Ultimately, the selection of 
objectives and the determination of their weights should be the responsibility of 
politicians who are charged with reconciling conflicting claims on public resources 
(Smith and Street, 2005). 
The parametric and non-parametric methodologies discussed in section 3 
generate weights as a by-product of the estimation procedure, rather than 
                                                 
83 The are various sources that could be used in an attempt to determine these prices including 
economic studies of willingness to pay, and use of prices of parallel markets, just to name a few.  
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 incorporating a pre-defined vector of weights84. Some authors actually see this as an 
attractive feature of these methods (Cooper et al., 2000). 
In the parametric paradigm, estimating efficiency with multiple outputs is 
usually accomplished with recourse to either cost functions85 or distance functions 
(Coelli and Perelman, 2000; Lothgren, 2000; Shephard, 1970). In both cases, the 
estimated weight for each output (shadow price) corresponds to the value implicit in 
the sample mean cost of producing an additional unit of that output. The underlying 
assumption is that the observed expenditure choices of organisations (on average) 
reflect the values that are placed by society on the outputs. 
In the non-parametric paradigm and particularly in DEA, the weights are 
allowed to vary freely so that each organisation’s efficiency score is maximised. This 
is equivalent to allowing each unit to choose the criteria by which it wishes to be 
judged. This flexibility does not come without a cost though, as it undermines the 
conclusions that can be drawn about relative efficiency (Pedraja-Chaparro, Salinas-
Jiménez and Smith, 1997). In effect, in small samples this may lead to some units 
being deemed efficient simply because they are different (in their input or output 
mixes) from other units86. A possible way of overcoming this problem would be to 
impose weights, but would bring us back to the problem of determining such weights 
removing the flexibility advantage of DEA. 
 
4.4.3.2 Modelling the production process 
 
Modelling the process whereby inputs are transformed into outputs plays a key 
role in efficiency measurement. Traditional empirical research models try to unveil 
the structure and determinants of the production process engrained in aggregate 
(sample average) patterns – e.g. the marginal productivity of factors of production; 
how the technology is characterised in terms of returns to scale; and how external 
environmental factors influence efficiency.  
                                                 
84 As Smith and Street (2005, p. 409) note: “It is of course possible that the weights emerging from 
statistical studies correspond to political preferences. However, we are not aware of any studies that 
have sought to verify this. At the very least, we would suggest that there is a need for careful dialogue 
between policy makers and analysts to ensure that the methods that are used reflect policy 
requirements”. 
85 This implicitly imposes a cost-minimising behavioural assumption on organisations. 
86 Related to this is the general issue of sensitivity in DEA. The relative efficiency score achieved by 
each unit can be sensitive to the number of inputs and outputs specified (Sexton, 1986; Nunamaker, 
1985). The more input and output variables are included in the model, the higher will be the number of 
units with an efficiency score equal to unity (Nunamaker, 1985). 
101  
 However, the managerial and policy interest often goes further in seeking to 
obtain information on the efficiency of individual organisations. Frontier analysis 
derives this information from the residual or organisation-specific effect. Focusing on 
the residual means the model parameters are no longer the main point of interest, 
which effectively “turns the statistical model on its head” (Smith and Street, 2005, p. 
410). 
Traditional statistical models seek to satisfy specific acceptability criteria87. 
Meeting these criteria ensures the models convey an adequate portrait of 
aggregate/structural features of production, but it does not guarantee they are 
appropriate for inferring efficiencies of individual organisations. In particular, 
individual efficiency can be under/overestimated as a result of model misspecification 
(omitted variables or functional form) or measurement errors. Some of these problems 
can be avoided by testing the underlying representation of the production technology 
through sensitivity analysis. In DEA, different scaling assumptions can be tested and 
bootstrapping estimates may be employed to assess statistical significance (Simar and 
Wilson, 2002). Stochastic frontiers allow for different functional forms and 
distributions of the inefficiency effects to be tested, and provide confidence intervals 
around estimates of inefficiency and of the model parameters. 
In general, the sensitivity of results to different methodological choices 
depends on the complexity of the underlying production process. When this is process 
is relatively simple, the results are not expected to show wide variation across 
methods and assumptions. Smith and Street (2005) indicate estimates of the efficiency 
of companies providing water and sewerage services in the UK as an example. These 
appear to be relatively robust in the face of sensitivity analysis (Office of Water 
Trading, 1999). As a contrasting example, the authors mention the efficiency 
estimates derived from different models for the UK hospital sector, which seldom 
yield definitive or consistent conclusions (Jacobs, 2001). 
 
4.4.3.3 Environmental constraints 
 
                                                 
87 Typically these include consistency (as the sample size increases, estimates converge to parameters), 
unbiasedness (expected error in the estimate equal to zero), efficiency (sampling variance of the 
estimate as small as possible), robustness (sensitivity of estimates to potential model misspecification, 
missing information and measurement error) and parsimony (the model is as simple as possible). 
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 The measurement of public service efficiency is further complicated by the 
influence on efficiency of variables that lie outside managerial control (so-called 
environmental variables) - e.g. characteristics of individuals being served; external 
environment (geography, climate, and culture); and activities of other related 
organisations. 
Differences in these variables between organisations lead to differences in 
their production possibility frontiers (for each level of expenditure). The frontiers of 
organisations operating in less-favourable “environments” will lie inside those of 
more favourably endowed organisations. The effect of these variables needs to be 
taken into account when modelling efficiency otherwise efficiency will be 
over/underestimated. 
The way in which these variables should be included in the efficiency models 
is not consensual (Ozcan, Luke and Haksever, 1992, Buck, 2000, Fried et al., 2002). 
In DEA, they can be included alongside inputs in the production model, ensuring each 
organisation is compared only with organisations operating in identical or less 
favourable environments. Alternatively the model can be first estimated ignoring the 
environment, and in a second-stage analysis the effect of environmental variables can 
by estimated by regressing the efficiency scores on these variables (Gerdtham, 
Rehnberg and Tambour, 1999; Kooreman, 1994; Luoma et al., 1996). This is not a 
straightforward procedure though, since the efficiency scores are serially correlated 
and therefore the parameter estimates and the standard errors from these second-stage 
regressions are biased (Simar and Wilson, 2002). Also there is no consensual way of 
testing whether a particular environmental variable exerts a “significant” 
uncontrollable influence on efficiency and should therefore be controlled for (Dor, 
1994). 
In SFA, regressing the efficiency scores on environmental variables directly is 
not an appropriate procedure (Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGuckin, 1991; and 
Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991). In the first stage the inefficiency terms are 
assumed to be independently and identically distributed, which is inconsistent with 
assuming in the second stage they are a function of firm-specific factors. This 
inconsistency can be avoided by the use of alternative specifications (e.g. Battese and 
Coelli, 1995) that estimate efficiency and the effect of environmental variables on 
efficiency in a single stage procedure. 
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 In comparison with DEA, decisions on the inclusion of environmental 
variables in SFA models are facilitated by the possibility of testing if these variables 
“explain” a material proportion of the overall residual88.  In theory, including a new 
variable in the model should depend on whether it is thought to reflect an 
uncontrollable influence on the production frontier (in which case it would be 
included so that its effect is not mistakenly interpreted as (in)efficiency) or a 
characteristic of inefficient organisations (in which case it should be omitted from the 
production model and allowed to affect the estimates of efficiency89). 
 
4.4.3.4 Dynamic effects 
 
Organisations operate within historical contexts. They draw on past 
inheritances and make investments thinking in future performance90. Ideally, the 
production process should be modelled in a way that takes account of these dynamic 
effects - current performance being influenced by the endowment from previous 
organisational efforts, and contemporary inputs being partially invested for future 
output (Figure 4.8). 
 
                                                 
88 The statistically significant effect of these variables may be due to one or both of the following 
reasons (Smith and Street, 2005): (a) it explains some of the random error (the original model suffered 
from omitted variable or functional form misspecification); (b) it explains some of the inefficiency 
error (the variable is correlated with the original estimates of inefficiency). 
89 Omitting the variable from the production frontier does not mean it should be omitted from the 
model altogether. It will still be important to test the effect of the variable on efficiency (in a second 
stage procedure in DEA, or in a single stage model in SFA). In DEA, this will provide information on 
the significance and magnitude of the effect the variable has on the efficiency. In SFA, the significance 
and magnitude of the effect will also be estimated, and in addition the efficiency estimates will be 
improved in case the effect of the new variable is significant. 
90 In other words, there are lags between inputs and outputs – e.g. increased public expenditure at a 
given moment in time may have a bearing on improved output indicators only years later. This seems 




 Figure 4.8 : Dynamic effects 
 
 
In practice, modelling the production process in this way is an intensely 
complex exercise. Difficulties arise in measuring endowments from previous periods; 
in ascertaining the impact some elements of current efforts will have on future 
attainment; and also in modelling the effects of these variables, together with the 
effects of contemporary inputs and outputs, on efficiency. 
Existing examples of dynamic modeling of the production process include 
Färe and Grosskopf (1996) in DEA, and Bond (2002) in the parametric framework. 
However, even when adequate data is available, estimating these models often proves 
to be a deeply problematic exercise, impregnated with difficulties to which the 






Examples of public service efficiency estimation do not abound. Interesting 
work in this area includes the contributions of Coelli (1996a) for Australian 
Universities; De Borger and Kerstens (1996) for Belgian local governments; Fakin 
and Crombrugghe (1997); Evans, Tandon, Murray and Lauer (2000) for health 
expenditure; Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) for education and health in Africa; Johnes, 
Bradley and Millington (2001) for English secondary schools; Clements (2002) for 
education spending in Europe; Johnes, et al. (2002) for British higher education; 
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 Greene (2004) for health expenditure; Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) for 
public expenditure in the OECD; Stevens (2005a; 2005b) for English and Welsh 
universities and for English local governments; Afonso and Aubyn (2004, 2005) for 
health and education expenditure in the OECD; and Afonso and Fernandes (2006) for 
local municipalities in the Lisbon Region. 
The most critical decisions in measuring efficiency involve the choice of the 
set of outputs to be measured and the choice of the set of weights reflecting the 
societal values attached to each output. In the public services, both of these are 
essentially political choices. Applying efficiency models to multiple-output 
technologies without an a priori definition of output weights imposes a set of 
assumptions on these weights91, but it does not offer a solution to the political 
problem. This highlights the relevance of drawing on complementary approaches, 
such as trade-off surveys or conjoint analysis, which may enlighten the 
methodological choices required to measure efficiency (Shaw et al., 2001; Ryan and 
Farrar, 2000). 
The quality of the efficiency measures conveyed by the methods presented in 
this chapter will ultimately depend on the institutional framework under scrutiny. 
When a uniform set of objectives can be unequivocally applied to all organisations, 
the results are likely to be fairly robust. When organisations are thought to have an 
important degree of autonomy about the values they should pursue, the results may be 
less informative and more susceptible to criticism. 
The quality of the results will also depend on the extent to which all the 
variables that significantly influence the productive process are taken into account, 
and their influence is correctly modelled. In its most general form, the production of 
public services should be modelled according to the structure depicted in Figure 4.9. 
However, in practice it is very unlikely that the information required for the 
estimation of such a comprehensive model can be obtained. Even if it could be 
obtained, modelling it would be of formidable complexity. 
 
                                                 
91 DEA adjusts these weights so that the efficiency of each organisation is maximised, which is 
effectively equivalent to allowing each organisation to define its own set of weights. SFA (in the dual 
cost-function form) estimates these weights based on sample average costs, and thus assumes that the 
decisions made in practice concerning the distribution of expenditure between outputs effectively 
reflect societal valuations of those outputs. 
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 Figure 4.9: Public service production model 
 
 
Practicable empirical applications of efficiency models are necessarily infested 
with all sorts of compromises as they try to give parsimonious accounts of reality. 
Results are likely to be sensitive to these assumptions. So it is important to avoid 
relying on point estimates of efficiency for individual organisations. It is more 
sensible to simply sort the results into three groups: consistently efficient (may be 
indicative of best practice); consistently inefficient (may be indicative of sub-standard 
performance); and inconsistent results (avoid drawing strong inferences).
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 Chapter 5: Modes of Governance and Education 
Efficiency 
108  
 5.1 Introduction 
  
In section 7 of chapter 3 we laid out the main research hypothesis of this 
thesis. We argued that improving the efficiency of government activity implies that (i) 
governments retreat from interfering with transactions that do not exhibit attributes 
that call for public central coordination; (ii) when public central coordination is 
required, it should be confined to the specific attributes of transactions that markets 
fail to address, and in a way that explicitly acknowledges the risks of government 
failure. This chapter tests this hypothesis in the context of education services. 
Applying our research hypothesis to the education sector yields specific 
expectations regarding the optimal organisational structure of education services from 
an efficiency point of view. Confining government interference to the attributes of 
education that call for public central coordination (externalities, market failures in 
general, and redistributive motives) provides for partial government involvement in 
the funding of education, but not necessarily in the provision of the service. It further 
suggests that when government directly provides the service through publicly owned 
and managed schools, these should be allowed to operate on an essentially 
decentralised manner, in line with the incentives that guide privately managed 
schools.   
In the following sections we investigate the effect of organisational structure 
on efficiency. Efficiency is measured through a stochastic frontier for an unbalanced 
data panel of 18 OECD countries in 2000 and 2003. Organisational structure is 
explored through two analytical components: the share of public/private providers in 
the system and the degree of decentralisation of decision-making procedures of public 
providers. 
The share of public providers is found to exert a negative effect on efficiency 
whereas the degree of decentralisation of the decision-making procedures of public 
providers is found to exert a positive effect on efficiency. Both results corroborate our 
research hypothesis. 
The next section explores the attributes of education that call for public central 
coordination. Section 5.3 presents the variables used for measuring efficiency and the 
organisational variables whose effect on efficiency is being investigated. Section 5.4 
focuses on the stochastic model that underpins the results presented in section 5.5. 
Section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
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5.2 The Economics of Education 
   
Since the early writings of Sir William Petty and Adam Smith, economists 
have come to regard education as an investment made by students and by society at 
large, each of these groups incurring their own costs and reaping specific rewards92. 
Students bear the costs of education in the form of direct costs of tuition and 
income forgone for attending school instead of taking a paying job. The benefits 
accrue in the form of higher average income in the course of the life-cycle, greater job 
opportunities, and less probability of becoming unemployed (OECD, 2001). In 
addition, several non-financial rewards reinforce the benefits obtained through the 
labour market. There is evidence of more educated people making better choices 
concerning health, thereby extending their life expectancy and improving their quality 
of life. There is also evidence of children of more educated parents performing better 
at school, leaving school later and learning more (Michael, 1982; Haveman and 
Wolfe, 1984; Wolfe and Zuvekas, 1995; and Leibowitz, 1974). 
Society as a whole incurs the direct costs of providing free or heavily 
subsidized education to its citizens, and forgoes the opportunity to devote the 
resources engaged in education to other projects. The benefits stemming from a well 
educated citizenry come in various forms. National income increases directly with the 
higher payoffs that educated workers obtain in the labour market. Civic involvement 
and electorate responsibility are likely to improve with education (Teixeira, 1992). 
The level of crime is likely to decrease (Ehrlich, 1975; Lochner and Moretti, 2001). 
Furthermore, some studies suggest that education provides economic benefits to 
society that exceed the sum of its benefits to individuals (i.e. education generates 
external effects), by contributing to the creation of an appropriate environment for 
innovation, and thus accelerating the growth rate of the economy (Lucas, 1988; 
Romer, 1990; Barro, 1991; Jorgenson and Fraumeni, 1992; Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 
1995). 
Although associations between education and various desirable economic 
outcomes are well established, significant questions remain about the magnitude and 
interpretation of these relationships (Hanushek, 2002). First, the direction of causality 
                                                 
92 Schultz (1961; 1963), Becker (1993) and Mincer (1970, 1974) were responsible for the introduction 
of the conceptualisation of education as an investment into mainstream economics, and for creating the 
basis for a steady stream of subsequent theoretical and empirical analyses (Hanushek, 2002). 
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 intrinsic to these relationships is still the subject of controversy (on the link between 
education and economic growth see Bils and Klenow, 2000; Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil, 1992; and Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). Second, average effects and marginal 
effects may not coincide, which further complicates the analysis. Third, the external 
effects often associated with education are elusive and difficult to estimate 
convincingly. 
  The existence of large returns to education is not by itself a reason for 
government to interfere with the production and/or the consumption of education. It is 
simply a powerful incentive for individuals to invest in human capital accumulation. 
Government involvement in the education sector is usually justified on the basis of 
externalities, market failures in general, and redistributive motives (Hanushek, 2002). 
Despite being elusive and difficult to estimate, there appears to be a 
consensual sense that education involves substantial externalities (Cohn and Geske, 
1990). The main candidates for the role of positive external effect generators are 
citizen involvement in the community and government, crime reduction, family 
decision making and child upbringing, and economic growth. Public central 
coordination can allow for these external effects and bring individuals decisions in 
line with the appropriate social calculus. 
Other types of market failures that may lead government to intervene include 
capital market and information imperfections. If individuals cannot barrow against 
their human capital, they may be forced to underinvest in education (Becker, 1993). 
This possibility has not received strong empirical support (Cameron and Heckman, 
1999), but the current level of government interference in primary and secondary 
education hinders the proper evaluation of the real significance of this problem. Also, 
if informational problems prevent individuals from accurately assessing the influence 
of schools on their performance93, they may be unable to make optimal human capital 
investment decisions. In both instances public central coordination can 
remove/mitigate the hindrances to efficient individual decision-making. 
The remaining argument for government interference in education is usually 
entrenched in the desire to change the prevailing distribution of income (Juhn, 
Murphy and Pierce, 1993). The precise definition of societal redistributive goals, and 
the way they interact with education remain largely unexplored. 
                                                 
93 Apart from school inputs, student performance is generally affected by a mixture of student innate 
ability and a range of environmental factors (namely the family socio-economic background). 
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 While these attributes can be legitimately invoked to justify government 
involvement in education, none of them provides for extensive public funding of 
education or direct public provision of education services. 
Externalities and capital market imperfections lead to sub-optimal investment 
on education. Public funding is therefore required to motivate individuals to 
investment more on education, but this is likely to be residual. Using the education 
system as a redistributive mechanism also implies that a certain (residual) share of the 
system be publicly funded. Information imperfections, on the other hand, bring a role 
for government in terms of facilitating information, but have no implications for the 
funding or provision of the service. 
In virtually all the OECD countries, the organisation of primary and secondary 
education has moved toward extensive government financing and government 
provision. Our research hypothesis refutes the adequacy of such a large intervention. 
In the next sections we place our hypothesis under empirical scrutiny.  
 
5.3 Education Efficiency and Organisational Structure 
 
There are a limited number of studies addressing the efficiency of education 
systems at the international level (Clements, 1999, 2002; St. Aubyn, 2002; Gupta and 
Verhoeven, 2001; Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2004, 2005). These studies follow a parallel 
line of research to the traditional econometric estimation of education production 
functions using cross-country data (Barro and Lee, 2001; Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; 
Hanushek and Luque, 2003). In both approaches, socio-economic variables describing 
students’ backgrounds such as parents’ education and wealth are the key variables 
used to explain efficiency94. Whilst the importance of these variables cannot be 
overstated, they are of little help to policymakers attempting to improve the outcomes 
of education expenditure since (at least in the sort run) they are beyond government 
control. More interesting from a policy point of view is the effect that organisational 
                                                 
94 The literature focusing on the econometric estimation of education production functions does not 
explicitly acknowledge the concept of efficiency. Typically, qualitative measures of education outputs 
(results from international studies assessing students’ academic abilities) are regressed on a set of 
education system resources (financial and/or physical) and other environmental variables thought to 
affect the performance of the education system. However, since students’ socio-economic background 
(normally proxied by parents’ education and wealth) is often presented as a relevant environmental 
variable for explaining students’ performance, it is implicitly assumed that it interferes with the 
relationship between inputs and outputs, and thus with efficiency.      
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 structure of education systems has on efficiency (something that government act 
upon). The nature and significance of this effect is explored in the rest of this chapter. 
 
The traditional conceptualisation of the education production process is of the 
following form (Hanushek and Taylor, 1990): 
 
                                                     );;( εFSfA =                                          
 (1) 
 
A: a vector of variables measuring individual achievement; 
S: a vector of variables measuring school inputs; 
F: a vector of variables measuring students’ socio-economic background; 
ε: a vector of unmeasured factors that contribute to individual achievement 
(individual ability and random factors). 
 
Here, we expand this model to );;;( εOFSfA = , where O is a vector of 
variables measuring organisational structure. 
For measuring student achievement we draw on the results of two OECD 
surveys conducted in 2000 and 2003 which evaluate the mathematical, reading and 
scientific ability of 15 year old students95. 
Several different variables have been considered in the education efficiency 
literature to measure the school inputs contributing to student achievement. These 
have typically included financial indicators such as expenditure per student and 
physical indicators such as average class size, ratio of students to teaching staff, and 
number of instruction hours. Financial inputs were predominant in most of the pioneer 
studies on education efficiency. Recent studies have favoured the use of multiple 
physical inputs instead - often being alleged that financial inputs reflect to a large 
extent differences in costs between countries (mainly teachers’ salaries) causing 
significant distortions to the measurement of efficiency. 
                                                 
95 An arithmetic average of the mathematic, reading and science scores from the 2000 and 2003 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) surveys was considered. Since the reporting 
scales for mathematics are not directly comparable between 2000 and 2003, as the PISA 2003 
mathematics assessment was more comprehensive than the one that took place in 2000, we drew on the 
two components of the 2003 mathematical results (space and shape and change and relationships) 
common to the 2000 survey. 
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 We employ a single financial indicator - cumulative expenditure per student96 
(CEPS) between the age of 6 and 15 in equivalent US dollars - as the input variable 
for three different reasons. First, differences in costs underlying financial measures of 
inputs can be mitigated by the use of values converted at purchasing power parities 
(PPPs) - although they are not totally eliminated as PPPs are calculated taking into 
account the average level of prices (the one that underlies the gross domestic product) 
and not the particular prices/costs of specific services like education. Second, some of 
these differences in cost actually reflect differences in the overall efficiency of the 
system that should be considered by our calculations. For example, the skill and 
ability of school managers to contract the best teachers at the best price, to put in 
place an incentive regime that ensures high labour productivity, or to outsource non-
core activities in a cost effective manner, create differences in costs that should be 
reflected in a proper account of efficiency. Third, despite all the imperfections and 
flaws of international data on education expenditure, this still arguably remains the 
best available proxy for the entire set of resources that go into the production of 
education. Resources such as physical infrastructure (buildings, computers, etc) and 
policy administration (of schools and the education system as a whole) escape 
traditional physical input measures, but have a bearing on financial inputs. 
Students´ socio-economic background is proxied by the PISA’s index of 
economic, social and cultural status (IESCS). This indicator captures various aspects 
of students’ family and home background that are thought to be relevant for school 
achievement97. 
Organisational structure is expressed by two variables: the share of public 
providers in the system (%PUBPROV), and the degree of decentralisation/managerial 
                                                 
96 Let n(0), n(1) and n(2) be the typical number of years spent by a student from the age of six up to the 
age of 15 years in primary, lower secondary and upper secondary education. Let E(0), E(1) and E(2) be 
the annual expenditure per student in US dollars converted using purchasing power parities in primary, 
lower secondary and upper secondary education, respectively. The cumulative expenditure is then 
calculated by multiplying current annual expenditure E by the typical duration of study n for each level 









97 IESCS is derived from the following variables (OECD, 2004b, p. 307): i) the highest international 
socio-economic index of occupational status of the father or mother; ii) the highest level of education 
of the father or mother converted into years of schooling; and iii) the number of books at home as well 
as access to home educational and cultural resources, obtained by asking students whether they had at 
their home: a desk to study at, a room of their own, a quiet place to study, a computer they can use for 
school work, educational software, a link to the Internet, their own calculator, classic literature, books 
of poetry, works of art (e.g., paintings), books to help with their school work, and a dictionary. 
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 autonomy of public providers (DEC). In the following paragraphs we provide a brief 
discussion of the rationale for including these variables.  
Primary and secondary education is mainly a public enterprise. On average 
across OECD countries only 4 per cent of 15-year-olds are enrolled in schools that are 
both privately managed and predominantly privately financed (OECD, 2004b). 
However, publicly financed schools are not necessarily publicly managed, and in fact, 
in the quest for efficiency gains, governments are increasingly relying on the transfer 
of public funds to privately managed schools to deliver education services. 
Accordingly, schools that are privately managed but predominantly publicly 
financed98 account for a more expressive average of 13 per cent of school enrolment 
in OECD countries. 
In contrast to previous studies that have tested (unsuccessfully) the effect of 
the ratio of public-to-total expenditure on efficiency99, we argue that the share of 
public providers (schools both funded and managed by the public sector) offers a 
better account of the structural diversity of education systems and that its effect on 
efficiency is the one that should be investigated. 
Apart from the segmentation between public and private providers, a second 
organisational feature of education systems whose impact on efficiency is worth 
studying relates to the reforms that have been taking place throughout the last two 
decades in terms of the way the public sector operates as a service provider. In 
particular, while seeking to improve efficiency, many governments have opted for 
devolving decision-making authority to schools and lower levels of governments.  
This has been accomplished in the expectation it will enable downsizing of central 
education administration; elimination of superfluous layers of bureaucracy; and 
improvement of chains of command in decision making, delivering a larger 
proportion of financial and human resources directly to local governments, schools, 
and students (Behrman, et al., 2002). 
                                                 
98 OECD (2004b) designates these as “government-dependent schools”. Public schools are defined as 
educational instructional institutions that are controlled and managed directly by a public education 
authority or agency; or controlled and managed either by a government agency directly or by a 
governing body (council, committee, etc.), most of whose members were either appointed by a public 
authority or elected by public franchise. Private schools are defined as educational instructional 
institutions that are controlled and managed by a nongovernmental organisation (e.g., a church, a trade 
union or a business enterprise) or if their governing board consisted mostly of members not selected by 
a public agency. 
99 Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005) did not find a significant relationship between public-to-total education 
expenditure and efficiency. The authors argued that this was “probably because most spending in this 
level of education is essentially public and high for most countries” (p. 23).  
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 We examine the effect of decentralisation/managerial autonomy on efficiency 
using an indicator of the distribution of educational decisions by specific levels of 
government in public lower secondary education (OECD, 2004a). The percentage of 
decisions taken at the “local” and “school” levels is taken as the appropriate indicator 
of decentralisation/managerial autonomy. Information on four different functional 
domains is considered: 
- Organisation of instruction: student admissions; student careers; instruction 
time; choice of textbooks; grouping students; additional support for students; teaching 
methods; regular day-to-day student assessment; 
- Personnel management: hiring and dismissal of teaching and non-teaching 
staff; duties and service conditions of staff; salary scales of staff; influence over the 
careers of staff; 
- Planning and structures: opening or closure of schools; creation or abolition 
of a grade level; design of programmes of study; selection of programmes of study 
taught in a particular school; choice of range of subjects taught in a particular school; 
definition of course content; setting of qualifying examinations for a certificate or 
diploma; credentialing (examination content, marking and administration); 
- Resources: allocation and use of resources for teaching staff, non-teaching 
staff, capital and operating expenditure. 
 
Our model is estimated for an unbalanced panel of 18 OECD countries in 
2000 and 2003100. Data for all variables are presented in the statistical annex and 
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5.1.   
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
PISA scores 494.000 30.811 393.000 544.000 
Cumulative expenditure per std 44148.406 18548.700 10480.545 73328.892 
IESCS -0.020 0.359 -1.130 0.690 
%PUBPROV 0.846 0.187 0.233 0.995 
Dec 0.603 0.261 0.156 1 
 
 
                                                 
100 Data on cumulative expenditure refers to 1998 and 2002 (deflated to 1998 prices). Data on 





We use the Battese and Coelli (1995) model for a stochastic frontier 
production function which is equivalent to the Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGukin 
(1991) specification, with the exception that allocative efficiency is imposed, the first-
order profit maximising conditions removed, and panel data is permitted. The model 
may be expressed as: 
 
                                 Yit = Xitβ + (Vit - Uit)          i=1,...,18; t=1,2 (2) 
 
Yit is the logarithm of the PISA score of country i in period t; 
Xit is the logarithm of cumulative expenditure per student of country i in 
period t; 
β is a vector of unknown parameters;  
t denotes the time period; 
Vit are random variables assumed to be independent and identically distributed 
N(0,σV2), and independent of Uit;  
Uit are non-negative random variables assumed to account for technical 
inefficiency in production and assumed to be independently distributed as truncations 
at zero of the N(mit,σU2) distribution, where: 
                                                               
                                                               mit = Zitδ,  (3) 
 
Zit is a p×1 vector of variables deemed to influence the efficiency of country i 
in period t; δ is an 1×p vector of parameters to be estimated. 
 
Following Battese and Corra (1977), the likelihood function is parameterised 
in terms of the variance ratio γ=σU2/(σV2+σU2). Hence γ indicates the relative 
magnitude of technical inefficiency variance to total variance in the model. 
 
Six different specifications of equation (3) are tested: 
Model a:  mit = δ1IESCSit; 
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 Model b: mit =δ0+δ1IESCSit+δ2ln(%PUBPROV); 
Model c: mit =δ1IESCSit+δ2ln(DEC); 
Model d: mit =δ1IESCSit+δ2ln(%PUBPROV)+δ3ln(DEC); 
Model e: mit =δ1IESCSit+δ2ln(%PUBPROV)+δ3ln(%PUBPROV*DEC); 
Model f101: mit =δ0+δ1IESCSit+δ2ln(DECINDEX) 
 
Models “a”, “b”, and “c” test the isolated effect on efficiency of IESCS, 
%PUBPROV and DEC, respectively102. Models “d”, “e” and “f” include 
simultaneously the three variables and consider different specifications for 
%PUBPROV and DEC. Model “d” treats the effects of %PUBPROV and DEC on the 
general efficiency of education systems as being autonomous and independent from 
each other. The implicit assumption is that decentralisation of decision making in the 
public sector has an impact on the efficiency of the education system as a whole that 
is independent of the public share of the system (i.e. the effects of decentralisation in 
the public sector spillover to other parts of the system – possibly through competition 
with private and not-for-profit providers). Model “e” considers that the effect of 
decentralisation on efficiency is mediated by the share of public providers in the 
education system (i.e. there are no spillover effects). Finally, model “f” tests the effect 
on efficiency of an overall index of decentralisation that assumes private schools 
correspond to a level of decentralisation of one and that public schools are in this 
respect comparable to private schools, i.e. the type of ownership is irrelevant. In the 
different specifications an independent term was included when its estimate was 
significant103. 
  
5.5 Results  
 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in the production function 
frontier and technical inefficiency effects for the different specifications are presented 
                                                 
101 DECINDEX= 1-[%PUBPROV(1-DEC)]. This index assumes that private schools correspond to a 
level of decentralisation of 100 per cent. The index is equivalent to an average of the level of 
decentralisation of public and private schools, weighted by the share of public and private providers in 
the education system, respectively.  
102 In these two later cases controlling for IESCS. 
103 We performed generalized likelihood ratio tests to determine whether or not an independent term 
should be included.  
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Table 5.2: Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results. Absolute t-ratios in Parentheses 
Model a 
Production function Technical inefficiency effects Variance parameters
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
Constant 6.100 IESCS -0.187 σ2 0.002 
 (30.787)  (-4.253)  (2.813)
CEPS 0.012 Log Likelihood 52.274 γ 0.125 
 (0.686)    3.410 
Model b 
Production function Technical inefficiency effects Variance parameters
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
Constant 6.205 Constant 0.047 σ2 0.002 
 (3.871)  (1.887)  (4.132)
CEPS 0.004 IESCS -0.180 γ 0.196 
 (0.257)  (-4.538)  (1.183)
  ln(%PUBPROV) 0.117   
   (1.997)   
  Log Likelihood 56.366   
Model c 
Production function Technical inefficiency effects Variance parameters
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
Constant 6.114 IESCS -0.143 σ2 0.002 
 (34.016)  (-2.856)  (3.215)
CEPS 0.012 ln(DEC) -0.031 γ 0.258 
 (0.724)  (-1.295)  (0.828)
  Log Likelihood 53.113   
Model d 
Production function Technical inefficiency effects Variance parameters
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
Constant 6.131 IESCS -0.140 σ2 0.002 
 (50.426)  (-3.185)  (4.521)
CEPS 0.011 ln(%PUBPROV) 0.135 γ 0.391 
 (0.940)  (2.469)  (1.543)
  ln(DEC) -0.055   
   (-3.150)   
  Log Likelihood 57.667   
Model e 
                                                 
104 The one that generated the highest log likelihood value. 
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 Production function Technical inefficiency effects Variance parameters
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
Constant 6.128 IESCS -0.139 σ2 0.002 
 (42.047)  (-3.152)  (2.187)
CEPS 0.011 ln(%PUBPROV) 0.176 γ 0.344 
 (0.809)  (4.014)  (0.923)
  ln(%PUBPROV*DEC) -0.055   
   (-2.816)   
  Log Likelihood 57.780   
Model f 
Production function Technical inefficiency effects Variance parameters
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
Constant 6.109 Constant -0.083 σ2 0.002 
 (32.700)  (-1.615)  (1.144)
CEPS 0.012 IESCS -0.166 γ 0.248 
 (0.677)  (-3.150)  (0.316)
  ln(DECINDEX) -0.105   
   (-2.349)   
    Log Likelihood 56.211     
Table 5.3: Efficiency Ranking 
Country Output Efficiency Country Output Efficiency 
2000 2003 
Finland 0.991 Netherlands 0.997 
Norway 0.990 Korea 0.995 
Denmark 0.990 Finland 0.994 
Korea 0.989 Iceland 0.993 
Hungary 0.976 Norway 0.991 
Austria 0.974 Czech Republic 0.990 
Czech Republic 0.973 Denmark 0.989 
Germany 0.972 Sweden 0.989 
Spain 0.952 Japan 0.989 
Italy 0.925 Hungary 0.980 
Greece 0.909 Germany 0.978 
Portugal 0.872 Slovak Republic 0.971 
  Austria 0.971 
  Italy 0.948 
  Spain 0.942 
  Portugal 0.890 
  Greece 0.893 
Average Efficiency 0.960 Mexico 0.792 
 
The results are consistent between the different models. Apart from the 
expected positive effect of students’ socio-economic background on efficiency 
(reflected in the negative estimate of the technical inefficiency coefficient), the share 
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 of public providers is found to exert a negative effect on efficiency whereas 
decentralisation is positively associated with efficiency (the technical inefficiency 
parameters are positive and negative, respectively). 
The extreme cases of (in)efficiency presented in Table 5.3 provide good 
illustrations of these results. In general, the most efficient countries (Finland, Norway, 
Denmark and Korea in 2000; the Netherlands, Korea, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
C.Republic, Denmark, Sweden and Japan in 2003) have better economic and cultural 
status, higher levels of decentralisation of decision making in the public sector, and 
lower shares of public providers105 in comparison with the most inefficient countries 
(e.g. Italy, Greece, and Portugal in both 2000 and 2003; and Spain and Mexico in 
2003). 
We tested the robustness of these results by performing a series of generalized 
likelihood ratio tests. The likelihood ratio statistic is given by )ln(ln2 01 LL −=λ , 
where ln L0 and ln L1 are the maximum log-likelihood values under the null and 
alternative hypotheses, H0 and H1, respectively. Under the null hypothesis this statistic 
is usually assumed to be asymptotically distributed as a chi-square random variable 
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions involved in the test. 
However, when the null hypothesis involves a restriction of the type γ=0 this statistic 
can be shown to have an asymptotic non-standard mixed qui-square distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters restricted to zero under the null 
hypothesis (Coelli et. al, 1998)106. The results of the likelihood ratio tests are 
presented in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4: Likelihood Ratio Tests (5% level of significance) 
Model b 
Null hypothesis λ Critical Value Decision
H01: ln(%PUBPROV)=0 8.367 3.84 Reject 
H02: λ=0, Constant=0; IESCS=0; ln(%PUBPROV)=0 26.507 8.761 Reject 
Model c 
Null hypothesis λ Critical Value Decision
H01: ln(DEC)=0 1.678 3.84 Not Reject
H02: λ=0; IESCS=0; ln(DEC)=0 20.001 7.045 Reject 
Model d 
                                                 
105 Except for Iceland (2003), Norway (2000 and 2003), Finland (2003) and Sweden (2003), where the 
share of public providers is relatively high. 
106 We extracted the critical value for this statistic from Kodde and Palm (1986). 
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 Null hypothesis λ Critical Value Decision
H01: ln(%PUBPROV)=0 9.107 3.84 Reject 
H02: ln(DEC)=0 7.338 3.84 Reject 
H03: ln(%PUBPROV)=0; ln(DEC)=0 10.785 5.99 Reject 
H04: λ=0; IESCS=0; ln(%PUBPROV)=0; ln(DEC)=0 29.109 8.761 Reject 
Model e 
Null hypothesis λ Critical Value Decision
H01: ln(%PUBPROV)=0 10.967 3.84 Reject 
H02: ln(%PUBPROV*DEC)=0 7.564 3.84 Reject 
H03: ln(%PUBPROV)=0; ln(%PUBPROV*DEC)=0 11.011 5.99 Reject 
H04: λ=0; IESCS=0; ln(%PUBPROV)=0; 
ln(%PUBPROV*DEC)=0 29.335 8.761 Reject 
Model f 
Null hypothesis λ Critical Value Decision
H01: ln(INDEXDEC)=0 8.057 3.84 Reject 
H02: λ=0, Constant=0; IESCS=0; ln(INDEXDEC)=0 26.197 8.761 Reject 
  
The first set of null hypotheses in each model tests the individual and 
combined significance of the organisational variables DEC and %PUBPROV. The 
last null hypothesis tests the appropriateness of the stochastic frontier and technical 
inefficiency effects specification by assessing the possibility of it being equivalent to 
the average response function, which can be efficiently estimated by ordinary least 
squares regression. These null hypotheses are clearly rejected107 and so we conclude 
that the effects of our organisational variables are significant and that the stochastic 




The education sector is undergoing intense reforms. New modes of delivery 
and new provider structures, mostly drawn from private sector practice, are being 
tested and adapted to the political and institutional context in which education 
services operate. Governments are increasingly relying on private providers as a 
means of defining institutional environments that induce efficient behaviour. At the 
same time, the public sector itself is redefining the way it operates as a service 
provider – from a traditional purely bureaucratic form of organisation to the 
constitution of effective service agencies, highly decentralised, and operating along 
                                                 
107 Except for the individual effect of DEC in model “c”. However, since we expect this effect to be 
influenced by %PUBPROV this lack of individual significance does not appear to be particularly 
meaningful.   
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 privately-inspired management criteria. Overall, these tendencies are in line with the 
research hypothesis laid out in the previous chapter. The empirical results presented in 
the current chapter corroborate our hypothesis that these practices should have 
positive effects on efficiency. 
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 Chapter 6: Modes of Governance and Health 
Efficiency 
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 6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter investigates the research hypothesis formulated in the seventh 
section of chapter 3 within the context of health care services. According to this 
hypothesis, the optimal organisational structure in terms of efficiency is one where 
governments confine their interference to the specific attributes of transactions that 
markets fail to address, and in a way that allows for risks of government failure. 
Governments can be involved in the health sector in various ways, the most 
significant of which is in guaranteeing that the entire population is protected against 
the financial risks of sickness and medical treatment. The second most significant role 
is in the provision of medical services, by owning and operating medical care 
providers. In addition to intervening in the funding and provision of health services, 
governments can tax goods with adverse effects on health, and regulate the health 
sector – defining the operational framework of insurance companies; issuing licenses 
for medical care providers; and (dis)approving the commercialisation of new drugs 
and devices. 
Our research hypothesis raises specific expectations as to the optimal form of 
government involvement from an efficiency point of view. Contrary to the education 
sector, confining government interference to the attributes of health transactions that 
call for public central coordination (mainly information imperfections) provides for 
extensive government involvement in health funding/insurance, and simultaneously 
significant involvement in the provision of services. On the other hand, and as in the 
case of education, it also suggests that public health care providers should be given 
sufficient autonomy to explore the benefits of decentralised coordination, and should 
be made to operate in an environment open to competitive forces.   
Several OECD countries have recently introduced substantial reforms to the 
organisational structure of their health services, in an attempt to stimulate innovation 
and flexibility in the way health systems respond to political priorities. These reforms 
have included experimenting with market-inspired mechanisms in the internal 
operation of public health care providers and in their interaction with private 
providers. This chapter draws on the reform experience of 23 OECD countries to test 
the effect of health modes of governance on efficiency, and assess the empirical 
validity of our research hypothesis. The results show that the introduction of market-
type mechanisms to public integrated health systems has a positive effect on 
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 efficiency, whereas further movement towards a market model of health care 
insurance and provision (public contract, and private insurance/provider models) 
reduces efficiency.    
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section two examines the attributes of health 
that call for public central coordination. Section three presents various modes of 
organising transactions in the health sector and discusses their expected effect on 
efficiency in the light of our research hypothesis. Section four focuses on the 
methodological issues that underlie the international comparative measurement of 
health service efficiency. Section five presents DEA and SFA efficiency estimates for 
four different input-output datasets. Section five concludes the chapter.  
  
6.2 The Economics of Health 
 
The importance of the health sector can hardly be overstressed. Health (like 
education) is among the basic capabilities that give value to human life. The 
opportunity to receive basic education or health care, together with freedom of 
political participation, form a set of substantive freedoms which are simultaneously 
constitutive components of human development (end goals) as well as drivers of 
economic progress (Sen, 1999). 
In order to understand the attributes of transactions in the health sector whose 
optimal coordination requires government interference, we need to look at the 
variables that influence the health status of individuals and their well being (Figure 
6.1). Individual utility is a function of health status and consumption of all other kinds 
of goods. Health status, in turn, depends on individual behaviours (which also affect 
utility directly); environmental factors; medical care; and other factors such as 
genetics and socioeconomic variables. 
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 Figure 6.1: Health and utility (adapted from Cutler, 2002, p. 2147) 
 
 
Health-related behaviours such as smoking and drinking yield benefits for 
individuals (direct consumption value), but they also bring negative health 
consequences both to the individuals who adopt these behaviour and possibly others. 
Similarly, health-related environmental factors such as pollution generate benefits for 
firms and consumers (if pollution is a by-product of industrial activity), but they also 
have harmful side-effects for health. In both instances, government intervention is 
required to correct these external effects and induce individual (and managerial) 
decisions to allow for the full societal costs of these behaviours. 
In addition to externalities, some health-related behaviours have merit good 
attributes which may also justify government intervention. In particular, if individual 
decisions on the consumption of goods or services harmful for health are short-
sighted, mostly driven by impulse and/or addiction, taxing or banning consumption 
may be necessary to induce people to internalise the full consequences of their 
behaviour. 
Individual health status is in itself a source of external effects. From a negative 
perspective, individual sickness and sickness-related behaviours may have direct 
negative consequences for other members of society (e.g. contagious diseases; 
development of antibiotic-resistant bacteria from inappropriate use of antibiotics). 
From a positive perspective, health is (together with education) a cornerstone of 
human capital (Becker, 1975), which in turn plays a key role in economic growth 
(Bleaney, Kneller and Gemmel, 2001; Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, 2001). Since 
individual decision-making is unlikely to reflect these externalities, public central 
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 coordination is required to influence the consumption of health care and/or regulate 
health-related behaviours. 
The most important role for government in the health sector, however, is in the 
market for health care and its subsidiary health insurance. Medical care and insurance 
markets are plagued with informational problems: moral hazard and adverse selection 
in health insurance; incomplete information on the part of patients in health care; 
asymmetric information between consumers and producers about patients needs; and 
inability to determine the quality of services, even after they have been provided 
(Cutler, 2002). These informational problems lead free competitive markets for 
medical care and insurance to failure108. 
Health insurance109 markets are prone to moral hazard problems – people are 
likely to consume more health services when insured than they would do if they had 
to pay the full price of these services. In addition, health insurance markets are also 
known to suffer from adverse selection problems. Assuming individuals represent 
heterogeneous medical risks, and insurers are able to identify individual risk types and 
price policies accordingly, a free insurance market will ensure that individuals are 
fully insured, but higher risk people (who seek more generous health insurance) will 
pay higher premiums. This equilibrium does not pool health risks, and is therefore 
inefficient. If it is assumed instead that knowledge of individual risk type is limited or 
insurers are not allowed to use such knowledge in setting prices, high risk individuals 
will tend to drive up the price of more generous plans, while the other plans remain 
relatively cheap. This situation is also inefficient, and it gives rise to three sources of 
welfare loss: first, a risk segmentation loss, as sick individuals still pay more for 
insurance than the healthy; second, given the differences in price, marginal people are 
inappropriately induced to buy less generous insurance plans in an attempt to benefit 
from lower premiums; third, insurance plans tend to be less generous in their benefits 
so as to attract the healthy and repel the sick. In either case public central coordination 
                                                 
108 Apart from externalities, merit good attributes, and information imperfections, equity is another 
important motivation for government involvement in medical care. Modern societies have come to look 
at medical treatment not just as an another ordinary service but has a right of citizenship, regardless of 
the financial position of the individual in need, or their past efforts to provide for health hazards. 
Ensuring universal access to medical services is often an important driver of government involvement 
in health services. 
109 The goal of health insurance is to equalise the marginal utility of income in different states of 
nature, which in many cases is achieved by smoothing the financial risk associated with medical costs. 
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 is required so that some form of mandatory, universal insurance plan may be 
enforced110. 
In medical care, informational problems also hinder the coordinative 
efficiency of free competitive markets. First, information asymmetries between 
patients and physicians as to the complexities of medical care diagnosis and treatment 
give market power to the later. Second, medical care has attributes of a credence 
good, i.e. ascertaining the quality of the service is difficult, even after it has been 
provided (Tirole, 1988; Darby and Karni, 1973). The combination of profit-
maximisation with these two forms of information imperfections contributes to 
disseminating perverse incentives that lead competitive markets to failure. Private for-
profit suppliers will have an incentive to skimp on quality if consumers and/or 
government lack the regulatory and monitoring ability to detect such behaviour. 
The coexistence of public and not-for-profit together with for-profit medical 
care providers may be seen as a means of counteracting the perverse incentives that 
pure profit maximisation would lead to (Arrow, 1963), as these different 
organisational forms are expected to influence each other in the market place111. It is 
also a way of avoiding the perverse incentives that could be created if the public 
sector held the monopoly of medical care service provision – lack o competitive 
pressure for innovation and efficiency, and the typical shortcomings of public 
bureaucracies (addressed in section 4.2, chapter 3).    
    
6.3  Modes of Governance and Health Efficiency 
 
Health services can be organised in three fundamentally different ways – via 
hierarchical bureaucracies, through long-term contractual arrangements under some 
                                                 
110 In practice, all OECD countries have some form of publicly financed or administered health 
insurance programmes. Private health insurance is the dominant form of basic coverage in the United 
States and Switzerland, and covers a sizeable minority of the population in Germany and the 
Netherlands. In countries such as Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, and most Nordic countries, 
private health insurance policies are not commonly used. In other countries, private health insurance is 
used to fill gaps in the benefits package (a supplemental policy) or absorb out-of-pocket payments 
(complementary insurance). Private insurance duplicates coverage provided by universal public 
programmes in Australia, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, where such coverage is 
purchased mainly to increase choice of providers and timeliness of care (Docteur and Oxley, 2003). 
111 Hansmann (1980) argued that the quality at for-profit hospitals in the US was kept high because not 
for-profit competitors provided high quality services, making deviations from quality by for-profit 
hospitals more readily detectable. However, Cutler and Horwitz (1999), and Silvermann and Skinner, 
(2000) drew attention to the inverse effect, i.e. for-profit hospitals may lead not-for-profit hospitals to 
change their behaviour in socially adverse ways. 
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 degree of non-market control112, and as direct, short-term market-based interactions 
between patients and providers. These arrangements are independent of whether 
ownership is public or private113 (WHO, 2000).  
The way health services are financed plays a critical role in the design of their 
optimal mode of governance. An adequately financed health system should ensure 
universal financial protection. It should avoid exposing individuals to large 
unexpected expenses, relying as fully as possible on predictable prepayment 
(insurance) and minimising the share of out-of-pocket funding. It should also 
effectively pool the financial risks of healthy and sick individuals. Problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection (discussed in the previous section) prevent free 
competitive insurance markets from achieving these goals efficiently, which prompts 
extensive government intervention in the funding of health care114. This result 
motivates our first hypothesis regarding the effect of health organisational structure 
on efficiency: modes of governance based on direct, short-term market interactions 
between patients and providers, or relying mainly on unregulated private insurance 
are expected to be relatively inefficient.  
At the service provision level, market modes of governance are generally 
perceived as being more effective in stimulating innovation and flexibility in the way 
the health system responds to specific needs. However, the combination of profit-
maximisation with imperfect information propagates perverse incentives that lead 
competitive markets to failure. Public hierarchical modes of governance have the 
                                                 
112 One type comprises long-term contracts between the public sector and nongovernmental providers 
(both non-profit and for-profit). Another contractual arrangement characterizes private insurance, 
which may or may not be publicly regulated. 
113 WHO (2000, p. 63) provides an interesting example: “ownership of services that are organized as 
hierarchies can be public, as in the extensive network of public health, hospital, and ambulatory clinics 
that are part of the Turkish Ministry of Health service delivery system and that of many other countries. 
But they can also be private, as in a United States health management organisation like Kaiser 
Permanente. Such private entities often suffer from many of the same bureaucratic rigidities as public 
ones. Likewise although market-based interaction between providers and patients is most common in 
the private sector, short-term market exchanges in the form of user fees are pervasive in the public 
sector in many low income countries”. 
114 The public sector is the main source of health funding in all OECD countries, except the United 
States, Mexico and Korea (OECD, 2003). The public share of health spending stood at 72,2% on 
average across OECD countries in 2000. It accounted for more than 80% of total health expenditure in 
several countries, including the Czech Republic, Denmark and the United Kingdom. The remaining 
20% where spread between private insurance and out-of-pocket payments. Furthermore, there is 
evidence suggesting that there has been a convergence in the share of public spending over the past 
three decades (OECD, 2003). Many countries which started with a relatively high public share in 1970 
had a lower public share in 2000 (e.g., the Czech Republic, Norway and the United Kingdom), while 
several countries which started with a low public share in 1970 have seen this share increase over time 
(e.g., the United States, Greece and Portugal). 
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 advantage of lacking a profit-maximising motif, and enabling greater political control 
over health service delivery, ensuring that transactions respect given priorities among 
interventions and patients. However, if the public sector holds the monopoly of health 
care provision it will lack competitive incentives for efficiency and innovation, which 
will tend to be aggravated by the typical rigidities of public hierarchical organisations 
reflected in the vested interests of bureaucrats and limited adaptability capacity to 
changing priorities and strategic orientations. This in turn leads to our second 
hypothesis: modes of governance that combine public and private provision and that 
integrate market-type mechanisms115 into the operation of the public sector are 
expected to counteract the perverse incentives of pure profit maximisation, the 
monopolistic and bureaucratic failures of exclusive public provision, and to maximise 
efficiency.   
Recent reforms in some OECD health systems embody some of the underlying 
prescriptions of this second hypothesis (Docteur and Oxley, 2003). One of the key 
areas of reform has consisted in the separation of purchasers and providers within 
public integrated systems and, more generally, the strengthening of purchasers’ 
agency role within the health-care system. In parallel, there has been a shift towards 
more independent producers with greater management independence and 
                                                 
115 Similar transformations in the way public health  providers operate to those discussed for publicly 
managed schools in the previous chapter. These include changes in the incentive environment of 
organisations as well as modifications to the distribution of decision-making control, revenue rights, 
and financial risk among the different players. WHO (2000, p.63) highlights some of the key issues at 
stake: 
• The degree of autonomy (decision rights) that the organisation has vis-à-vis its owners, policy-based 
purchasers such as insurance funds, the government, and consumers. Critical decision rights include 
control over input mix and level, outputs and scope of activities, financial management, clinical and 
non-clinical administration, strategic management, and market strategy (where appropriate). 
• The degree of accountability. As decision rights are delegated to the organisation, the ability of 
governments to assert direct accountability (through the hierarchy) is diminished. When autonomy 
increases, accountability must be secured by shifting from hierarchical supervision to reliance on 
monitoring, regulations, and the economic incentives embedded in contracts. 
• The degree of market exposure or revenues that are earned in a competitive way rather than through a 
direct budget allocation. Market participation need not imply out-of-pocket financing; it is preferable 
for provider organisations to compete for prepaid revenues. When governments bail out organisations 
that run deficits or are indebted as a result of weak technical performance, they undermine the impact 
of market exposure. 
• The degree of financial responsibility for losses and rights to profit (retained earnings and the 
proceeds from the sale of capital). This determines the financial incentive for managers and staff to 
economize. Under increased autonomy they, rather than the public purse, become the “residual 
claimant” on revenue flows, but such claims must be clearly spelled out and regulated. 
• The degree of unfunded mandates. Where the share of total revenues earned through markets is 
significant, organisations are at financial risk because of the unrecoverable costs associated with 
requirements for which no funds are provided, such as care for the poor or very sick. Organisational 
reforms that increase autonomy should therefore be accompanied by complementary reforms in health 
financing to protect the poor.
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 responsibility. Contracting-out selected activities has also increased (the typical 
example is the Private Finance Initiative in the United Kingdom which allows the 
private sector to build hospitals and to operate all non-medical services within them 
under contract). A limited number of countries (the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, the Czech Republic and New Zealand) have experimented with 
greater competition among hospitals116 as a means of inducing improvements in 
efficiency. However, in many cases competitive pressures and provider incentives 
were weak, purchasers lacked the skills and information to place enough pressure on 
providers for change, conditions of tight supply gave providers a strong market 
position, and policies were in place for too short a period to have a substantive 
impact. As a result, policies were often set back and, in some cases (New Zealand, for 
example) reforms were almost completely reversed. While attempts at active 
competition in health-care markets have been curtailed, some of the underlying 
elements of these reforms nonetheless remain. All countries appear to have 
maintained contracting arrangements, even if they have become longer-term in nature 
and place greater emphasis on co-operation than on head-to-head competition. 
In order to test our two hypotheses regarding the connection between modes of 
governance and health efficiency, we draw on the typology of OECD health systems 
provided by Docteur and Oxley (2003, p.9 and 10)117: 
 
*** 
Although there is considerable variation within systems, OECD countries can be classified as 
generally consistent with one of the three approaches described below. It is important to recognise that 
elements of more than one of these approaches exist in most countries (even if one form is dominant) 
and that the dominant model has tended to shift under the force of reforms: 
 
The public-integrated model combines on-budget financing of health-care provision with 
hospital providers that are part of the government sector. These systems, which merge the insurance 
and provision functions, are organised and operated like any government department. Staff is generally 
paid on salary (although, in some cases, doctors can have private patients as well) and they are most 
often public-sector employees. Ambulatory doctors and other health-care professionals can be either 
                                                 
116 Healthcare providers competing for the customers of health-care purchasers on the basis of price. 
117 Few attempts have been made to create an empirical categorisation of health care systems. This is 
mainly explained by the heterogeneity of existing systems, and the coexistence of various models 
within each system. The same cannot be said of the “industry” on theoretical typologies of health 
systems – for a recent survey see Burau and Blank, 2006.  
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 public employees or private contractors to the health-care authority, with a range of remuneration 
packages.  
 
In the public-contract model, public payers contract with private health-care providers. The 
payers can be either a state agency or social security funds. Single-payer arrangements have a stronger 
position vis à vis providers (as in the public integrated model) and tend to have lower administrative 
costs than do multiple payer systems. In many public-contract systems, the private hospitals and clinics 
are run on a non-profit basis. Independent private contractors generally supply ambulatory care. In the 
past, payment of providers has been often on an ex post basis for services provided, although contract 
arrangements have been evolving.  
 
A private insurance/provider model uses private insurance combined with private (often for-
profit) providers. Insurance can be mandatory (Switzerland) or voluntary (the United States), and in the 
case of the latter, affordable insurance may not be available to some individuals. Payment methods 
have traditionally been activity based…Under these arrangements, insurers selectively contract with 
competing providers and restrict patient choice of providers and services. 
*** 
 
We did not embrace this categorisation in its pure form as it does not take into 
consideration the recent transformations of public integrated systems. In the same 
study, Docteur and Oxley (2003, p.10, p.32) provide additional information that 
enables us to catagorise health systems allowing for those transformations: 
 
*** 
Broadly speaking, public-integrated systems exist in the Nordic countries, Australia (public 
hospitals), Italy, Greece and Portugal and, before reforms of the early 1990s, the United Kingdom. 
New Zealand introduced a purchaser-provider split in the 1990s similar to developments in the United 
Kingdom, but it has since moved closer to an integrated model following reforms in 2000. Canada, 
most of the remaining Continental European countries, Japan, and, now, the United Kingdom and, to 
some extent, New Zealand, belong to the public-contract category. 
*** 
A first area of reform concerns the separation of purchasers and providers within public 
integrated systems and, more generally, the strengthening of purchasers’ agency role within the health-
care system....A significant number of countries with integrated systems have now moved in this 
direction (Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Sweden, Italy, Portugal and, more recently, 





 By complementing this information with OECD health care reviews and 
country profiles of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, we 
compiled the following classification: 
i) Public integrated models without active purchaser-provider split (PPS): 
Norway, Denmark, Finland, Spain, France, Iceland. 
ii) Public integrated models with active purchaser-provider split: the United 
Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Sweden. 
iii) Public contract models: Austria, Luxembourg, Canada, Germany, Belgium, 
Japan, Netherlands, Ireland. 
iv) Private insurance models: the United States, Switzerland. 
According to the first hypothesis laid out in this section, models i and ii should 
outperform models iii and iv in terms of efficiency. According to the second 
hypothesis model ii should be the optimal mode of governing health services, and 
therefore should outperform all the other models. We investigate the empirical 
validity of these hypotheses in section 6.5. In the next section we discuss the 
methodological assumptions that underlie the efficiency estimates examined in 
section 6.5.  
 
6.4 Health Efficiency: Methodological Issues 
 
Measuring the efficiency of health services is an exercise fraught with 
difficulties. Problems arise in measuring the performance of health systems, in 
identifying the entire range of variables that influence the health status of individuals; 
in understanding the pathways whereby those variables affect health status and in 
particular the way they interact with each other in doing so; and in finding empirical 
data for all these variables. With such a litany of problems, any interpretation of 
results needs to be cautious.  
Individual health depends on medical and non-medical sets of inputs. The first 
set includes inputs under control of the health system (part of its domain of 
accountability). Examples of such inputs include human resources, drugs, and 
physical infrastructure. Since detailed information on these items is available for only 
a tiny handful of countries, it is common to use financial variables (e.g. total 
expenditure per capita) as an aggregate proxy. The second group includes inputs that, 
by their own nature, escape the control of health systems, and for which therefore they 
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 should not be held accountable. The list of non-medical determinants of health is 
long: GDP per capita, income inequalities, educational attainment, employment 
status, quality of housing, diet, smoking, alcohol consumption, physical activity and 
other lifestyle factors, genetic inheritance, etc. In theory the effects of these variables 
on health should be controlled for. In practice it is very difficult to take proper 
account of these affects. Many of these variables interact with each other118, with 
medical inputs, and with individual health in ways that are still poorly understood. 
Furthermore, data on behavioural variables (e.g. diet, smoking, alcohol consumption) 
and genetic inheritance is not yet available at the international level. Not controlling 
for the effects of these variables on health status remains a serious limitation of most 
studies on health efficiency given the high risk of model misspecification (by 
omission of variables). The results presented in the next section do not circumvent 
this risk. 
WHO (2000) defined three core policy goals for assessing the performance of 
health systems: (i) average level of population health and health inequalities in the 
population; (ii) average level of responsiveness of the health system and inequalities 
in responsiveness within the population (quality of interaction between consumers and 
providers with particular emphasis on such issues as dignity, autonomy, 
confidentiality, promptness of attention, access to social support networks, basic 
amenities, and choice of provider); and (iii) fairness in the way the costs of the health 
system are distributed across households (situations where households are forced to 
pay a catastrophic share of their non-subsistence income to the health system; cases 
where households in similar circumstances contribute very different shares of their 
non-subsistence income to the health system; and finally, the extent to which the poor 
contribute a larger share of their disposable income for health in comparison to the 
rich). 
The levels of health and responsiveness define the quality of the health system 
whereas the distributions of health, responsiveness, and financial burden define the 
degree of equity embodied in the system. WHO (2000) drew on an internet survey of 
informed respondents for determining the weights to be attached to these five 
outcomes in the construction of a composite indicator of health system 
                                                 
118 Education attainment, for example, is often correlated with GDP per capita, which in turn is 
correlated with health expenditure per capita (OECD, 2002). 
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 performance119. However, this indicator has been extensively criticised due to poor 
methodological procedures in the collection and treatment of data (see for example 
Williams, 2001). This criticism has had a strong echo in the literature on health sector 
efficiency, which generally relinquishes the use of WHO’s composite index as a 
measure of health system’s outcome in favour of one-dimensional indicators such as 
life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality or Disability-Adjusted Life 
Expectancy120. 
Difficulties in defining, measuring and modelling the inputs and outcomes of 
health systems make the measurement of efficiency a delicate empirical issue. Not 
surprisingly the existing literature on the topic is rather limited, particularly when it 
comes to international comparative studies121.  
Some of the most interesting contributions in the field include the work of 
Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) who applied FDH to a panel of data from 85 countries 
for various years between 1984 and 1995. The frontier was defined for life expectancy 
and infant mortality, while average per capita government spending (the private sector 
was ignored) on health and education were used as inputs to the production process. 
The authors controlled for the initial level of development by integrating the initial 
GDP per capita in the analysis. Evans, Tandon, Murray and Lauer (2000) estimated an 
efficiency frontier for 191 countries using an extension of least squares to panel data 
from 1993 to 1997. DALE, the chosen output indicator, was regressed on total health 
expenditure per capita, and a measure of educational attainment in the adult 
population as a control variable for non-health-system direct inputs. While studying 
the efficiency of the Portuguese health system St. Aubyn (2002) applied FDH and 
corrected least squares to OECD countries. Two different output indicators (DALE 
                                                 
119 The average weights from over 1 600 responses were 24% health, 25% health inequality, 13% 
responsiveness, 16% responsiveness inequality, and 22% fairness in financial contribution. These 
results are consistent with those collected by Gakigou et al. (2003) who made the first attempt to 
measure preferences of the general public on the relative importance of the goals of health systems 
drawing on data from 51 countries and more than 53 000 respondents. 
120 DALE is estimated from three kinds of information (Murray et al., 1999): the fraction of the 
population surviving to each age, calculated from birth and death rates; the prevalence of each type of 
disability at each age; and the weight assigned to each type of disability, which may or may not vary 
with age. Survival at each age is adjusted downward by the sum of all the disability effects, each of 
which is the product of a weight and the complement of a prevalence (the share of the population not 
suffering that disability). These adjusted survival shares are then divided by the initial population, 
before any mortality occurred, to give the average number of equivalent healthy life years that a 
newborn member of the population could expect to live. 
121 This contrasts with the study of technical efficiency of specific health care activities (e.g. secondary 
care and nursing home care; primary care delivery; and individual physician efficiency), where 
numerous contributions exist (for a comprehensive survey of these studies see Hollingsworth, 2003).
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 and infant mortality) were separately considered, and total health expenditure per 
head was selected as the appropriate input variable. In some specifications the 
percentage of the population without higher secondary or tertiary education entered as 
a control variable. Hollingsworth and Wildman (2002) computed cross efficiency 
measures (a means of validating Data Envelopment Analysis scores through different 
weighting schemes) using data from 30 OECD countries (again the selected variables 
were DALE, total health care expenditure per capita, and average years of schooling 
in the adult population). Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) incorporated the health 
system in their international comparison of public sector efficiency. They used FDH 
for comparing the relative efficiency of the public sectors of 23 industrialized OECD 
countries in 2000. Public spending as a percentage of GDP in 2000 was taken as the 
relevant input variable. A composite index of opportunity indicators (public 
administration, education, health and public infrastructure) and standard musgravian 
indicators (distribution, stability and economic performance) measured overall public 
sector performance. Within this composite index, health sector performance was 
appraised through an aggregate measure of infant mortality and life expectancy. 
Finally, Afonso and St Aubyn (2004) addressed the efficiency of health services in 
OECD through a combination of FDH and DEA with financial and physical measures 
of inputs. 
In estimating the efficiency of health systems we applied DEA and SFA to 
four different input-output datasets for a sample of 23 OECD countries122. The results 
of such exercise are used in section 6.5 to test the effect of modes of governance on 
efficiency. 
In the different specifications of the efficiency frontier we did not control for 
non-health system inputs for four different reasons. First, following the position of the 
World Health Organisation (see for example Evans, D., Tandon, A., Murray, C. and 
Lauer, J., 2003) health systems should be held accountable for some of these factors 
(e.g. discouraging tobacco consumption), which implies that they should not be 
included as separate inputs. Second, as we mentioned earlier variables such as GDP 
per capita or adult education are highly collinear with health expenditure per capita 
(one of the input variables used), bringing an insignificant contribution to the 
                                                 
122 The Czech Republic, Korea, Poland, Mexico, Turkey, Hungary, and Slovak Republic were left out 
of the analysis because they were deemed to create a bias in the efficiency rankings as a result of both 
low expenditure levels and results. 
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 estimation of the efficiency frontier. Third, there is a lack of reliable international data 
for items such as dietary habits, smoking and alcohol consumption. Fourth, limiting 
our analysis to OECD countries confers a basic degree of homogeneity to the sample 
that mitigates the potential pitfalls (omission variable bias) of not controlling for some 
of these non-health system inputs.          
In the first dataset, infant survival rate (ISR)123 and life expectancy are the two 
output variables selected (both in 1999) and per capita health expenditure in 
purchasing power parities (PPPs) is taken as the input variable (values for 1998)124. 
Because SFA in its primal form is not compatible with more than one output 
indicator, we aggregated the ISR and life expectancy indicators into one composite 
index. Equal weights (50/50) were accorded to the two components125. 
In the second dataset, practising physicians (density per 1000 population), 
practicing nurses (density per 1000 population), and total in patient care beds per 
1000 population are the three input variables used. ISR and life expectancy are 
maintained as the two output indicators126. Important physical inputs such as drugs, 
equipment and technology are left out of the analysis due to unavailability of data. 
This constitutes an important limitation to this particular specification of the 
efficiency frontier and stresses the importance of testing the effects of modes of 
governance on efficiency through a range of different input-output datasets and 
methodological approaches to the estimation of efficiency. 
In the third dataset, disability-adjusted life expectancy (DALE) is the output 
variable and the usual total health expenditure per capita in PPPs the input variable. 
Both variables refer to 2002127. 
In the fourth dataset, WHO’s (2000) composite index discussed above is the 
selected output variable and total health expenditure per capita in PPPs the input 
variable (both input and ouput variables concern 1997128). 
                                                 
123 (1000-Infant Mortality Rate)/Infant Mortality Rate, i.e. the ratio of children that survived the first 
year to the number of children that died.   
124 Data were extracted from OECD (2002). This same dataset is also used by Afonso and Aubyn 
(2004). 
125 Life expanctancy and infant mortality are two of the most commonly used indicators of health 
status. In the absence of any theoretical weighting criteria we decided to combine both indicators using 
equal weights. 
126 Since only physical inputs are being used, the ensuing estimates concern only technical efficiency. 
Data were extracted from OECD (2002). This dataset is also used by Afonso and Aubyn (2004). 
127 Data on DALE were extracted from WHO (2003), and health expenditure was obtained from OECD 
(2004c). 





The ensuing efficiency rankings displayed considerable sensitivity to the 
employment of different methodologies in the estimation of the efficiency frontier 
(DEA and SFA), to the use of different input-output datasets, as well as to the 
input/output orientation of the analysis. Given the extensive number of 
methodology/dataset/input-output-orientation combinations and the lack of a clear 
efficiency/inefficiency pattern amongst the results, an aggregate league table is 
presented in this section (Table 6.1)129. 
A simple arithmetic average of input and output efficiency scores was 
calculated. In order to facilitate the compilation we normalized the scores of each 
ranking and set the individual averages to one. However, it should be noticed that this 
table is meant to be merely illustrative of the average relative performance of each 
country across the various methodologies/datasets. No other meaning or interpretation 
should be derived from these figures as they mix together efficiency estimates based 
on different variables and methodological assumptions. 
 
Table 6.1: Average input and average output efficiency 
Country Avg input efficiency Country Avg output efficiency 
Japan 1.34 Japan 1.03 
Spain 1.29 Spain 1.03 
Portugal 1.29 Sweden 1.02 
Greece 1.28 Greece 1.01 
United Kingdom 1.21 Iceland 1.01 
New Zealand 1.11 United Kingdom 1.01 
Sweden 1.11 France 1.01 
Finland 1.10 Italy 1.01 
Ireland 1.04 Finland 1.00 
Iceland 1.01 Norway 1.00 
Italy 0.99 Portugal 1.00 
Australia 0.96 Canada 1.00 
Canada 0.94 Switzerland 1.00 
                                                 
129 Hollingsworth and Wildman’s (2003) results were also integrated in this aggregate ranking. The 
authors estimated health service efficiency of OECD countries using cross efficiency measures 
designed to validate data envelopment scores through different weighting schemes for inputs and 
outputs. In the estimation process, the output (measured in DALEs) was considered a function of the 
physical inputs into the health system (proxied by health expenditure per capita), and non-health inputs 
(measured by the average years of schooling in the adult population). The underlying data were 
extracted from WHO (2000). 
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 Belgium 0.92 Austria 1.00 
Austria 0.92 Australia 1.00 
France 0.90 New Zealand 1.00 
Norway 0.90 Belgium 1.00 
Denmark 0.88 Luxembourg 1.00 
Luxembourg 0.84 Germany 0.99 
Netherlands 0.83 Ireland 0.99 
Germany 0.75 Netherlands 0.99 
Switzerland 0.73 Denmark 0.99 
United States 0.61 United States 0.95 
 
Notwithstanding the interpretative limitations of table 1, it is still interesting to 
note that Japan, Spain, Greece, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland and Iceland 
come out of this aggregative exercise as examples of good performance, irrespective 
of whether the analysis is input/output orientated. Conversely, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Sates show 
evidence of poor performance in the provision of health care services, both in terms of 
input and output efficiency. 
In order to assess the hypothesis laid out in section 6.3, we regressed the 
individual DEA and SFA efficiency scores of our 4 input-output datasets on three 
dummy variables that capture the four modes of governance discussed in that same 
section. Hollingsworth and Wildman’s (2003) DEA cross efficiency scores were also 
integrated in this exercise. The results are presented in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2: Multiple regression analysis, modes of governance (x) vs efficiency (Y) 















DEA expenditure pc vs life expectancy and ISR 0.285** 0.464*** 0.400*** 
DEA doctor, nurses and beds vs life expectancy and ISR -0.224 -0.082 -0.154 
DEA expenditure pc vs disability life expectancy (2002) 0.264** 0.398*** 0.294** 
DEA expenditure pc vs WHO 2000 composite indicator 0.277** 0.394*** 0.273** 
DEA cross efficiency scores (Hollingsworth et al., 2003)    
All efficiency tables combined (table 1) 0.277** 0.466*** 0.345** 














DEA expenditure pc vs life expectancy and ISR 0.001 0.011 0.013 
SFA expenditure pc vs combined ISR and life expectancy 0.087*** 0.090*** 0.106*** 
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 DEA doctor, nurses and beds vs life expectancy and ISR -0.020 -0.006 -0.020 
SFA doctor, nurses and beds vs combined life expectancy 
and ISR  0.046 0.059 0.076** 
DEA expenditure pc vs disability life expectancy (2002) 0.007 0.012 0.014 
SFA expenditure pc vs disability life expectancy (2002) 0.021** 0.026*** 0.023** 
DEA expenditure pc vs WHO 2000 composite indicator 0.002 0.003 0.001 
SFA expenditure pc vs WHO 2000 composite indicator 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 
DEA cross efficiency scores (Hollingsworth et al., 2003) 0.056** 0.073*** 0.061** 
All efficiency tables combined (table 1) 0.025** 0.033** 0.034** 
Notes: 
The private insurance/ private provider model was taken as the benchmark in each regression. 
*** means the estimate is significant at the 1% level; ** means the estimate is significant at the 5%level; 
* means the estimate is significant at the 10% level. 
 
We obtained significant evidence in two thirds of the regressions analysed. 
Overall, the public integrated system with purchaser-provider split (PPS) is the model 
that generates higher average efficiency scores in regressions run over 7 different 
methodologies/datasets, whereas the public integrated systems without active PPS 
does better in the remaining 3 significant regressions. 
Regardless of whether the analysis is input or output orientated, the estimates 
of the dummy variables in the significant regressions are positive with no exception, 
meaning that both public contract models, as well as public integrated models with 
and without active PPS systematically outperform private insurance models (our 
selected benckmark). Public contract models are linked with an average input 
efficiency score 26.41 to 28.54 percentage points higher than that of private insurance 
models. For public integrated models with and without PPS that interval is of 39.38 – 
46.607 and 27.34 – 39.95 respectively. When efficiency is measured in an output-
oriented way, public contract models are estimated to achieve average efficiency 
scores 2.13 – 8.67 percentage points above private insurance models, while for public 
integrated systems with and without PPS these figures vary between 2.57 – 9 and 2.3 
– 10.62 percentage points respectively. 
When the effects of the four modes of governance are tested upon the average 
input efficiency scores calculated earlier on (table 2), public integrated models with 
PPS emerge as the top performers with an average score 46.61 percentage points 
above that of private insurance models, followed by public integrated systems without 
PPS (34.46) and public contract models (27.7). As for output efficiency, public 
integrated models without PPS occupy the first position 33.9 percentage points above 
private insurance models, followed by public integrated system with PPS (33) and 





This chapter investigated the research hypothesis formulated in the seventh 
section of chapter 3 within the context of health care services. According to this 
hypothesis, the organisational structure that maiximises efficiency is the one that 
confines government interference to the specific attributes of transactions that markets 
fail to address, and in a way that allows for risks of government failure. Applying this 
general hypothesis to the health sector led us to formulate two context-specific 
hypotheses. 
First, problems of moral hazard and adverse selection hinder the efficiency of 
free competitive health insurance markets, and prompt extensive government 
intervention in the funding of health care. Hence our first research hypothesis was that 
modes of governance based on direct, short-term market interactions between patients 
and providers, or relying mainly on unregulated private insurance were expected to be 
relatively inefficient. 
Second, the combination of profit-maximisation with imperfect information 
propagates perverse incentives that lead competitive markets to failure. Public sector 
monopoly of health care provision, on the other hand, lacks competitive incentives for 
efficiency and innovation, and suffers from the typical rigidities of public hierarchical 
organisations (risk of government failure). This in turn led us to our second 
hypothesis: modes of governance that combine public and private provision and that 
integrate market-type mechanisms into the operation of the public sector are expected 
to counteract the perverse incentives of pure profit maximisation, the monopolistic 
and bureaucratic failures of exclusive public provision, and to maximise efficiency.   
The results presented in section 6.5 corroborated the two hypothesis. Public 
integrated systems with active purchaser provider split came out of our analysis as the 
most efficient mode of organising health services. While the introduction of market-
type mechanisms into public integrated models seemed to increased efficiency, 
further movement towards a market-inspired mode of governance appeared to have 
detrimental effects on efficiency (public contract systems and private 
insurance/private provider systems were systematically outperformed by public 
integrated systems). 
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 Chapter 7: Modes of Governance and Social 
Protection Efficiency 
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 7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines our research hypothesis in the context of social 
protection. The governance of social protection systems takes us through an analytical 
route significantly different from the ones pursued in the two previous chapters for 
two different reasons. First, the bulk of social protection activity takes the form of 
social transfers in cash to individuals in (or at the risk of) poverty, or in pre-defined 
states of nature (families with children, etc). Therefore, contrary to education and 
healthcare, in this case there is no service being effectively provided other than an 
insurance service. The governance of social protection is thus confined to the funding 
and (re)distributional elements of an organisational arrangement and does not include 
elements of service provision in a technical sense. Second, private social insurance 
markets face a litany of problems they undermine their viability as a mode of 
governance for social protection. Again contrary to education and healthcare, here the 
relevant choices are not to do with the mix of public/private involvement in social 
protection, but with the coverage and nature of public social protection systems. 
The efficiency of social protection systems is an essentially neglected issue in 
the academic literature. Most of the existing studies have focused on assessing the 
impact of social security and taxation policies on income distribution without 
considering simultaneously the financial effort involved in these policies (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Myles, 1989; Palme, 1990; Bradshaw et. al, 1993; Atkinson, 
Smeeding and Rainwater, 1995; Forster, 1993; Kenworthy, 1998). When reference to 
efficiency is made it tends to be confined to the definition of a ratio between a 
measure of the impact of taxes and transfers on income distribution (or specifically on 
poverty alleviation) and a measure of social protection effort put in by the state, which 
technically corresponds to the notion of productivity rather than efficiency (e.g. 
Beckerman, 1979; Beckerman and Clark, 1982; Mitchell, 1991; Mitchell, Harding and 
Gruen, 1994). 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an analytical framework to estimate 
formally the efficiency of social protection systems and to investigate its causes. To 
do so we estimate a stochastic efficiency frontier for public non-pension social 
transfers in 19 OECD countries using panel data from the mid-1990s and the year 
2000. The targeting of transfers towards the bottom deciles of the working age 
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 population is thought to be the key explanatory variable of efficiency and its effect is 
estimated together with efficiency itself in a single-stage procedure. 
In addition to measuring and explaining efficiency, we use our results to test a 
common underlying claim of two different strands of literature130 which suggests that 
there is a trade-off between the size of transfers and their targeting. We find no 
empirical support for such a view. 
After measuring efficiency and tracing it back to the targeting of transfers, we 
investigate the governance arrangements that lead different social protection systems 
to achieve different targeting patterns. Drawing on Kraus’ (2004) organisational 
typology of modern social security systems, we find the combinations Beveridge-con-
social-assistance and Bismarck-without-social-assistance to be associated with, 
respectively, the highest and lowest levels of efficiency. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section two presents a brief overview of the 
contextual conditions that have shaped the evolution of social protection systems, as 
well as the attributes of social protection that call for government intervention. 
Section three discusses the methodological issues that underpin the measurement of 
social protection efficiency. Section four provides the main efficiency results and 
investigates the alleged link between the size of transfers and their targeting. Section 
five examines the effects of different social security governance arrangements on 
efficiency. Section six provides some concluding remarks. 
 
7.2 The Economics of Social Protection 
 
In most advanced economies, social protection systems emerged and 
developed in a context characterised by high economic growth, low unemployment, 
strong national states, and limited international competition faced by domestic firms. 
As conditions evolved though, these systems generated high levels of expenditure, 
which weighed heavily on public budgets. Their roots can be found in decisions made 
especially in the 1960s and 1970s to create and extend public programmes in the 
fields of education, health, old-age and other areas. Once established, these 
programmes created spending obligations that have proved hard to control. As 
economic growth decelerated and unemployment rose, the financial sustainability of 
                                                 
130 Korpi, 1983; Korpi and Palme, 1998; and Mahler and Jesuit, 2004, on the one hand, and Tanzi and 
Schuknecht, 1997a, 2000, on the other. 
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 social protection systems was called into question. Additional pressures to reform also 
came from perceptions that the design features of some of the social programmes had 
perverse effects on individuals’ incentives to work and save, which could compromise 
economic growth. This section begins with a brief survey of the contextual conditions 
that have shaped the evolution of social protection since the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century (section 7.2.1).   
Social protection systems define the collective intervention of society to shield 
citizens from a wide range of vulnerabilities, sustain their well-being and enhance 
their capabilities in managing risks. These systems have proved successful in ensuring 
that the structural adjustment associated with continued economic growth did not 
translate into unacceptable consequences for the well-being of vulnerable groups. 
Their contribution to maintaining a policy environment that facilitates sustainable 
economic growth makes them an asset of society (Ercole and Salvini, 2003), 
generating benefits that accrue to the populations at large and hence must be borne 
collectively. In section 7.2.2, we discuss the attributes of social protection whose 
efficient coordination requires that public central coordination supersede the market. 
 
7.2.1 The Growth of Government and the Development of Social Protection 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century government spending in today’s 
industrial nations accounted for less than one-tenth of national income. In the 1990s 
the government’s share of output was roughly half. A combination of both reactive 
actions to unpredicted events (such as wars and depressions) as well as voluntary 
policies (in tune with the prevailing ideology on the role of the state) has been 
responsible for such increase in the economic weight of government. 
Classical economists favoured a small allocative role for government. As a 
reflection of this limited role, in the 19th Century the state provided law and order and 
(mostly in the second half of the 19th century) became involved in primary education 
and in the provision of basic infrastructure. Governments were expected to balance 
their budget in peace times, and they had hardly any role in income distribution or 
stabilisation (Bastiat, 1944-45; Buchanan, 1985). By modern standards, public 
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 spending was low as a share of gross domestic product (10 percent on average) and 
did not change much between 1870 and World War I131 (Table 7.1). 
Between 1913 and the beginning of World War II, public spending grew 
substantially. As a consequence of World War I, governments increased their ability 
to tax and consequently, to spend (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961). Also, in the late 
19th century, economists like Schmoller and Wagner had started advocating a 
distributive role for the state. As a consequence of World War I and the Great 
Depression, governments of several countries started to develop extensive and largely 
redistributive spending programs (such as those associated with the New Deal in the 
United States). Social security systems with limited coverage and benefit levels were 
introduced in many countries between 1880 and 1930 and, over time, added to 
budgetary obligations of governments. Average public spending rose from about 12 
percent in 1913 to about 18 percent after World War I, and to over 22% before World 
War II. 
The post-war period, and in particular the 1960s and 1970s, witnessed a 
growth in public spending, unseen during peace times. This growth resulted from the 
enthusiasm about what government could do with respect to redistribution, 
stabilisation and even allocation. This was the period when 'wars on poverty' or the 
welfare state were launched. By 1980 average spending in industrial countries had 
increased to over 40 percent of GDP; by 1995 it had reached 46 percent of GDP132. 
Until World War II, most of the growth in government spending had been on 
goods and services. After World War II, and especially after 1960, however, subsidies 
and transfers, especially in cash, were the driving force behind government growth. In 
1870, transfers and subsidies amounted to 1 percent of GDP or 10 percent of total 
spending. By 1937, this share had risen to over 4 percent of GDP, largely due to the 
introduction of basic social insurance and to unemployment benefits, the latter as a 
consequence of the Great Depression. Between 1960 and 1980, subsidies and 
                                                 
131“The prevailing attitude of economists vis-a-vis the role of government at the turn of the century can 
be illustrated by citing an influential French economist who wrote that the level of taxation could be 
called 'moderate' when the ratio of all taxes in national income was 5 to 6%. Taxes became 'heavy' 
when the ratio was 10 to 12%. Beyond that percentage the rate of taxation would be 'exorbitant' and 
would have serious consequences for the growth of the country and the liberty of its citizens and its 
industry.” (Tanzi and Shuknecht, 1997, p. 398).  
132 “When the overall developments between the late nineteenth century and the late twentieth century 
are compared, it is noticed that half of the growth in government expenditure – from 10 percent of GDP 
around 1870 to 28 percent in 1960 – occurred during the two world wars. Expenditure growth to 46 
percent of GDP in the thirty-six after 1960 equalled the expenditure growth in the previous ninety years 
even though the post-1960 period was free of major wars or depressions.” (Tanzi, 2000, p. 20) 
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 transfers increased from less than 10 percent to 21.2 percent of GDP, and in 1980 
subsidies and transfers absorbed 50 percent of total public spending. After 1980, the 
expansionary trend continued but at a much slower pace. Expenditure on transfers and 
subsidies increased from an average of 21.4 percent of GDP in 1980 to 23.2 percent 
of GDP in 1995, slightly more than half of total government expenditure. While 
transfers continued to grow, producer subsidies, however, started coming down in a 
majority of countries. 
 
Table 7.1: The growth of general government expenditure, 1870-1995 in percentage of GDP 
(adapted from Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1997b, p. 397) 

















1937 1960 1980 1990 1995 
General government for all years         
Australia 18.3 16.5 19.3 14.8 21.2 31.6 34.7 37.1 
Austria - - 14.7 20.6 35.7 48.1 48.6 52.8 
Canada - - 16.7 25.0 28.6 38.8 46.0 46.2 
France 12.6 17.0 27.6 29.0 34.6 46.1 49.8 53.7 
Germany 10.0 14.8 25.0 34.1 32.4 47.9 45.1 49.5 
Ireland - - 18.8 25.5 28.0 48.9 41.2 42.0 
Japan 8.8 8.3 14.8 25.4 17.5 32.0 31.7 35.6 
New Zealand - - 24.6 25.3 26.9 38.1 41.3 34.7 
Norway 5.9 9.3 16.0 11.8 29.9 37.5 53.8 49.2 
Sweden 5.7 10.4 10.9 16.5 31.0 60.1 59.1 66.2 
Switzerland 16.5 14.0 17.0 24.1 17.2 32.8 33.5 39.4 
United Kingdom 9.4 12.7 26.2 30.0 32.2 43.0 39.9 43.4 
United States 7.3 7.5 12.1 19.7 27.0 31.8 33.3 33.3 
Average 10.5 12.3 18.7 23.2 27.9 41.3 42.9 44.9 
Central government for 1870-1937, general government thereafter 
Belgium - 13.8 22.1 21.8 30.3 58.6 54.8 54.9 
Italy 11.9 11.1 22.5 24.5 30.1 41.9 53.2 51.9 
Netherlands 9.1 9.0 13.5 19.0 33.7 55.2 54.0 50.9 
Spain - 11.0 8.3 13.2 18.8 32.2 42.0 44.3 
Average 10.5 11.2 16.6 19.6 28.2 47.0 51.0 50.5 
Total average 10.5 11.9 18.2 22.4 27.9 42.6 44.8 46.1 
 
The rapid expansion of public expenditure between 1960 and 1980 is 
remarkable because it occurred when most countries were not engaged in war effort; 
there was no depression, and the demographic developments were generally fiscally 
friendly. It essentially reflected a change in attitude towards the role of the state. The 
1960s and 1970s was the heyday of Keynesianism and the time when governments 
were perceived by many to be efficient in allocating and redistributing resources and 
in stabilising the economy. This was also the period when basic social security 
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 systems acquired some of the characteristics of the welfare state. In many countries 
the social security systems expanded their activities outside the field of insurance for 
old age, and the link between benefits and contributions became more tenuous for 
individual contributors. For the most part, this growth was not induced by technical 
factors, such as declining government productivity or ageing populations, but by 
political decisions that extended services, thus turning limited social safety nets into 
universal social benefits. 
The current policy commitments imply a considerable upward dynamic in 
some of the social expenditure categories, and could become an important threat for 
future budgetary stability. In future years “technical factors” such as ageing of the 
population will exert considerable pressure on public spending if current policies stay 
unchanged. This is one of the main reasons why current policies are being exposed to 
increasing pressures for change and efficiency considerations have become so popular 
in this field. 
 
7.2.2 Social Protection and Public Central Coordination 
 
In a world of perfect knowledge and perfect foresight, with well functioning 
capital and insurance markets, there would be no reason for the state to play an 
extensive role in social protection. Voluntary decisions, insurance contracts, and the 
saving instruments created by markets would suffice. Under such circumstances, 
government intervention would only be required at a residual level, as a means of last 
resort, providing a social safety net to those whose total income over the entire life-
cycle is insufficient to sustain an adequate living standard133. The assurance of a 
minimum living standard for part of the population who would otherwise fall below 
the poverty line, apart from being justifiable on the basis of social conventions, such 
as moral criteria, or social solidarity, is also justifiable in terms of economic 
efficiency, given the externalities usually involved134 (Spicker, 2000).    
In the real world, however, insurance markets for social protection are known 
to be prone to moral hazard and adverse selection problems that lead them to 
                                                 
133 In this case, income is redistributed in a way that is not actuarially linked to the contributions made 
to the system by the recipient.  
134 Social protection can be regarded as a “good” whose consumption generates positive effects that 
spill over to society as a whole. Some of these effects result from the interaction with education, health, 
and employment, which are known to influence not only the ones directly concerned but also to the rest 
of society where they are inserted. 
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 inefficiency. Once insured, it is often difficult (if not impossible) for the insurer to 
monitor the behaviour of the individual who may not follow a proper conduct with 
regard to the particular risk subject to contract. If insured against unemployment, for 
example, a worker may find it advantageous to deliberately remain in that state, 
depending on the prevailing replacement rate. Furthermore, and as in the health 
sector, buyers of insurance generally have a clearer idea of the risk they represent than 
the insurer, so if the insurance premium is based on average risk, only individuals of 
average risk and above will be willing to buy the policy, which will bring financial 
losses to the insurer. On the other hand, if insurers somehow have knowledge on 
individual risk type, the market would be characterised by separating equilibrium, 
with full insurance for the good risks, but only partial or no insurance to the worse 
risks. Government intervention is then required so that a pooling equilibrium is 
reached by making the insurance compulsorily and regulating the ability of firms to 
accept/reject contracts. 
Apart from moral hazard and adverse selection problems, there are other 
serious obstacles to the efficiency of insurance markets for social risks. One such 
obstacle is the uncertainty about the size of future claims and the resulting 
difficulty/impossibility in setting a realistic price for the insurance135. Another 
obstacle is risk correlation. Most of the risks social security systems attempt to tackle 
are correlated in time, which implies that the aggregate risk cannot be solved by 
pooling the individual risks. Public insurance schemes are not able to solve this 
problem either, but the state may have an edge in using its budget and public debt to 
shift resources across time.  
More generally, it is often argued that, individuals, left to their own decisional 
criteria, tend to be sub-optimally provident, in that their saving pattern seems to 
partially ignore their future income needs. By short-sightedness or by deliberate 
strategic behaviour people may not save enough and become a burden to society, even 
if they are, in life cycle terms, above a minimum poverty level. It is thus only logical 
that if people benefit from some form of public insurance they should be coerced to 
pay for it. By so doing, the government is in effect compulsorily raising saving levels 
and smoothing consumption across the life cycle. 
 
                                                 
135 This uncertainty is shaped by macroeconomic instability and by inflation in particular. 
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 Efficiency, therefore, rests at the heart of the role fulfilled by public social 
protection systems (Lucena and Macedo, 1996). Given the failures of free insurance 
markets, public social security systems assist individuals with the process of 
smoothing income across the life cycle (such as in the case of old age pensions) or 
across states of nature (such as in the case of unemployment benefits). In both 
instances, the system can be set in a way that is actuarially fair for every one. 
Therefore, it is justifiable exclusively on account of efficiency considerations, 
irrespectively of any a priori purpose of redistribution. Pure income redistribution 
arises only when the state helps some of its citizens sustain a minimum living 
standard, without there having been a significant contribution on their behalf entitling 
them to such level of assistance, i.e. when individuals are not being given benefits 
strictly on the grounds of an insurance logic, but are in fact receiving them on the 
basis of social charity. Important a category this may be (and indeed it stands on itself 
as one fundamental pillar of the notion of welfare state), the fact is that it does not 
express the majority of operations carried out by social security systems in modern 
societies. It plays a residual role when compared with the benefits (in kind and in 
cash) received by individuals as part of an implicit insurance contract with the state. 
Perhaps more importantly, the “pure” income redistribution involved emerges as a by-
product of the original goal of not allowing people to fall below a given living 
threshold, and not as a goal in itself. 
 
7.3 The Efficiency of Social Protection Systems: Methodological Issues 
     
As proposed by Farrell (1957, p. 254), “when one talks about the efficiency of 
a firm one usually means its success in producing as large as possible an output from 
a given set of inputs”. In general, a decision-making unit (DMU) is said to be 
technically efficient if it generates the maximum possible output from a given set of 
inputs, or seen from a different angle, if it minimises the amount of inputs used to 
generate a given level of output.  
Measuring efficiency usually involves three steps. First, inputs and outputs 
need to be properly defined and measured. Secondly, the set of feasible input-output 
combinations needs to be estimated (i.e. the production/efficiency frontier). Finally, 
comparing actual input-output combinations with feasible input-outputs yields 
efficiency estimates.  
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 The relevant input/output variables for measuring the efficiency of social 
protection systems depend on the precise analytical definition of social protection one 
adopts. A broad conception of social protection usually includes a wide range of 
activities such as health, education, welfare services, and government transfer 
payments. Given the specificities that characterise both health and education services, 
often welfare services and governments transfer payments are studied separately as 
the specific domains of a narrower definition of social protection. In the following 
analysis we concentrate on this second restrictive conception of social protection and 
specifically on the role performed by social cash transfers136.    
Social protection systems define the collective intervention of society to 
protect citizens against vulnerabilities that may negatively affect their living standard, 
and enhance their capabilities in managing risks (Ércole and Salvini, 2003). This 
intervention encompasses two different components - collective insurance services 
and pure vertical redistributive assistance to the destitute (Lucena and Macedo, 1996). 
The insurance component is designed to assist individuals with the process of 
smoothing income across the life cycle (e.g. old age pensions) or across states of 
nature (e.g. unemployment benefits)137. The practical effect of social transfers in both 
instances is to either prevent poverty and/or sustain living standards (a), or to 
mitigate/eliminate poverty (b). 
The purely redistributive component helps citizens sustain a minimum living 
standard, without there having been sufficient contribution on their behalf entitling 
them to such level of assistance, i.e. when individuals are not being given benefits 
strictly on the grounds of an insurance logic, but are in fact receiving them on the 
basis of social solidarity. The practical reflection of social transfers in this case is 
essentially poverty mitigation/elimination (c).    
Since poverty alleviation is the practical effect of transfers of type (c), (b) and 
to a significant extent (a), we will take it as the relevant output of social protection 
systems. In particular, our output variable is defined as the relative reduction of the 
                                                 
136 Social protection provided “in-kind” represents a relatively small part of total social expenditure and 
is ignored in this study. 
137 In both instances, the system can be set in a way that is actuarially fair for every one. Therefore, it is 
justifiable exclusively on account of efficiency considerations, irrespectively of any a priori purpose of 
redistribution. 
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This is the most simple and frequently cited indicator of the state’s 
redistributive impact on poverty (Mitchell, 1991), comparing the poverty rate 
associated with the actual distribution of income (disposable income) with the one 
that would result from the market, before any redistributive activity through the 
state’s tax and transfer systems (market income). 
The IPR is defined as the number of people in households below 50 per cent 
of the median disposable income in percent of the total population, after adjusting for 
household size. Incomes are recorded on an annual basis and all possible types of cash 
income are grouped into four categories (Förster and Pearson, 2002, p. 10): 
i) Gross earnings: the salary income of the household from dependent 
employment (excluding employers’ contributions to social security); 
ii) Gross capital and self-employment incomes: financial gains, real estate 
rents, occupational pensions and all kinds of private transfers as well as 
self-employment incomes; 
iii) Social security transfers: all kinds of cash transfers from public sources; 
iv) Taxes: direct income taxes and employee social security contributions 
paid by households. 
 
The IPR before taxes and transfers is defined in relation to market income (i + 
ii). The IPR after taxes and transfers is defined in relation to household disposable 
income (i + ii + iii - iv).  
Having defined poverty alleviation as the relevant output of our narrow 
conception of social protection, it seems obvious to take the size of social transfers as 
the appropriate input variable for assessing efficiency. We extracted data on public 
social transfers as a percentage of GDP from the OECD Social Expenditure Database 
                                                 
138 The data were kindly provided by Michael Forster and Marco Mira D’Ércole (OECD). A graphical 
representation of the data can be found in Forster and d’Ercole (2005, p.29). 
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 (SOCX)139. Only cash benefits were considered since social protection provided in 
kind has no bearing on our output variable and therefore should be kept out of the 
analysis. The analysis is confined to the working age population and so old age 
pensions were not considered either140. 
The impact of redistributive policies on poverty alleviation depends not only 
on the size of social transfers, but also on the size of taxes and the progressivity of the 
structure of taxes and transfers (Barr, 1992). In particular, the extent to which a given 
amount of social transfers maximises its poverty reduction effect (i.e. the efficiency of 
transfers as we are measuring it) is explained by the share of social transfers 
effectively channelled towards the poor, after allowing for the counteracting effect of 
direct taxation levied upon them. We designate this share as the net targeting of 
transfers towards the poor (i.e. the gross share of transfers received by the poor - 
















                       
In estimating efficiency in section 7.4 we will take the share of social transfers 
received by the poorest 30 per cent of the population as the relevant indicator of the 
degree of targeting of transfers and include it in our model as an explanatory variable 
of efficiency142.  
                                                 
139 This mainly includes income support to the working-age population at risk from illness or loss of 
earnings (disability cash benefits, occupational injury and disease, sickness benefits, family cash 
benefits, unemployment benefits, housing benefits and other contingencies). 
140 In their essence, and if one excludes the relative minority represented by the non-contributory 
regime, old age pensions are direct compensations paid by the state in rendering an insurance service. 
Pensions are to a larger or lesser extent linked to the contributions of the beneficiaries, even in the so-
called defined-benefit regimes. In the provision of this service, the state assists individuals smooth 
income across their life cycle. The prime function here is not to protect against states of nature where 
individuals might not be able to sustain an acceptable standard of life on their own earnings, but merely 
to enhance individuals’ ability to save during their working years and transfer consumption to their 
retirement years. Since the underlying function of old age pensions is essentially distinct from that of 
most other social programs, we concentrate our analysis on transfers targeted at the working age 
population. 
141 The extent to which transfers are offset by taxation can be seen as one particular measure of fiscal 
churning (Palda, 1997). 
142 Data on the distribution of transfers is an adapted version of table A.5. in Forster and D’Ercole 
(2005) and were kindly provided by Michael Forster and Marco D’Ercole. The selection of the 30 
percent threshold is justified on the grounds of it yielding data comparatively more reliable than that 
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 Because countries depart from different market income poverty levels they 
will have different poverty reduction opportunities to explore and will exhibit 
different sensitivities to income redistribution policies. The adoption of similar 
redistributive policies143 in countries with considerably different market income 
poverty rates will naturally result in dissimilar measures of poverty reduction. In order 
to allow for these dissimilarities we control for the initial poverty level by 
incorporating the reciprocal of the market income poverty rate as an input variable 
alongside social transfers.144
Data for all variables were collected for 1995 and 2000 and are presented in 
the statistical annex. Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Poverty reduction 0.559 0.176 0.155 0.828 
Social expenditure 0.067 0.025 0.023 0.128 
Market poverty 0.188 0.035 0.115 0.266 
Gross Targeting 0.473 0.115 0.258 0.785 
Net Targeting 0.222 0.156 -0.210 0.545 
 
With an appropriate set of inputs and outputs at hand, the next step is to 
determine the efficient set of input-output combinations against which individual 
social protection systems can be compared. Given that this frontier is not observable, 
one of two approaches can be followed. The first involves identifying the specific 
properties of each country’s distribution of income (both before and after taxes and 
transfers); defining the set of feasible redistributive policies; and determining, for the 
observed level of social expenditure, the maximum poverty reduction effect 
achievable. Although ideal from a theoretical point of view, in practice this approach 
is extremely complex and demanding in terms of the information required, which 
currently renders it unfeasible for an international comparative study. 
The second approach (the one we adopt here) is to estimate the frontier 
econometrically from a sample of observed inputs and outputs for different countries, 
                                                                                                                                            
for the two bottom deciles of the population, whereas using the bottom four deciles would capture a 
significant part of the middle income groups. 
143 Here in the sense of similar levels of social expenditure (same level of input), roughly equally 
targeted (same level of our explanatory variable of efficiency).  
144 Under efficient conditions, a given level of social expenditure is expected to have a lower poverty 
reduction effect when the poverty rate before taxes and transfers is higher. This is meant to be taken 
into account through the inclusion of the control variable. 
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 in different moments in time. The underlying procedure in this case is to compare a 
country with an ideal comparator constructed from information on other countries 
conducting similar operations. The purpose of efficiency analysis based on frontiers 
of this kind is to estimate a benchmark on the basis of real or observed performance, 
and not the theoretical maximum derived from a country-specific abstract production 
function145. 
As in the education chapter, we draw on the Battese and Coelli (1995) model 
for a stochastic frontier production function which is equivalent to the Kumbhakar, 
Ghosh and McGukin (1991) specification, with the exception that allocative 
efficiency is imposed, the first-order profit maximising conditions removed, and panel 







UVXY itititit β  
Equation 7.3 
 
Yi is the production (or the logarithm of the production) of the i-th firm; 
Xi is a k×1 vector of (transformations of the) input quantities of the i-th firm; 
β is an vector of unknown parameters;  
t denotes the time period; 
Vit are random variables assumed to be iid. N(0,σV2), and independent of Uit;  
Uit which are non-negative random variables which are assumed to account for 
technical inefficiency in production and are assumed to be independently distributed 
as truncations at zero of the N(mit,σU2) distribution, where: 
                                                               
δitit Zm =  
Equation 7.4 
 
                                                 
145 Gouyette and Pestieau (1999) come close to a formal measure of social protection efficiency, but the 
authors frame their tentative effort around the entire welfare system and not the social security field in 
particular. Total social spending is used as the input variable which includes, amongst other things, 
public health expenditure and old age pensions, items that do not fit in the state’s redistributive effort to 
reduce poverty and should therefore be kept apart. The analysis is also critically compromised by the 
use of the post tax-transfer poverty rate and the gini coefficient as alternative output indicators without 
any consideration for pre tax-transfer income distribution. By doing so, the impact of tax-transfer 
policies on poverty alleviation is ignored.       
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 Zit is a p×1 vector of variables which may influence the efficiency of a firm; and 
δ is an 1×p vector of parameters to be estimated. 
 
Following Battese and Corra (1977), the likelihood function is parameterised 
in terms of the variance ratio γ=σU2/(σV2+σU2). Hence γ indicates the relative 
magnitude of technical inefficiency variance to total variance in the model. 
 
In estimating efficiency we have used a translogarithmic version of this 










Yit is the relative reduction of the poverty rate before and after taxes and transfers of 
country i in period t; 
X1it is social expenditure as percentage of GDP of country i in period t; 
X2it is the reciprocal of the market poverty rate (before taxes and transfers) of country 
i in period t; 
β and Vit are as defined earlier; 
t denotes the time period 
Uit are non-negative random variables are assumed to be independently distributed as 
truncations at zero of the N(mit,σU2) distribution, where: 
                                                                 
10 1 δδ itit Zm +=  
Equation 7.6 
 
Z1it is the targeting of transfers towards the bottom three deciles of the population; 
δ0 and δ1 are parameters to be estimated. 
 
                                                 
146 We use a translog specification due to its flexibility in providing a second order approximation to 
the underlying production technology. 
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 The measures of technical efficiency relative to the production frontier (4) are 
defined as: 
 
),0(/),( ** iiiiiii XUYEXUYEEFF ==  
Equation 7.7 
7.4 Efficiency Results 
 
The estimation of the stochastic model Equation 7.5 with the inclusion of net 
targeting as the explanatory variable of the technical inefficiency effects (variable Z1) 
proved to be problematic. The estimated effect of net targeting on efficiency turned 
out to be statistically insignificant. Linked to this result, the estimated efficiency 
frontier was found not to be significantly different from the traditional average 
response function based on ordinary-least-square (OLS) estimation (which suggests 
all deviations from the production frontier are entirely explained by random noise 
with no role for inefficiency). 
Since there were reasons to be believe that the known unreliability of 
international comparative data on the size and distribution of direct taxation (Förster, 
M. and D’Ercole, M., 2005)147 might be interfering with the estimation procedure, we 
tested a second specification with the gross targeting of transfers as the explanatory 
variable of efficiency which provided much better results.  
The targeting of transfers was now found to have a significant positive effect 
on efficiency, which is in line with what the theory requires. Moreover, the stochastic 
frontier and technical inefficiency effects specification estimated was deemed more 
appropriate than the traditional average response function based on OLS estimation. 
All the results presented in this section are based on the estimation of this second 
specification [Equation 7.5 with gross targeting as the Z1 variable in Equation 7.6]148.  
 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in the production function 
frontier and technical inefficiency effects are presented in Table 7.3 and the ensuing 
efficiency ranking in Table 7.4. 
                                                 
147 Discrepancies in the treatment of property taxes across different OECD countries are just one 
example of the comparability limitations of the data on direct taxation provided by the OECD 
questionnaire on income distribution.  
148 The estimation results of the first specification with net targeting as the Z1 variable are presented in 
the statistical annex. 
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Table 7.3: Maximum likelihood estimation results. Absolute t-ratios in parentheses 
Production function  Technical inefficiency effects Variance parameters 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
β0  -4.566 δ0 -0.756 σ2 0.031 
 (-5.391)  (-1.281)  (3.181) 
β1 -3.126 δ1 -0.793 γ 0.154 
 (-4.183)  (-1.588)  (0.526) 
β2 1.046 Log likelihood 14.915   
 (1.019)     
β3 -0.559     
 (-2.857)     
β4 -0.173     
 (-0.332)     
β5 0.335     




Table 7.4: Efficiency ranking 
Country Output Efficiency Country Output Efficiency 
1995 2000 
United Kingdom 0.991 United kingdom 0.992 
Australia 0.988 C.Republic 0.988 
New Zealand 0.987 Australia 0.988 
C.Republic 0.984 Netherlands 0.987 
Netherlands 0.983 New Zealand 0.985 
Ireland 0.982 Finland 0.983 
Germany 0.979 Denmark 0.980 
Sweden 0.977 France 0.978 
France 0.975 Sweden 0.977 
Finland 0.973 Norway 0.976 
United States 0.972 United States 0.973 
Denmark 0.971 Switzerland 0.969 
Norway 0.969 Japan 0.969 
Japan 0.967 Ireland 0.959 
Belgium 0.962 Germany 0.958 
Canada 0.902 Canada 0.951 
Portugal 0.830 Portugal 0.847 
Italy 0.721 Italy 0.798 
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 In order to test the robustness of these results we have performed a series of 
generalized likelihood ratio tests. The likelihood ratio statistic is given 
by )ln(ln2 01 LL −=λ , where ln L0 and ln L1 are the maximum log-likelihood values 
under the null and alternative hypotheses, H0 and H1, respectively. Under the null 
hypothesis this statistic is usually assumed to be asymptotically distributed as a chi-
square random variable with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions 
involved in the test. However, when the null hypothesis involves a restriction of the 
type γ=0 this statistic can be shown to have an asymptotic non-standard mixed qui-
square distribution with a degree of freedom equal to the number of parameters 
restricted to zero under the null hypothesis (Coelli et. al, 1998)149. The results of the 




Table 7.5: Likelihood ratio tests (H01, H02: 5% level; H03: 10% level) 
Null hypothesis Λ Critical Value Decision 
H01: δ1=0 5.649968 3.84 Reject 
H02: β3=0; β4=0; β5=0 17.6347542 7.82 Reject 
H03: λ=0, δ0=0, δ1=0 5.649 5.528 Reject 
  
The first null hypothesis H01: δ1=0, tests the significance of the targeting of 
transfers in our model assessing the possibility of only δ0≠0, which would reduce the 
model to the panel data version of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977). The second 
null hypothesis H02: β3=0; β4=0; β5=0, tests the existence of constant returns to scale 
applying in a Cobb Douglas model. The third null hypothesis H03: λ=0, δ0=0, δ1=0, 
tests the appropriateness of the stochastic frontier and technical inefficiency effects 
specification by assessing the possibility of it being equivalent to the average response 
function, which can be efficiently estimated by ordinary least squares regression. The 
three hypotheses are clearly rejected and so we conclude the specification we use to 
be the most appropriate one. 
 
                                                 
149 We obtained the critical value for this statistic from Kodde and Palm (1986). 
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 Overall, the results stress the centrality of the targeting of transfers in 
explaining the efficiency of social protection systems in reducing poverty. In this 
respect the efficiency ranking presented in table 3 can be segmented into three main 
groups: 
- The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the Czech Republic and the 
Netherlands make up a group of highly efficient countries (both in 1995 and 2000) in 
reducing poverty through social transfers. The output efficiency scores in all these 
five countries are above 98 per cent, which means the poverty reduction effect of 
social transfers is only 2 per cent below the maximum established by our estimated 
frontier, allowing for each country’s individual level of transfers and market income 
poverty rate. At the basis of such high levels of efficiency are systems of relatively 
well targeted social transfers (ignoring the effect of direct taxation, the bottom three 
deciles of the population in these countries receive between 50 and 80 per cent of total 
non-pension transfers). 
- Denmark, Sweden, France, Norway, United States, Switzerland, Japan and 
Belgium allocate between 40 and 50 per cent of social transfers to the lowest income 
groups through the course of the two years under analysis achieving an intermediate 
level of efficiency (output efficiency scores between 96 and 98 per cent, i.e. the 
poverty reduction effect of social transfers falls short of the frontier by 2-4 per cent)  
- Canada, Portugal, and Italy form a third group of relatively inefficient 
countries where only 25 to 40 per cent of gross social transfers are targeted at the poor 
and where output efficiency scores are systematically below the 95 per cent threshold 
(in other words, the poverty reduction effect of social transfers in this group is 95 per 
cent of the maximum effect determined by the frontier).     
 
As noted above, it has been occasionally argued in the literature that a trade-
off exists between the size of transfers and their targeting towards the bottom income 
tiers of the population. This alleged trade-off is the subject of two contrasting 
arguments. 
The first posits that when social transfers become very large they “tend” to be 
poorly targeted due to the activity of pressure groups and the progressive 
universalization of the entitlement to social benefits irrespective of means-testing 
(Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1997a, 2000). The ensuing policy prescriptions of this 
161  
 literature are the confinement of the size of social transfers within moderate levels and 
the concentration of efforts in improving the targeting of transfers. 
Our results do not corroborate this thesis. Both the correlation between the 
size of social transfers and their degree of targeting towards the poor as well as the 
correlation between the size of social transfers and the efficiency scores of Table 7.4 
are non significant150. Hence, according to these results size is not linked to targeting 
or to efficiency - there is no trade-off151. 
The second argument asserts that the size-targeting trade-off stems from the 
political process. In the long run focusing on the improvement of the targeting of 
transfers is said to be likely to reduce the total amount of resources available for 
redistribution and to have an overall negative impact on poverty alleviation152 (Korpi, 
1983; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Mahler and Jesuit, 2004; Nelson, 2004). Baldwin 
(1990, p. 298) provides an interesting account of the alleged phenomenon: 
 
*** 
…In nations where the state became the main insurance broker of the bourgeoisie, in contrast, 
the disadvantaged gained from clinging to the coattails of the favoured. The middle classes arranged 
things first and foremost for themselves, the unfortunate were beneficiaries of a comparatively 
successful trickle-down…In the long run, the unfortunate have gained most from those welfare states 
securely anchored in the interests and affections of the bourgeoisie. 
*** 
 
Hence, the size of highly targeted programs is thought to be limited by the 
lack of political power of their main supporters (the poor), whereas social programs 
with extensive coverage are expected to capture support from a much more powerful 
political base (Korpi, 1983). Following this line of reasoning, granting high levels of 
income security to middle and high-income groups is supposed to increase the 
possibilities of also providing income protection for the poor153. 
                                                 
150 The pearson correlation coefficient between efficiency and social expenditure is 0.186 and not 
statistically significant. The same coefficient for social expenditure and targeting is 0.185 and also non 
statistically significant. 
151 In fact, all the countries we identified as being relatively inefficient in redistributing income (with 
low levels of targeting towards the poor) have relatively small social security budgets when expressed 
as a percentage of GDP. 
152 Korpi and Palme (1998, p.663) have designated this as the “paradox of redistribution” whereby “the 
more we target benefits to the poor…the less likely we are to reduce poverty and inequality”.  
153 An argument that has also become to be known as the middle-class inclusion thesis (Pedersen, 
1999).   
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 Our results do not corroborate this argument either. Firstly, has it has already 
been stated our evidence does not support the notion of a size-targeting trade-off. 
Secondly, we find no evidence of a link between the targeting of transfers and poverty 
alleviation (measured through our output variable)154. Therefore, the idea that better 
targeted transfers have an overall negative impact on poverty alleviation due to the 
preponderance of an indirect negative effect caused by an alleged reduction in 
redistributive funds is not supported by our dataset. 
 
A common thread to both of these arguments is their reliance on anecdotal 
empirical evidence of a purely descriptive nature and merely tentative efforts at 
measuring the concepts involved. 
Our study differs from this literature both in terms of the methods employed in 
the examination of the states’ redistributive policies and the analytical results derived 
from that examination. We have used refined input and output indicators that purged 
non-poverty-alleviation elements from the analysis155; the efficiency of social 
transfers has been assed in accordance with a formal efficiency analysis framework; 
and the study has been conducted for a sample larger than that of any previous work. 
The results thus obtained underline the importance of the targeting of transfers as the 
key variable for explaining the efficiency of social transfers and do not corroborate 
the existence of an empirical size-targeting trade-off. 
 
7.5 Modes of Governance and Social Protection Efficiency 
 
After measuring efficiency and tracing it back to the targeting of transfers, the 
subsequent logical step is to investigate the institutional factors that lead different 
countries to achieve different targeting patterns. In order to do so we need to allow for 
the significant variety of governance arrangements that characterise modern social 
security systems. 
The literature on the welfare state is permeated by organisational typologies. 
The most influential of these is probably Esping Andersen’s (1990) classification of 
                                                 
154 The pearson correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.227 and non statistically 
significant. 
155 The input indicator does not include health expenditure or old-age pensions. The output indicator 
reflects the impact of tax-transfers policies specifically on poverty alleviation and not on the entire 
distribution of income (as in some of the previous works).    
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 welfare regimes, which became a source of inspiration for most of the categorisation 
efforts that followed (e.g. Lewis, 1992; Castles and Mitchell, 1993; Ferrera, 1996, 
1998; and Korpi and Palme, 1998), and is itself inspired by the tradition of Titmuss 
(1958, 1974). However, our use of these typologies to explain the targeting of 
transfers and efficiency is compromised both by the prominent role old age pensions 
play in them as well as by their reliance on political/institutional factors that escape 
the scope of our analysis (such as political orientation and the influence of labour 
unions). 
The classification developed by Kraus (2004) enables us to overcome these 
problems by limiting the analysis to monetary social transfers other than pensions and 
by focusing specifically on the characteristics of social transfers systems that directly 
relate to the social security strategies employed. 
The author identifies three ideal-type social strategies156 in Europe. The social 
assistance strategy aims at poverty mitigation through the provision of a socially 
acceptable minimum support for those with inadequate income for reasons of 
misfortune. The social insurance strategy focuses on poverty prevention through the 
provision of income replacement benefits as part of an underlying compulsory 
insurance contract. This strategy has been adopted under two different approaches. In 
the Bismarck-type social insurance coverage is limited to specific groups (normally 
defined by occupational category), and benefit entitlement is dependent and related to 
past contributions/earnings. In the Beveridge-type social insurance benefit entitlement 
is also dependent on past contributions but benefits are generally flat-rate as the 
system seeks to reach a more comprehensive coverage. Finally, the social allowance 
strategy is based on the idea of universal guaranteed minimum income as a right of 
nation-state citizenship. It foresees the concession of grants whose entitlement and 
level does not depend on neediness, past earnings or contributions157. 
It is argued that real-world social security systems do not conform to any 
single ideal-type social strategy but instead comprise a mixture of different strategies, 
the relative importance of each strategy varying from one system to the other. In order 
to examine the differences between European social transfer systems in terms of the 
adopted social security strategy mixes, the author develops a classification of social 
                                                 
156 Drawing on the work of Esping Andersen (1990), Hill (1996) and Dixon (1999). 
157 The most universal social allowance would consist in the granting of some basic income to every 
citizen regardless of any criteria other than citizenship (Hill, 1996).  In practice it is usually adopted 
some form of demographic criteria such as number of children and age.  
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 transfer systems according to the extent to which the various strategies are employed. 
The three key distinctive features considered are the funding regime, benefit levels 
and benefit entitlement. The following pairs of indicators were taken as proxies of 
these key features (Kraus, 2004, p.437)158: 
- With respect to funding issues the share of transfers in GDP and the ratio of 
funding by the state to funding by contributions; 
- With respect to the level of protection the ratio of minimum income 
guaranteed to median equivalsed income for single adults and an indicator for income 
replacement rates of social transfers; 
- With respect to the conditions for benefit entitlement the share of means 
tested benefits in social expenditures and an indicator for the degree of coverage of 
social transfers. 
 
By applying cluster analysis to this set of indicators the author concludes that 
within the European social transfer systems four general types of regimes can be 
identified (Kraus 2004, p.442, 443): 
- The Southern European Cluster (Greece, Portugal, and Italy) where the 
dominant strategy adopted is Bismarck-type social insurance only marginally 
supplemented by additional measures of social assistance or allowances. Overall 
coverage is fragmented, means tested assistance is of minor importance and social 
allowances are either inexistent or play an insignificant residual role; 
- The Central European Cluster (Germany, Belgium, Austria, and France) 
where the dominant strategy is Bismarck-type social insurance supplemented by 
social assistance measures to provide a guaranteed minimum income for those not 
covered by the main strategy and a small amount of social allowances, particularly in 
the field of family benefits; 
- The Northern European Cluster (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands) where the dominant strategy can be described as Beveridge-type social 
insurance supplemented to a relatively large extent by non-contributory-based social 
allowances. Overall coverage is the highest in Europe, and means tested social 
assistance varies in importance between countries; 
                                                 
158 The underlying dataset and the subsequent analysis is for the mid-1990s. 
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 - The British Cluster (UK and Ireland) where the dominant strategy is 
Beveridge-type social insurance supplemented by social assistance with means tests 
playing a prominent role and a high degree of coverage. 
 
This class assignment of social security regimes seen in the light of the 
efficiency ranking we obtained for the mid-1990s (section 7.4, Table 7.4) yields some 
insightful results. The members of the British cluster159 are unequivocally the best 
performers in terms of efficiency with average output efficiency scores of 98%. In 
sharp contrast, the Southern European Cluster stands out by its clear concentration at 
the bottom of the table (average efficiency 77%). In between these extremes, the 
Northern and Central clusters occupy a space that is difficult to disentangle (the 
average efficiency score is of 97% for both clusters160). Kraus found similar results 




“The Beveridge-con-social-assistance strategy of the British cluster leads to a redistributive 
pattern that clearly reflects the simultaneous impact of both the poor law tradition [means tested social 
assistance] and the Beveridge-goal of universal coverage. Consequently, the system is highly 
favourable to lower income groups, whereas recipients of medium and high incomes are markedly less 
favoured…the Bismarck-con-social-assistance strategy of the Central cluster is primarily directed 
towards the protection of workers and places more emphasis on horizontal redistribution. Accordingly, 
medium income levels benefit to a comparatively large degree, while the low income groups are still 
covered by minimum income guarantees. As the latter are all but absent in the Southern cluster, the 
Bismarck strategy adopted produces only minor vertical redistribution. Finally, with regard to the 
Northern cluster, the Beveridge-con-social-allowance strategy produces a redistributive pattern half-
way between the Central and the British cluster, being more favourable to low income groups than the 
Central cluster, whereas high income groups benefit stronger than in the British group”. 
Kraus (2004, p.451, 454) 
*** 
                                                 
159 Apart from the United Kingdom and Ireland it may be reasonable to consider additionally Australia 
and New Zealand as being part of this cluster given the evident similarities in terms of policy and 
social security indicators between these countries. However, in the absence of further research, the 
inclusion of these countries in the British cluster remains essentially speculative.   
160 We are considering Denmark as making part of the Northern Cluster again for reasons of similarity 
in terms of social security policies in relation to the other members of the group. Again, the same note 
of caution on the validity of such judgement applies as in the extension of the British cluster. 
161 Measured by the skweness and kurtosis of the distribution by the different quintiles of the 
population of the increase of average income due to social transfers. 
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Our results show that when the effect of different social security regimes is 
assessed not on the overall redistributive pattern they create but rather on the 
efficiency of social transfers in alleviating poverty the relative position of the 
Northern and Central clusters becomes ambiguous. This may be explained by the 
simultaneous presence of two competing forces. One the one hand, the Beveridge-
type social transfers of the Northern cluster are expected to produce better results in 
terms of efficiency when compared with the intrinsically less well targeted transfers 
of Bismarckian systems162. On the other hand, the social allowances schemes 
characteristic of the Northern cluster are expected to be detrimental to efficiency 
when compared with the supplementary means tested social assistance of the central 
cluster. The relative weight of these two counteracting forces ultimately determines 
which of the two models is linked to higher levels of efficiency. The short number of 
observations in our sample does not allow us to draw any definite conclusions on that. 
The results also show that the two contrasting policy approaches of the British 
and Southern clusters yield equally contrasting efficiency results. This can be 
explained by differences both at the level of the main social security strategy being 
followed as well as of the supplementary schemes adopted.      
Bismarckian systems place an emphasis on the role of the state as a 
monopolistic insurance provider for given sectors of the population. With a view to 
protecting individuals belonging to certain corporatist groups from inappropriate 
voluntary self-protection163, the state takes full responsibility for providing 
compulsory insurance for most of the relevant social risks, leaving a very small 
margin for individual voluntary action in the insurance market. The result is that a 
substantial share of social transfers is allocated on a categorical basis (without any 
means test), leading to substantial horizontal redistribution164. The targeting of social 
transfers is generally poor, and thus the system is deemed inefficient according to our 
measurement criteria. 
Beveridge-type systems are instead informed by the notion of a basic role for 
the state in social insurance provision. Although it is explicitly acknowledge the need 
                                                 
162 Flat-rate benefits of typical Beveridge-type schemes tend to create a redistributive pattern that is 
relatively favourable to the low income deciles of the population.   
163 Which may result from individual short-sightedness as well as problems of adverse selection and/or 
imperfect information. 
164 For example from active to currently non-active persons; from families without children to families 
with numerous children. 
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 for state intervention in the form of flat-rate insurance benefits covering as large a 
proportion of the population as possible, it is simultaneously recognised that any level 
of protection above the minimum is expected to be acquired in the market through 
voluntary social insurance. This policy approach clearly improves the targeting of 
transfers and consequently the efficiency of social expenditure. 
These two policy strategies epitomise two radically different approaches to the 
governance of social security. The first prescribes a bureaucratic, centrally-driven 
remedy for dealing with a market failure. The second foresees the need for some level 
of central coordination in assuring a minimum level of insurance provision, but leaves 
the rest of the system to be coordinated by decentralised decision making procedures.    
Apart from the insurance component an equally important part of social 
security systems is to do with purely redistributive expenditure intended to assist 
individuals in need that did not make significant contributions in the past entitling 
them to social insurance. Means tested social assistance is the policy instrument that 
overtly attempts to fulfil that role165. Its residual role in the Southern cluster also helps 




Benefit systems redistribute income. But they do not primarily redistribute 
from rich to poor. Rather, they redistribute from young to old, from those who work 
to those who do not, and from childless families to families with children. In most 
countries benefits are not so much based on the income of the individual or family, 
but on the circumstances of the family and the individuals that make up the family 
more generally (Forster and Pearson, 2002). 
In the mid-1990s, on average the bottom 30 per cent of the population 
received 36,16% of total benefit payments. The top 30 per cent of the population got 
an average of 25,89% of all benefits. The middle 40% of the population absorbed the 
remaining 37,95%. In other words, the benefit system did not have a very different 
effect on final income inequality from paying everyone in the population a fixed 
amount of benefit, regardless of income level. 
                                                 
165 In this respect it must be said that universal social allowances are neither intended nor able to fulfil 
that role. 
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 On the basis of such poor targeting are two key factors. The first is the 
progressive transformation of social security systems from mechanisms of collective 
insurance, providing services that are not properly supplied by the market, into 
instruments for the pursuit of obscure political agendas of equality. The 
universalization of benefits (e.g. social allowances) is the practical manifestation of 
such transformation, and it collides quite evidently with the initial theoretical drive of 
social security (and indeed the only one that can be justified on economic grounds): 
poverty alleviation, be it as a direct counterpart to the contributions made by 
individuals when they were not in poverty (insurance component), be it as gesture of 
social solidarity when the recipient has not contributed to the system and would thus 
otherwise be left uninsured (purely redistributive component). In practice, the 
universalization of benefits enables the middle and richest classes to get hold of 
resources that should either be channelled to the poorest deciles of the population or 
that should not have been appropriated by the state in the first place. 
The second factor is fiscal churning. Palda (1997, p. 190) defines a transfer as 
being churned “when the person who receives it would have been just as well off, or 
better off, with a tax cut of the same size as that of the transfer”. Money is taxed out 
of a citizen's pocket, filtered through a government bureaucracy, and sent back into 
that same citizen's pocket. This process needlessly destroys resources: the tax and 
subsidy misdirect the individual's economic efforts and the bureaucracy that 
overlooks transfers and taxes consumes resources without any productive counterpart.
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 Chapter 8: Conclusion
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 The size and role of government has long been the subject of controversy. It is 
plain that market economies cannot function without government. It is equally clear 
there are limits to the extent that it is desirable to expand government activity. The 
optimal balance between market and government remains an open debate. 
There is ample evidence of the potential of government expenditure on a core 
set of activities to improve economic performance by fostering the accumulation of 
human and physical capital, raising the rate of technical progress, and creating 
synergies with private activities166. On the other hand, there is equally ample evidence 
that as government outgrows this set of core activities it can crowd out more 
productive private sector activity and depress economic performance. This effect is 
further amplified by the reliance on distortional taxation to finance growing public 
sector activity, which imposes allocation effects over and above those related to the 
level and composition of public expenditure167. 
Therefore, as government expands its activities there must come a point where 
social welfare would increase if people had been allowed to keep their money to 
spend for themselves instead of paying extra taxes to finance expansionary public 
services. In theory at least, there must be an optimal level (and structure) of taxation 
to finance an optimal level of core public services provided in an efficient way. 
The political science and public management literature is filled with analytical 
typologies on the governance of public services, but fails to establish a link with 
efficiency.  The economics literature, in contrast, provides useful tools for 
understanding the nature of the relationship between governance and efficiency, but it 
still lacks a unified body of theory and it is sill at its infancy when it comes to 
measuring public service efficiency and investigating its causes. 
NIE (arguably the most influential economic theory of organisation) lays 
emphasis on the role of transaction costs arising from contractual hazards associated 
with the propensity of individuals to behave opportunistically and noncontractible 
environmental uncertainties. Costs of this kind are important (even if not the most 
important) to explain the boundaries of organisations (and in particular firms’ 
                                                 
166 The actual level of expenditure depends on the level of efficiency of government activities. 
167 Most taxes distort economic behaviour by influencing people’s preferences between consumption 
(work) and leisure, or by interfering with the incentives to invest or save. Expansionary public sector 
activities financed through distortional taxation imply an increase in taxes rates that is more than 
proportional to the required addition on tax revenue. The excess burden or deadweight lost associated 
with taxation increases with the square of the marginal tax rate (Dupuit, 1844).   
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 decisions to “make or buy” inputs), but the claim they explain the existence of firms 
reduces the role of conscious central coordination to vanishing point. 
Resource-based/evolutionary perspectives of the firm bring the limitations of 
NIE to the fore by drawing our attention to the role of interrelationships between 
activities, and associations of capabilities that support them in explaining the need for 
hierarchical coordination.  
Although NIE and resource-based theories of organisation complement each 
other in a certain way, we found both to be insufficient to grasp the full extent of the 
link between economic organisation and efficiency, not least because of their 
exclusive focus on the organisation of production. 
Following Hayek’s seminal distinction between spontaneous self generating 
order and organized (“made”) order we have argued that economic organisation is 
essentially about bringing order into systems of human interaction. Order can be 
accomplished through a multitude of modes of governance, ranging from conscious 
deliberate design to spontaneous self-reinforcing rules. Running each of these modes 
of governance entails costs of coordination and motivation of individual decisions 
which vary with the attributes of the transactions168 upon which they are deployed. 
Minimising these costs is the main problem of economic organisation. 
No system can coordinate overall economic activity more efficiently than a 
system of markets (Arrow and Debreu, 1954). The informational requirements of the 
price mechanism are minimal when compared with others systems capable of 
producing an equally effective outcome.  
However, decentralised coordination of transactions for which there is a great 
deal of a priori knowledge about the optimal solution (i.e. with design attributes - 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) is inefficient due to the brittleness of the system in 
dealing with imperfect information and excessive demands of communication. Central 
coordination through formal organisations structured along hierarchical lines is, in 
this case, optimal. 
Decentralised coordination is also sub-optimal when transactions exhibit 
public good attributes, externalities, merit good attributes, and/or information 
asymmetries. Public central coordination is, in this case, optimal. 
                                                 
168 Some authors (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) refer to these cost as “transaction costs”, in the 
sense that they represent the costs of coordinating economic transactions. However, these should not be 
mistaken for the typical transaction costs alluded to by TCE, which make up only a small part of the 
former.    
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 From the need to correct the market does not follow immediately, or 
necessarily, the need, or desirability, to fully replace it. We have argued in this work 
that while government should interfere with specific attributes of the organisation of 
services that markets fail to address, it will still be desirable to rely on market forces 
as thoroughly as possible for the remaining attributes of services they coordinate 
efficiently. What is more, government corrective interference should openly 
acknowledge the limits of central coordination and associated intrinsic risks of 
government failure. 
The key policy implication that follows is that the detailed design conditions 
of the organisation of public services need to be rigorously tailored to the specific 
characteristics of each service. Depending on these characteristics, the optimal mode 
of organisation will lie within a continuum of funding and provision arrangements, 
ranging from small scale regulation of private sector activities to universal 
monopolistic provision of services through centralised public bureaucracies. 
In the private economy, profit-maximising producers and utility maximising 
consumers harmonise their individual goals using the price mechanism. In a perfectly 
competitive market, prices adjust to that ensure supply equals demand for each good 
and service, and that the allocation of resources is Pareto efficient - given all the 
restrictions in terms of available resources and technological possibilities, no other 
allocation is unanimously preferred. 
In the “public” economy, using prices in the form of fees/charges as a means 
of paying for the services citizens consume is also associated with a number of 
positive outcomes169. However, often some of the specific attributes of services that 
markets fail to address are precisely to do with the funding side of the service and 
require public intervention. 
Education offers one of the most compelling cases for public funding with 
positive efficiency implications. Capital market imperfections are more likely to 
affect investment in human than in physical capital (as the later can serve as 
collateral), forcing individuals to underinvest in education. Education is also known to 
have important effects on citizen involvement in the community and government, 
                                                 
169 Charging consumers a price equal to the marginal cost of provision is needed to induce both 
consumers and providers to behave in ways that ensure efficiency; political accountability is 
strengthened through strong and clear awareness of the costs and benefits of services made to 
consumers; the burden of distortionary direct taxation and/or regressive indirect taxation is eased by 
funding services through fees/charges.   
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 crime, family decision making, child upbringing, and economic growth. Public 
funding of education is required to allow for these credit-constraints and external 
effects, pushing the rate of human capital accumulation closer to its optimal level. 
In healthcare, higher propensity of those with greater health risks to buy 
insurance and to insure at higher levels than those in good health limits access to 
affordable insurance for high risk individuals, lowers coverage and leads to under-
consumption of healthcare from a social optimum point of view (Docteur and Oxley, 
2003). Public funding is required to make the insurance compulsorily, regulate the 
ability of individuals and organisations to accept/reject contracts, and ensuring that a 
pooling equilibrium is reached. Chapter 6 provided evidence on the inefficiency of 
short-term market interactions between patients and providers, or unregulated private 
insurance systems as mechanisms for funding healthcare.  
Similarly to healthcare, moral hazard and adverse selection make public 
funding of social protection systems necessary to pool social risks effectively. Unlike 
healthcare, though, public funding of insurance for social risks is additionally required 
to deal with problems created by uncertainty about the size of future claims and risk 
correlation in time.  
When market failures are confined to the funding attributes of the service (e.g. 
transport), private provision is enough to ensure efficiency (provided that the other 
necessary conditions for effective competition are in place). When market failures 
extend to the provision side of the service (e.g. education and healthcare), private 
provision alone does not ensure effective competition, or efficiency. 
Market failures at the service provision level generally stem from: (i) 
information asymmetries that cloud the ability of consumers (and government) to 
effectively assess the quantity and quality of service provided; (ii) market power 
following natural monopolistic/oligopolistic market structures at the regional/local 
level. Any of these two failures, or a combination of both, require the public sector to 
play an active role in the provision of the service, either by replacing (e.g. police), 
supplementing (e.g. health care and education), or regulating private provision (e.g. 
transport)170. When the public sector replaces or supplements the private sector, the 
                                                 
170 Other institutional arrangements typically elicited to address these market failures include 
professional norms, licensure, and non-profit organisations.  
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 resulting organisational arrangement is inevitably sub-optimal when compared with 
the perfect competitive market theorised by neoclassical economists171. 
Moderate information asymmetries combined with a 
monopolistic/oligopolistic market structure172, call for partial public sector 
involvement in the provision of the service. Public providers are likely to counteract 
the potential perverse effects of combining information imperfections with private 
providers’ incentives to exploit market power. Private providers, in turn, are likely to 
sharpen the incentives of public providers to behave efficiently. Primary and 
secondary education is a good example of such type of service, and our empirical 
results in chapter 5 appropriately demonstrated that (i) efficiency declined as the share 
of public providers increased; and (ii) efficiency improved with the degree of 
decentralisation of decision making processes within publicly owned and managed 
schools (i.e. with their degree of managerial autonomy). 
When information asymmetries are particularly severe, limiting substantially 
the ability of consumers and/or government to monitor the quantity and quality of 
service outputs, the case for involving the private sector in the provision of the service 
becomes very weak. In such case, the public sector is then left with the task of fully 
replacing the market. Medical care is a good example of this type of service, and our 
empirical results in chapter 6 showed evidence of efficiency being higher in public 
integrated systems (typically consisting of a majority of public providers) as opposed 
to systems of private (for-profit and non-for-profit) provision. 
Finally, our study of the governance and efficiency of social protection 
systems took us through a distinct analytical path. Private social insurance markets are 
prone to failure to such an extent that, even in theory, they cannot be conceived of as 
a viable mode of governance for social protection. Here, the choice is thus not 
between public or private provision of social protection, but merely greater or lesser 
public involvement. Accordingly, what our hypothesis suggested, and our empirical 
results confirmed, was that as public social security systems exceed their remit to 
                                                 
171 Even if we assume the existence of a performance management system that renders effective 
incentives for managers of public organisations to maximise efficiency in a given moment, there are 
likely to be obstacles attached to public ownership that will eventually damage efficiency in the 
medium or long run. A typical example would be managers spotting an opportunity for making an 
investment in a particular source of innovation, but not being able to obtain from the public sector the 
financial support required to make that investment, or not being able to capture adequate rewards for 
having done so. 
172 As a result of economies of scale/scope in the production of the service together with its provision at 
the local/regional level.  
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 assist individuals with the process of smoothing income (across the life cycle and 
across states of nature), and to provide social safety nets (to those whose total income 
over the entire life-cycle is insufficient to sustain an adequate living standard), 
efficiency is damaged. We also found that efficiency is not affected by the level of 
social protection provided within the remit defined by our hypothesis. This contradicts 
other authors’ suggestion of the existence of a trade-off between the size of transfers 
and their targeting towards the bottom income tiers of the population – either due to 
the activity of pressure groups and the progressive universalization of the entitlement 
to social benefits irrespective of means-testing; or because granting high levels of 
income security to middle and high-income groups allegedly increases the political 
support for redistribution in a way that improves the possibilities of providing income 
protection for the poor.   
 
This thesis has made significant progress in understanding the organisational 
drivers of efficiency. Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go in the quest for 
understanding the key levers that affect the efficiency of public services. There are 
several areas where further research is likely to yield results of utmost importance. 
First, much is to be expected from exploring in greater depth the attributes of 
transactions that call for central coordination. In particular, the development of a 
conceptual framework, similar to the one used by TCE, that refines the study of the 
interaction of public good attributes, externalities, and information asymmetries with 
different modes of governance to the level of individual services would certainly shed 
light on elements that are currently overlooked by the macro scale of our analysis.  
In the education sector, there are clear gains to be made from better 
understanding the theoretical and practical implications of the ownership of schools 
(especially between publicly owned, privately managed schools on the one hand, and 
privately owned and managed schools on the other) on efficiency, in the context 
imperfect information on school outputs.   
In the health sector, the current reliance on disability-adjusted life expectancy 
and infant mortality rates as outcome measures of health systems at the international 
level is regrettable not only because of the inability of these variables to capture 
thoroughly the health status of individuals, but also because they fail to account for 
non-medical determinants of health (e.g. physical exercise; dietary habits, etc) whose 
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 effects cannot be ignored (and for which there is currently no cross-country data 
available).  
In the social protection sector, additional effort should go into unveiling the 
relationship between the size of social transfers and the extent to which they are 
targeted towards the lowest income classes. Although we did not find evidence of a 
significant correlation between the two, we did notice that none of the most efficient 
countries were high spenders, and there appeared to be signs of inefficiency when 
high spending countries such as Sweden, Finland, Denmark, or Netherlands were 
compared with countries like the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand or the 
Czech Republic. One could argue that more spending leads to less targeting and 
greater inefficiency as it both enables and encourages rent seeking behaviour of 
interest groups. It may also be argued that inefficiency associated with churned 
transfers is conducive to higher social spending173. The theoretical link between size, 
targeting, and efficiency needs further investigation. 
Second, in the near future it is unlikely that significant efficiency 
improvements will arise from radical shifts in the organisation of public services. The 
potential for improvement lies in fine tuning the role the public sector plays in the 
governance of these services. A substantial part of this process will involve forging 
new hybrid governance arrangements both within public sector and in the way it 
interacts with the private and voluntary sectors. There is already a considerable body 
of theory focusing on the inner workings of these hybrid modes of governance, but 
any sensible map of future lines of research must include incentives to move ahead 
with this line of investigation. 
Third, the measurement of public service efficiency is an exceptionally 
complex methodological task that still faces enormous obstacles. The determination 
of the societal value of public services and aggregation of public service outputs is 
central to the study of the optimal forms organising public services. We need better 
measures of the output of the public sector than the ones currently available at the 
international level to explore fully the learning potential engrained in the rich 
diversity of governance structures deployed by different countries to similar services. 
Equally, there needs to be a better understanding of the relative preferences of society 
                                                 
173 It is doubtful whether the governments of high spending countries would be able to collect the 
amount of taxes they do, if a significant portion of those resources were not channelled back again to 
their original source. 
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 for public services if we are to be able to monitor and influence the effectiveness and 
efficiency of government activity in the future. 
The importance of this point cannot be overstated. If information 
imperfections are extreme, or the quality of available measures of public sector output 
is very poor, in the sense that the later is essentially undetermined, replacing a failing 
market with public provision may improve service effectiveness but does not 
necessarily ensure efficiency174. Conversely, in a scenario of non-competitive market 
structures (monopoly/oligopoly) and perfect information, private provision combined 
with price regulation175 is likely to bring about an efficient outcome176. 
Monitoring and managing the performance of public services appropriately 
implies using information on inputs, outputs and environmental constraints for all 
relevant providers to estimate efficient costs of provision, which can then be drawn 
upon to identify good/poor performance and trigger changes: e.g. inefficient providers 
losing market share; managerial boards of inefficient providers being subject to 
sanctions; expanding existing efficient providers; and allowing new providers to 
operate. The benefits of such a relative performance management exercise will 
arguably be improved if users are able to choose between providers, but they do not 
critically rely on the availability of choice, nor should they be confused with the 
benefits of choice (in the cases where indeed there are some benefits associated with 
choice). 
The potential gains to having the public sector involved in the provision of a 
given service (alone or together with private providers) will only be fully explored if 
public provision is, in itself, subject to competitive pressures that diffuse incentives 
for efficient behaviour. In order for that to happen, information on the relative 
performance of public sector organisations needs to be available and used to elicit 
corrective action. 
                                                 
174 The lack of a profit-motive for public providers may lead them to deliver higher levels of service 
outputs than profit-seeking providers knowledgeable of the difficulties of individuals (or government) 
to monitor their performance. Conversely, it is equally reasonable to assume that the profit-motive will 
lead private providers to be technically more efficient than public providers not subject to any kind of 
proper performance monitoring.   
175 E.g. the yardstick competition model proprosed by Schleifer (1985). 
176 Kenneth Arrow’s (2001, p. 1202) vision of the future role of the public sector in this area is 
particularly insightful: “I do believe we will see a transformation of the economy and of the medical 
care market because of the information revolution. I think it can take many decades to really 
understand how to use our information powers. It may well be that there will still be asymmetry of 
information, in the form of a group that certifies the information, even at the end of the process”. 
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 When the nature of services is such that requires them to be provided by 
regional/local public monopolies (e.g. police services), relative performance 
management is likely to be particularly valuable. By using information on the costs of 
the various providers to infer a benchmark against which to evaluate individual 
organisational performance, government can infuse competitive pressures in a system 
that, otherwise, lacks strong incentives to behave efficiently. 
Local government activity is an area where a variant of this approach could 
also yield important results (Besley and Case, 1995; Bordignon, Cerniglia and 
Revelli, 2002). In the presence of imperfect information regarding the behaviour of 
local officials, the local electorate can look at the performance of other (neighbouring) 
jurisdictions to provide a benchmark against which to assess the performance of their 
own elected officials. 
Measuring activities at a refined level of detail has already proven to be 
possible across a wide range of health care and education services in some countries 
(a good example is the UK). Significant efforts are currently being developed by EU 
members to improve the measurement of non-market output in national accounts 
(Smith and Street, 2006). A persistent concern remains, though, as to how the various 
activities or outputs should be valued. Traditionally, costs have been used as a proxy 
for value, which effectively assumes they reflect closely marginal benefits (something 
that in a non-market setting is very unlikely). Ultimately, the selection of objectives 
and the determination of their weights is the responsibility of politicians who are 
charged with reconciling conflicting claims on public resources. 
  
What public services are to be provided, by whom and in what way, are questions 
that lie at the heart of electoral politics in contemporary democracies, and are likely to 
continue to do so. The questions are much the same in all countries, yet the answers 
adopted differ considerably. One explanation is that history matters. The organisation 
of public services is shaped by dynamic relations with some degree of instability, so 
that small variations can produce large and long-lasting deviations in outcome 
overtime. Structures are costly to change, and as soon as social norms and political 
decisions arise, the governance arrangements tend to exhibit high sensitivity to initial 
conditions (Arrow, 2001). 
The precise nature of the social contract implicit in the funding of public 
services provides a good illustration of such path dependencies. While most countries 
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 have made the financing of education and healthcare the responsibility of the state, 
some (most notably the United States) have left it to the responsibility of families, 
local communities, and employers. This diversity in policy approaches is not 
necessarily explained by discrepancies in tastes, technologies, or political systems. A 
plausible explanation is simply that history matters. Temporary shocks to the 
distribution of wealth as well as to the political system are known to be capable of 
permanently moving society from one equilibrium to another, with long-lasting 
effects on the economy and the social contract.   
In a path dependant policy world, where governance arrangements are often as 
much the product of careful policy design as of circumstantial determination, 
understanding the processes that work to shape the efficiency of public services can 
yield an invaluable contribution to policy making. Over the last decades, major 
changes have been attempted or advocated in various public services across a range of 
jurisdictions. The boundaries between the public and private sector have shifted in a 
number of areas and are likely to continue to do so. New modes of delivery and new 
provider structures have been tested and adapted to the political and institutional 
context in which public services operate. This thesis has drawn on the experience of 
various countries operating similar public services under different organisational 
regimes to shed light on the policy drivers of public service efficiency. The next 
fundamental step is to combine the theory and evidence presented in this work with 
the current knowledge on the optimal levels and structures of taxation and public 
expenditure to achieve a better understanding of the optimal size and role of State in 
modern societies.  
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 Statistical Annex – Data and Sources 
 








Index of economic 
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status (3) 
%Decision-making 




Austria (2003) 496 73329 0.06 0.51 0.92 
C.Republic (2003) 511 23144 0.16 0.92 0.93 
Denmark (2003) 493 67037 0.20 0.81 0.78 
Finland (2003) 544 50645 0.25 0.98 0.93 
Germany (2003) 499 47660 0.16 0.49 0.92 
Greece (2003) 463 28791 -0.15 0.16 0.97 
Hungary (2003) 491 18190 -0.07 0.96 0.89 
Iceland (2003) 498 54144 0.69 0.75 1.00 
Italy (2003) 474 68939 -0.11 0.63 0.96 
Japan (2003) 530 63351 -0.08 0.67 0.73 
Korea (2003) 541 39017 -0.10 0.56 0.42 
Mexico (2003) 393 10480 -1.13 0.22 0.87 
Netherlands (2003) 525 48394 0.10 1.00 0.23 
Norway (2003) 490 60193 0.61 0.68 0.99 
Portugal (2003) 468 42048 -0.63 0.41 0.94 
S.Republic (2003) 488 11893 -0.08 0.65 0.87 
Spain (2003) 482 40424 -0.30 0.28 0.64 
Sweden (2003) 507 56668 0.25 0.83 0.96 
Austria (2000) 510 71387 0.01 0.47 0.89 
C.Republic (2000) 500 21384 -0.04 0.62 0.94 
Denmark (2000) 497 65794 0.20 0.74 0.76 
Finland (2000) 538 45363 0.04 1.00 0.97 
Germany (2000) 485 41978 0.16 0.53 0.96 
Greece (2000) 458 27356 -0.08 0.23 0.96 
Hungary (2000) 485 20277 -0.05 1.00 0.95 
Italy (2000) 471 60824 -0.17 0.36 0.94 
Korea (2000) 537 30844 -0.17 0.32 0.51 
Norway (2000) 499 61677 0.49 0.65 0.99 
Portugal (2000) 458 36521 -0.58 0.24 0.93 
Spain (2000) 485 36699 -0.39 0.41 0.62 
(1) Arithmetic average of PISA Mathematics (space and change; change and relationships), Reading 
and Science scores (OECD, 2004b, Tables 2.1c; 2.1d; 2.2c; 2.2d; 6.2; 6.6; OECD, 2001. Tables 
3.3;2.3a;3.6).  
(2) Cumulative expenditure per student between 6 and 15 years-old in purchasing power parities 
(OECD, 2004b, Table 2.6 (values deflated to 1998); OECD, 2001, Table 3.6).  
(3) Mean Pisa Index of Economic and Social Status (OECD, 2004b, 
Tables 2.6;4.3b).   
(4) Percentage of decisions relating to public sector, lower secondary education, taken at each level of 
government (OECD, 2004a, Table D6.6). 
(5) Percentage of students enrolled in Public Schools (OECD 2004b, Table 5.19; OECD, 



































AUS (mid-1990s) 0.205 0.075 0.130 0.635 0.059 0.621 0.122 0.545 
CAN (mid-1990s) 0.178 0.094 0.084 0.473 0.040 0.382 0.468 0.203 
C.REP (1992) 0.177 0.030 0.146 0.828 0.062 0.422 m m 
DEN (mid-1990s) 0.205 0.045 0.160 0.780 0.110 0.456 0.559 0.201 
FIN (mid-1990s) 0.181 0.054 0.127 0.702 0.128 0.432 0.392 0.263 
FRA (mid-1990s) 0.261 0.068 0.194 0.741 0.079 0.356 0.121 0.313 
GER (mid-1990s) 0.186 0.072 0.113 0.611 0.056 0.388 0.698 0.117 
IRL (mid-1990s) 0.266 0.086 0.180 0.676 0.090 0.471 0.094 0.427 
ITA (mid-1990s) 0.236 0.127 0.109 0.463 0.064 0.168 0.611 0.065 
JPN (mid-1990s) 0.140 0.119 0.022 0.155 0.023 0.293 0.942 0.017 
NLD (mid-1990s) 0.176 0.062 0.114 0.649 0.110 0.458 0.603 0.182 
N.ZLD (mid-1990s) 0.182 0.070 0.112 0.616 0.068 0.547 0.344 0.358 
NOR (mid-1990s) 0.142 0.067 0.075 0.530 0.081 0.451 0.522 0.215 
POR (mid-1990s) 0.166 0.100 0.066 0.400 0.053 0.217 0.351 0.141 
SWE (mid-1990s) 0.186 0.042 0.145 0.776 0.092 0.383 0.560 0.168 
UK (mid-1990s) 0.204 0.080 0.125 0.610 0.078 0.545 0.225 0.422 
USA (mid-1990s) 0.187 0.135 0.052 0.278 0.031 0.414 0.498 0.208 
AUS (2000) 0.205 0.086 0.119 0.580 0.058 0.628 0.141 0.539 
CAN (2000) 0.160 0.103 0.057 0.356 0.030 0.394 0.594 0.160 
C.REP (1996) 0.195 0.038 0.157 0.807 0.057 0.453 0.274 0.329 
DEN (2000) 0.185 0.050 0.135 0.731 0.086 0.506 0.591 0.207 
FIN (2000) 0.153 0.064 0.088 0.578 0.085 0.501 0.459 0.271 
FRA (2000) 0.241 0.060 0.181 0.749 0.075 0.363 0.139 0.313 
GER (2000) 0.205 0.080 0.125 0.610 0.048 0.335 0.638 0.122 
IRL (2000) 0.188 0.119 0.069 0.368 0.053 0.455 0.194 0.367 
ITA (2000) 0.218 0.115 0.103 0.472 0.059 0.169 0.638 0.061 
JPN (2000) 0.165 0.135 0.030 0.181 0.027 0.277 0.954 0.013 
NLD (2000) 0.149 0.059 0.090 0.603 0.078 0.492 0.669 0.163 
N.ZLD (2000) 0.183 0.095 0.088 0.482 0.073 0.554 0.357 0.356 
NOR (2000) 0.145 0.060 0.085 0.587 0.068 0.438 0.620 0.166 
POR (2000) 0.157 0.096 0.061 0.390 0.057 0.212 0.510 0.104 
SWE (2000) 0.162 0.051 0.110 0.682 0.077 0.412 0.656 0.142 
UK (2000) 0.199 0.087 0.112 0.564 0.065 0.563 0.222 0.438 
USA (2000) 0.180 0.137 0.043 0.240 0.026 0.403 0.725 0.111 
BEL (mid-1990s) 0.265 0.075 0.190 0.719 0.109 0.360 0.190 0.291 
SWI (2000) 0.115 0.058 0.057 0.494 0.065 0.335 1.629 -0.210 
Notes: (m) missing data; (1), (2), (3), and (6)  - Forster, M. and d’Ercole, M.M. (2005); (5) OECD Social Expenditure 
Database; (7) transfers and taxes received (paid) by the three bottom deciles of the population as a share of their equivalized 
disposable income - data kindly provided by Marco Mira D'Ércole based on the OECD questionnaire on distribution of 
household incomes.   
 
Table 8: Maximum likelihood estimation results (Z1: net targeting) 
Production function  Technical inefficiency effects Variance parameters 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
β0  -5.078 δ0 -0.341 σ2 0.037 
 (-2.364)  (-0.479)  (0.821) 
β1 -2.310 δ1 1.101 γ 0.835 
 (-2.513)  (0.918)  (3.348) 
β2 -17.283 Log likelihood 24.513   
 (-1.987)     
β3 -0.391     
 (-4.079)     
β4 -19.675     
 (-1.990)     
β5 -2.392     
  (-1.275)         
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Table 9: Likelihood ratio tests (H01, H02: 5% level; H03: 10% level) 
Null hypothesis Λ Critical Value Decision 
H01: δ1=0 3.648 3.84 Not Reject 
H02: β3=0; β4=0; β5=0 18.468 7.82 Reject 
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